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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this action for divorce pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.
§78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding custody of the two

natural children of the parties to plaintiff/appellee Rebekah R. Bohman ("Rebekah").
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Utah
App. 1993).
A.

Whether the trial court's findings of fact were adequate to support its

award of custody of the parties' two natural children to Rebekah.
Standard of Review: Whether the findings of fact demonstrate a rational
factual basis for the ultimate decision by reference to pertinent factors that relate to
the best interests of the child, including specific attributes of the children. Smith v.
Smith 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986).
B.

Whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact

concerning custody.
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's findings of fact concerning the
custody reviewing the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
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favorable to the findings are supported by the evidence. Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d
1209 (Utah 1996).
II.

Whether the trial court's findings of fact concerning its visitation order are

adequate.
Standard of Review: Findings of fact must demonstrate a rational, factual basis for
the trial court's decision. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989).
III.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to impute income to Rebekah for

purposes of calculating alimony and child support.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App.
1993).
IV.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to make adequate findings of fact as to

the appropriate child support amount.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah
App. 1996).
V.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to make adequate findings of fact to

support its award of alimony.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah
App. 1991).
VI.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that certain premarital property of

defendant/appellant Bradford K. Bohman ("Brad") had been consumed during the marriage.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion.

Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah

App. 1991).
VII.

Whether the trial court's findings of fact concerning values of certain personal

property are inadequate.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App.
1990).

2

VIII.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the obligation to BB Ranchers

should be limited to a four-year period based on the statute of limitations.
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court correctly applied the law. Howell 806
P.2d 1209.
IX.

Whether the trial court erred in not taking into account the value of Rebekah's

wedding rings in valuing the marital estate.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah
App. 1988).
X.

Whether the trial court erred in ordering Brad to pay a portion of Rebekah's

attorney's fees.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App.
1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes bear upon the issues in this case:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(7) (Supp. 1997), which provides in pertinent parts:
(a)
The court shall consider at least the following factors in
determining alimony:
(i)
the financial condition and needs of the recipient
spouse;
(ii)
the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce
income;
(iii)
the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv)
the length of the marriage.
(h)
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify
the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996), which provides in pertinent part:
An action may be brought within four years:
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(1)
upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded
upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods,
wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account;
also on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or
materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases
may be commenced at any time within four years after the last charge
is made or the last payment is received;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(c) (Supp. 1997), which provides:
If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at least
at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater
income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the
evidentiary basis for the imputation.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-45-7.12 (1996), which provides:

If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level
specified in the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be
ordered on a case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than
the highest level specified in the table for the number of children due support.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below
This is an action for divorce. The complaint was filed on September 13, 1994. The
trial took place on April 22, 23, 24, and 26, 1996. On June 14, 1996, the court made an oral
ruling. Thereafter, Brad filed a motion to amend or clarify the court's ruling, which was
argued on July 30, 1996. On October 17 and 21, 1996, the court heard and reviewed the
objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce. After
other issues concerning the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of
divorce were resolved, the decree of divorce was entered on August 6, 1997.
Statement of Facts
Background
Brad and Rebekah Bohman were married September 20, 1989. R. at 448. Rebekah
had been married three times before; Brad had one previous marriage. Rebekah had four
children from her previous marriages; Brad did not have children before this marriage.
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The Bohmans had two children together. At the time of trial, Braxton was age 6 and
Bryson was age 4. R. at 452. Brad had also adopted Angela, one of Rebekah's children from
her previous marriages. At the time of trial, Angela was 14. R. at 451.
The Bohmans separated for the first time in the fall of 1994. This action was filed on
September 13, 1994. At the initial hearing on the parties' motions for temporary relief, the
court awarded the parties temporary joint custody of the parties' two natural children,
Braxton and Bryson. At least in part because of Rebekah's aversion to joint custody, the
parties reconciled for several months. R. at 534. They separated again in May of 1995, and
the divorce proceeded. R. at 536.
Brad is a physician specializing in anesthesiology. R. at 648-49. He had worked as
an anesthesiologist and had an established practice before his marriage to Rebekah. R. at
648-49. Prior to the marriage, Rebekah worked at a hospital. During her relationship with
Brad, she quit her employment and attended college for a period of two years. R. at 454.
However, when she was pregnant with the parties' first child, she stopped her education. Id.
During the period when Rebekah attended college, she expressed her intention to
become a nurse anesthesiologist. However, during the parties' separation, she made no effort
to seek employment or further her education. She testified that she no longer wanted to be a
nurse and that she wanted to work in the field of sports medicine, but had undertaken only the
most minimal investigation of the training required to work in that field and had taken no
classes. R. at 454-55.
Facts Pertaining to Custody
Each party sought custody of the two natural children, Braxton and Bryson.

A

custody evaluation was performed by Philip B. Johnson, who recommended joint custody,
with Rebekah to have primary physical custody and with Brad to continue to have extensive
visitation as he had during the separation. The court found that it was "unfortunate" that it
could not order joint custody in this case, because "each party has strengths, which combined
with one another in a joint custody arrangement and the flexibility of Defendant's work
5

schedule, would really inure to the benefit of the children." Finding of Fact No. 7, R. at
1532.

However, because the parties could not agree to joint custody and because the

relationship between the parties had been tempestuous and punctuated by a history of
"uncooperation," the court declined to award joint custody. Finding of Fact No. 7, R. at
1532.
The primary reason for the recommendation by the custody evaluator that Rebekah
have primary physical custody of the children was the fact that she had been the primary
physical caretaker of the children in the past.
However, the evidence presented by Brad indicated that Rebekah had substantially
diminished her role in the younger children's lives during the last several years of the
marriage.

For example, the evidence showed, and the court found, that Rebekah was

drinking to excess. Finding of Fact No. 14, R. at 1534. Rebekah had been out of the home in
activities with her friends who had no children, patronizing clubs, golfing, and playing tennis.
Because of Brad's flexible work schedule, he was able to spend substantial time with the
children and did so during the last several years of the marriage.
The court found that Rebekah needed to become educated and become employed, but
that she could provide personal care for the children. Finding of Fact No. 10, R. at 1532-33.
The court also found that Rebekah is a profligate spender; her extravagant spending
caused the court concern about her stability and ability to manage money. Finding of Fact
No. 15, R. at 1534.
The court also questioned Rebekah's stability in light of the fact that she was leaving
her fourth marriage. Finding of Fact No. 13, R. at 1534.
With respect to Brad, the court found that he was a very mature, stable parent who
will provide constancy and consistency. Finding of Fact No. 18, R. at 1535. The court also
found that Brad was attuned to education and its importance in the children's lives, and that
he would be a positive influence if he is allowed substantial contact with the children, so that
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he could help with the homework, monitor their grades, and provide fundamental motivation.
Finding of Fact No. 17, R. at 1535.
Facts Concerning the Parties
At the time Rebekah met Brad, she was separated from her third husband and had
been living in a friend's home. R. at 557. Rebekah testified that she had been married to a
Mr. Kimber from 1974 to 1981, and that he was the father of her three eldest children. She
then married Mr. Sanders in 1981, and he was Angela's father.
Rebekah then moved in with Mr. Branz in 1982, and she married Mr. Branz in 1985.
She testified that her children lived with her while she lived with Mr. Branz and that Mr.
Branz had problems with alcohol and drugs and was abusive to her. Immediately after
leaving Mr. Branz, Rebekah became involved with Brad.
Rebekah's oldest child from a previous relationship, Janica, age 21, had a child out of
wedlock. At the time of trial, she was working as a certified nurse assistant. She had moved
in and out of the Bohmans' home several times during their marriage. R. at 593-94.
Rebekah's child Ryan was age 17 at the time of trial. He had been arrested for
fighting and had other academic and citizenship problems in high school. R. at 646. Like
Janica, he had moved in and out of the home during the marriage and the parties' separation.
R. at 595-96.
Rebekah's daughter Cami was age 18 at the time of trial. She had lived with her
grandfather and was arrested for shoplifting. R. at 597. She had had difficulty in high school
and a history of truancy.1 She had moved out of her mother's home and back again. R. at
597-99.
Angela, who was adopted by Brad, was doing well in school at the time of trial.
After awarding custody to Rebekah, the court awarded Brad visitation three weekends
per month from Friday to Sunday or from Saturday to Monday, depending on Brad's
1

Rebekah testified that, although her daughter was truant a good part of her junior year, Rebekah did not learn
of the truancy for several months. R. at 628, 646-47.
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schedule, holiday visitation in accordance with the statutory schedule, one midweek visit
each month, and visitation for half the summer.
Financial Issues
Income
Brad testified that he expected to earn about $240,000 in 1996.

Based on his

historical income, the court found that his annual income for purposes of calculating alimony
and child support was $278,000. The court found that Rebekah had no income and imputed
no income to her.

The court observed that the alimony award "won't last very long."

Finding of Fact No. 26, R. at 1540.
Child Support
The court awarded child support of $1,000 per month, per child, for the parties' three
children. No specific findings were made as to the basis for that award.
Alimony
The court found that, based on the standard of living of the parties, Rebekah's
reasonable needs were $7,225 per month and that Brad's reasonable living expenses were
between $8,300 and $8,900 per month. The court found that Brad could meet his needs and
pay alimony, child support, and taxes. Finding of Fact No. 30, R. at 1542. Thus, taking into
account the child support awarded, the court awarded alimony of $4,225 per month for five
years, beginning July 1996.
Premarital Assets
Brad had accumulated substantial assets prior to his marriage to Rebekah. By Brad's
calculation, the premarital assets for which he was entitled to credit had a total value of
$531,478. Exhibit 45a at trial. In addition, Brad had a number of premarital assets that had
not changed form that he sought to have awarded to him. Although the trial court recognized
that Brad was entitled to credit for the amounts held in his IRA accounts at the time of the
marriage and the appreciation on those amounts, the trial court did not recognize any credit
for the amounts Brad held in checking accounts or in his business at the time of the marriage.
8

The trial court also refused to grant credit for a Jeep owned by Brad at the time of the
marriage, a loan repaid by Brad's brother, and a loan owed by Rebekah to Brad.
Valuation Issues
The court recognized that Brad was entitled to a premarital credit for a house on Ross
Drive he had purchased prior to marriage, but did not grant the proper amount of credit.
Likewise, the parties disagreed as to the value of a checking account and a van.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Custody of the

Parties' Two Children to Rebekah.
The trial court did not make adequate findings of fact to support its award of custody
of the parties' two natural children to Rebekah. The trial court failed to take into account
much of the evidence adduced at trial concerning the best interests of the children and simply
awarded custody based on its finding that Rebekah had been the primary caretaker of the
children. In addition, the trial court and the custody evaluator gave excessive weight to the
fact that Rebekah had temporary custody of the children.
The evidence does not support the trial court's findings of fact concerning custody in
certain crucial areas, including the finding that Rebekah was the primary caretaker, that she
had been equal to Brad in promoting visitation, that she had greater flexibility to provide
personal care for the children, that she had the ability to provide adequately for the children
financially, and the moral character, past conduct, and demonstrated moral standards of the
parties. The trial court also failed to take into account Rebekah's lack of contact with her
extended family and the problems suffered by her older children.
II.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Concerning its Visitation Order are

Inadequate.
The trial court's visitation order was not consistent with its findings of fact
concerning the importance of Brad's remaining involved in the children's lives, particularly
in their education.
9

III.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Impute Income to Rebekah for

Purposes of Calculating Child Support and Alimony.
The trial court did not impute any income to Rebekah because it found that she should
care for the children and not work outside the home. However, Utah law requires that
income be imputed for child support purposes, the children are now in school, and Rebekah
was already using surrogate care for the children.
IV.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Make Adequate Findings of Fact as

to the Appropriate Child Support Amount.
The trial court awarded $1,000 per month, per child, as child support, without any
findings of fact on which to base that amount. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12 (1996)
requires that such findings be made.
V.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Make Adequate Findings of Fact to

Support its Award of Alimony.
The findings of fact as to Rebekah's needs were inadequate, since the trial court
simply accepted her claims. The trial court made no findings as to Brad's net income or as to
Rebekah's ability to contribute to her own support. Also, the trial court failed to make
adequate findings of fact on which to base the duration of the alimony award.
VI.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Certain Items of Brad's

Premarital Property had been Consumed during the Marriage.
The trial court failed to apply consistent principles in determining whether Brad was
entitled to premarital credits for certain property. Because many of the assets at issue were
cash, and because the parties had cash at the end of the marriage, the trial court erred in
finding that those accounts had been consumed. Also, the trial court erred in granting a
$5,000 credit to Rebekah for her premarital property.
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VIL

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Concerning the Values of Certain

Items of Personal Property were Inadequate.
The trial court did not indicate by its findings of fact how it determined the values of
certain marital property, including the van, the First Security checking account, and the
proceeds of the sale of Brad's premarital home located on Ross Drive.
VIII. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Obligation to BB Ranchers
Should Be Limited to a Four-Year Period Based on the Statute of Limitations.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996) provides for a four-year statute of limitations
for oral contracts. However, the statute also provides that the action may be commenced
within four years after the last charge is made. In this case, the last charge at issue was made
in 1995. For that reason, the statute of limitation does not apply.
DC

The Trial Court Erred in not Taking into Account the Value of

Rebekah's Wedding Rings.
Because the rings are marital property, their value should have been included in the
marital estate.
X.

The Trial Court Erred in Ordering Brad to Pay a Portion of Rebekah's

Attorney's Fees.
The trial court failed to make adequate findings as to the reasonableness of the
requested fees, the financial need of the receiving spouse, and the ability of the other spouse
to pay.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE TWO NATURAL CHILDREN
OF THE PARTIES TO REBEKAH.

Custody determinations in Utah are governed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (Supp.
1997), which provides in pertinent parts as follows:
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(1)
. . . In determining custody, the court shall consider the best
interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards
of each of the parties. . . .
(2)
In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other
factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best
interests of the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing
contact with the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
In this case, the trial court failed to follow the mandate of § 30-3-10 (1997) in awarding
custody of the parties' two natural children to Rebekah. The court failed to properly weigh
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each party and did not adequately
consider which parent was most likely to act in the best interests of the children.
A.

The Trial Court's Findings Were Not Adequate to Support its Award of
Custody of the Parties' Two Natural Children to Rebekah.

In Smith, 726 P.2d 423, the Utah Supreme Court examined the role of the trial court
in custody determinations. The Court noted that it would not overturn a trial court's custody
determination unless the evidence clearly showed that the custody determination was not in
the child's best interests. Id. At 425.
The Court also noted that no one set list of factors can govern custody determinations
in all cases, but that the factors relied on by the trial judge in awarding custody must be
articulable and articulated in the judge's written findings and conclusions. Id. At 426. In
addition, the Court said:
[I]t is essential that the court set forth in its findings of fact not only that it
finds one parent to be the better person to care for the child, but also the basic
facts which show why that ultimate conclusion is justified. There must be "a
logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions."
Id. At 426. Citations omitted.
In the Bohmans' case, the trial court's findings do not set forth a logical and legal
basis for the ultimate conclusion that custody should be awarded to Rebekah. Many of the
findings are critical of Rebekah; for example, the court expressed concerns about her stability
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in light of four marriages, her excessive drinking, her extravagant spending, and her failure to
take steps to become educated or employed.
The court's findings with respect to Brad were more favorable; the court found that he
is mature and stable and can provide constancy and consistency. Further, the court said that
Brad is attuned to education and its importance in the children's lives and would be a positive
influence and motivator for their education. The court noted that Brad's work schedule has
large blocks of time that he can spend with the children.
Some of the findings that support the custody award are internally inconsistent. For
example, the court said in finding of fact no. 10 that Rebekah has greater flexibility to
provide personal care for the children because she is unemployed, but that she needs to
become employed or pursue an education.2 In that same vein, the court noted that alimony
would terminate in five years so that it was necessary for Rebekah to plan for her future by
obtaining employment or education, but that she could provide personal care for the children.
With respect to the parties' respective abilities to provide for the children financially,
the court found that it should not give that issue any weight (finding of fact no. 21), despite
the fact that Rebekah was a profligate spender without any employment prospects beyond a
wage of $5.00 per hour, whose alimony will terminate in five years or earlier, if she remarries
or cohabits. The court ignored Brad's higher income, his career stability, and his proven
ability to manage money.
The trial court noted that this case was a close one and that "this case boiled down to
a choice between a very good parent and one who was just slightly better." Finding of Fact
No. 22. The findings that seemed to tip the balance in Rebekah's favor were as follows:

2

The trial court was apparently confused about the children's ages and the time at which they would begin
school. In finding of fact no. 4, the court noted that Braxton was age 6 and Bryson was age 5, but said that the
youngest child would be in school in two or three years. At the time of trial, Braxton was already in
kindergarten and Bryson was scheduled to begin kindergarten in the fall of that year, 1996, not two or three
years in the future.
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(1)

that Rebekah was the primary caregiver, although defendant had

contributed meaningfully, especially during the last few years (finding of fact no. 8);
(2)

that Rebekah could provide more personal care (finding of fact no. 10);

(3)

that Rebekah had temporary custody of the children and they were

doing well, although the court also found that Brad had contributed very meaningfully
to their state of emotional health and happiness (findings of fact nos. 11 and 12);
(4)

that Rebekah is a very loving, caring parent who has the best interests

of her children at heart (finding of fact no. 16);
(5)

that the children should live with Angela, their older half-sister

(finding of fact no. 20);
(6)

that Rebekah was the primary psychological parent, although the

children were closely bonded to both parents (findings of fact no. 20).
Many of the foregoing findings are linked to the fact that Rebekah had temporary
custody of the children. Likewise, the report of the custody evaluator, Philip B. Johnson, was
based in large part on the temporary custody arrangement.
In Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, the Supreme Court defined the consideration to be given to
temporary custody arrangements. The Court noted that temporary arrangements are not to be
given the same weight as a permanent custody order; modifiable only on a showing of a
substantial change in circumstances. As the court said: "A temporary custody order is only
that, temporary. It is effective only until a fully informed custody determination can be made
at a final hearing." Id. at 1215.
In Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, the court emphasized the necessity for adequate findings of
fact in custody cases. The court said: "The trial court is required to make adequate findings
regarding the best interests of the child and past conduct and demonstrated moral character of
each of the parents. It is also required to consider which parent is most likely to act in the
child's best interest and to make findings regarding that consideration." Id. At 259 (citations
omitted).
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In this case, the trial court failed to make findings on the past conduct and
demonstrated moral character of each of the parents. Instead, it simply found that it was in
the children's best interests that custody be awarded to their mother. The court failed to take
into account the past conduct of Rebekah and also failed to find which parent would be most
likely to act in the children's best interests and to make findings regarding that consideration.
The court's findings actually support the conclusion that Brad would be more likely to act in
the children's best interests, especially given the court's findings concerning his financial
stability and the likelihood that he would encourage the children's education. In this case, as
in Barnes: "The record is replete with highly disputed evidence relevant to the custody issue
which is not dealt with at all in the findings." Id. At 261.
Thus, the court's findings of fact concerning custody are inadequate under the
standards set forth in the cases cited, and reversal and remand should be ordered.
B.

The Evidence Does Not Support Certain of the Trial Court's Findings
Concerning Custody.

The evidence does not support the following findings of the trial court:
(1)

that Rebekah was the primary caregiver of the children; (finding of

fact no. 8);
(2)

that the parties would be equal in promoting visitation (finding of fact

(3) ,

that Rebekah had greater flexibility to provide personal care for the

no. 9);

children because she has no employment (finding of fact no. 10);
(4)

that Rebekah will be able to provide adequately for the children

financially (finding of fact no. 21);
(5)

that the parties are equal in moral character (finding of fact no. 20).

Utah appellate courts have held that an appellant who attacks the evidence supporting
a trial court's findings of fact must marshal the evidence supporting the findings and then
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demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support those findings. Hagan v. Hagan, 810
P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991).
In addition to the findings set forth above, it is appellant's position that the trial court
failed to make adequate findings concerning the past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties and which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of
the children. Those findings are required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (Supp. 1997).
(1)

Evidence Relating to Finding that Rebekah was the Primary
Caregiver of the Children.

Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Finding: Rebekah testified that she was the
primary caregiver of the children.

The custody evaluator accepted that representation,

apparently because Rebekah had not worked outside the home.
Evidence Contradicting Finding: Brad reported that he had provided more of the care
for the children in recent years, because of the flexibility of his schedule and the fact that
Rebekah was out of the home doing other things. R. at 705. There was strong evidence
corroborating Brad's testimony that Rebekah had been out of the home a great deal in recent
years. For example, Brad introduced into evidence cellular telephone bills for representative
periods of time—Exhibits 56, 57, and 58. Those telephone bills indicated that Rebekah was
using her cellular telephone, out of the home, a great deal during the representative time
periods of May 1995 (Exhibit 56), October of 1994 (Exhibit 57), and April of 1995 (Exhibit
58). If Rebekah were truly a stay home mom, it is difficult to imagine why she would be
required to make dozens of cellular telephone calls each month.
Rebekah's friends testified that she liked to socialize and play golf and that several of
her friends were unmarried women without children. Brad likewise testified as to time
Rebekah spent with her friend Debbie Larsen.

The evidence also clearly showed that

Rebekah traveled with boyfriends, sometimes with the children and sometimes without;
played tennis and golf; was out of the home for hair appointments, nail appointments, plastic
surgery, and many other commitments which interfered with her care taking of the children.
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The custody evaluator put great weight on the fact that the children were in Rebekah's
physical custody during the separation. However, the custody evaluator seemed to ignore the
fact that Brad had the children every weekend and as much of the rest of the time as Rebekah
would allow.
The recommendation of the custody evaluator to grant physical custody of the
children to Rebekah was based on his assumption that she was the primary caretaker of the
children. Because the evidence was conflicting on this issue, particularly as to the last few
years of the parties' marriage, this finding on the part of the custody evaluator, and likewise
on the part of the court, seems to have been based primarily on the fact that Rebekah was not
employed and Brad functioned as the breadwinner for the family. This assumption results in
a bias that makes it nearly impossible for a breadwinner parent to obtain custody of children,
when the other parent has not worked outside the home.
Because of this assumption, the custody evaluator and the court ignored the negative
evidence concerning Rebekah's capabilities as a parent, her excessive drinking, her inability
to manage money, the poor school and behavior records of her four older children, her
friendship with an emotionally disturbed person, Debbie Larsen, her lack of supervision of
the children as testified by her own mother, and her multiple successive relationships. Thus,
although the court found that Brad was more stable and mature, and more likely to promote
the children's education, custody of the children was awarded to Rebekah because of her
supposed ability to provide personal care for them and her past history of providing care for
them.

Thus, although the evidence indicated that Brad was in the position to provide

personal care for the children, because of his flexible schedule, and to provide a more stable
environment, especially in the long term, it was almost impossible for Brad to overcome the
presumption in favor of the nonworking parent.
Likewise, the custody evaluator put great weight on the fact that the children were
with Rebekah during the separation. The custody evaluator seemed to ignore the problems
that Rebekah had had in prior relationships and with her four older children. He did not even
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interview those children. He also ignored the fact that the four older children had returned to
live with their father at one point. It appeared that the custody evaluator was biased because
of the fact that Brad had questioned his evaluation. R. at 701-2.
(2)

Findings that the Parties Would Be Equal in Promoting Visitation.

Evidence Supporting Finding: Rebekah testified that she understood the importance
of Brad's relationship with her children and had cooperated with Brad in visitation.
Evidence Contradicting Finding: It was undisputed that visitation had been difficult
during the parties' separation. It was further undisputed that Rebekah refused to engage in
mediation concerning visitation and custody issues. R. at 870-71.
From the time of the first hearing on the motion for temporary relief, Rebekah sought
to limit Brad's visitation with the children as much as possible. She refused to consider joint
custody, even though the custody evaluator recommended it, and even reconciled with Brad
briefly to avoid joint custody. During the separation, she refused to communicate with Brad
when she took the children out of town, refused to provide information about the children's
whereabouts so that Brad could call them, and took no part in transporting the children back
and forth for visitation.

R. at 779-82. Although Rebekah had no employment and no

commitment to any particular schedule, she resisted allowing flexibility in the visitation
schedule to accommodate Brad's work schedule.
Rebekah constantly accused Brad of being "controlling" because he sought as much
visitation with his children as possible, when, in fact, it was Rebekah who sought to control
and limit the amount of time the children spent with Brad.
(3)

Evidence Relating to Finding that Rebekah had Greater
Flexibility to Provide Personal Care for the Children because she
had no Employment.

Evidence Supporting the Finding:

Obviously, Rebekah should have had greater

ability to provide personal care for the children, because she was not employed outside the
home.
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Evidence Contradicting

Finding:

The e\ idence at ti ial in this matter si 1 :»v < eel tl lat

Rebekah needed to become educated or obtain employment, so that she could support herself
in the future.

Ihe facts that she had moved quickly from one relationship with a man to

another and that she had had only low level employment, clearly indicated the necessity for
her to obtain training to be able to support herself. Her alimony award in this case is for a
period of onl> fi ( - e years. E\ en hei adi ill: children depend on hei foi suppoi t

I hus, she

should not long remain unemployed.
Brad, on the other hand, is employed as an anesthesiologist.

His schedule is

children get home from school on most days, and he could provide backup care for the times
when he was on call as an anesthesiologist. R. at 788.
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employment. The evidence indicated that in 1993, Rebekah started going out more in the
evenings and during the days. R. at 762-63. In particular, Rebekah would socialize with her
friend Debbie Larsen and they would drin k to excess, R at ) 63. Rebekah testified that si le
spent $150 per month on gasoline. That would amount to approximately 2,500 miles per
month . .: -

ipossible for her to drive that fai as a stay home mother.

Exhibits :-o. 57, and 58 also indicate that Rebekah was not in the home,

These

exhibits were her cellular telephone bills indicating use of telephone out of the home during
tl

•

. .

•

D.

It is clear that Rebekah must work outside the home or obtain education so that she
can work outside the home to support herself in the future. Neither the custody evaluator nor
the court seemed t :> ha1' - z :oi isidered the fact that R ebel ;:al i • ill be v • ithc I it alin IOI P • in a fiveyear period.

No credible evidence was presented showing that Rebekah had given any

thought to the children's financial stability in the future oi to what will happen when her
a

,f
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custody seemed to assume maintenance of the status quo with a lack of concern for the
future.
(4)

Evidence Concerning Rebekah's Ability to Provide Adequately for
the Children Financially.

Evidence Supporting Finding:

The only evidence supporting the finding that

Rebekah will be able to provide adequately for the children financially is the court's order
awarding her alimony of $4,225 and child support of $3,000 per month. However, alimony
will terminate from five years from the summer of 1996. Angela, Brad's adopted child, will
turn eighteen in four years. There was no evidence whatsoever that Rebekah would be able
to provide for the children after her alimony award expired and she was no longer receiving
child support for Angela.
In addition, there was overwhelming evidence that Rebekah could not manage
money. The court found that " Plaintiff is a profligate spender and that that was part of the
problem in the parties' marriage. Plaintiffs extravagant spending caused the Court some real
concerns about Plaintiffs stability and her ability to manage to stay on a budget where things
are going to be somewhat limited following this marriage." Finding of Fact No. 15, R. at
1534.
There was overwhelming evidence to support this finding.

Throughout the last

several years of the parties' marriage, and during the separation, Rebekah insisted on
spending more money than the parties could afford and more money than she was awarded as
temporary alimony and child support. When she learned that the parties were separating the
second time in the spring of 1995, she purchased a grand piano for $18,000, signing Brad's
name to the contract. R. at 567. Throughout the separation, she was consistently late in
making mortgage payments. She testified that she had difficulty making ends meet. She
incurred substantial debt during the separation, despite the fact that Brad paid alimony and
child support on a temporary basis as ordered by the court. There is every reason to think
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court's finding that Rebekah will be able to provide adequately for the children financially.
(5)

Evidence that the Parties Are Equal in Moral Character and
Evidence Concerning the Past Conduct and Demonstrated Moral
Standards of Each of the Parties.

hwileme Supportwy hlmlmy
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finding.
Evidence Contradicting Finding:

The evidence presented at trial indicated that

Rebekah.. was age 38 at the time of ti ial an :1 lea \ ing hei foi irth mai riage. She had had foi u
children prior to her marriage to Brad. Her older children had been sent, to li\ e with theii
father during the time that she was dating Brad. During the parties' separation, she had two
fairly serious boyfriends, i,-.. :Iintze and David Garside, and had other boyfriends as well
Testimony of Shirley

Morgan, R. at 936

Brad had been married once before this

max riage and. had one I. :)iig tei m i elationship during the pai tie s"!l separation.
Rebekah had traveled extensively with her boyfriends during the separation—to Mr.
Hintze's home at Bear Lake on numerous weekends, to Mexico, New York, Jackson Hole,
A

.he had taken the el lildrei I : I it

of school to travel to Mexico with David Garside.
Extensive evidence was presented concerning Rebekah's drinking habits. Her own

her supervision of the children. Brad's mother, Mildred Bohman, testified that Rebekah
drank to excess in her presence.
In respoi lse to a qi lestion naire she filled en it c!.i n ing tl le custody ' e eali iatioi :i Rebekal I
indicated that the most positive thing that ever happened to her was her friend, Debbie
Larsen. Debbie Larsen was a fiiend without children, with whom Rebekah would drink at
private clubs and play golf

Rebekah had told her husband, that Debbie Larsen had made

lesbian advances to her. Debbie Larsen was an alcoholic who eventually killed herself.
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Debbie Larsen also considered adopting Rebekah's daughter Janica's out of wedlock child.
R. at 610-12.
Noleen Bennett, a therapist who saw both parties, suggested that Rebekah may have a
narcissistic personality and borderline personality disorder. R. at 379-80.
Brad testified that Rebekah's appearance was very important to her, that she spent a
great deal of money on clothing, had had a number of plastic surgeries, including several
breast augmentations, liposuctions, chemical peels, cosmetic alterations to her legs and teeth,
that she spent a good deal of time on her nails, her tanning, and her hair, and that her values
put greater emphasis on appearance and image than on character.

By Rebekah's own

testimony, the values most important to her to instill in her children were being polite and
clean. R. at 532. Rebekah had forged Brad's name on a contract, had lied about taking real
estate classes, and had "stockpiled" goods that she could charge to Brad's account at the time
of separation.
(6)

Other Factors not Taken into Account in the Court's Findings of
Fact.

Rebekah has very little contact with extended family. She has almost no contact with
her own father, and he does not function as a grandfather to her children. She is estranged
from her sister.

Brad, on the other hand, has a large, extended family, which he sees

frequently. He has four brothers and the children have a number of cousins on his side of the
family. Brad's family owns a ranch in Morgan, and family gatherings regularly take place at
the ranch. R. at 649.
The trial court also failed to take into account the many problems of Rebekah's older
children-they had not done well in school, they had had legal problems, they had moved in
and out of their mother's home and required her to provide support. By contrast, it was clear
that Brad could provide the direction and motivation to assist the younger children to succeed
academically and could provide a more stable environment.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT CONCERNING
ITS VISITATION ORDER ARE INADEQUATE.

The parties originally separated in the fall of 1994. In November of 1994, a hearing
on Rebekah's motion for temporary relief took place

The commissioner ordered the parties

to share equally custody of the two younger children, Braxton and Bryson, neither of whom
was

Rebekah immediately objected to that recommendation. Rebekah also

requested an evidentiary hearing on the custody issue.
The parties then reconciled for a period of time.

Alter they separated again, the

o

•» d

subsequent hearings, a temporary order was finally entered which provided that the parties
would have joint legal custody of Braxton and Bryson, with defendant to have reasonable and

awarded one week per month for the summer months and holiday visitation. Each party was
ordered to provide the other with the opportunity to provide care for the children in instances
where the parent would otherwise use surrogate care.

Rebekah was also ordered to

encourage and facilitate Brad's visitation with the older child, Angela.
The ci istod> e \ ah lation condi icted b> I 'hilip B
temporary visitation schedule continue.

Jol inson re ;:: Dmmended that tl ite

I lie custody evaluation further recommended that

there should be flexibility to allow for continuity of visitation with Brad and his on-call
schedule as an anestl lesiologist
In its findings of fact, the court made the following finding of fact that related to the
visitation schedule:
12
The Court finds that the children are happy, well adjusted and
doing very well. However, the Court also recognizes that the Defendant has
contributed very meaningfully to their state of emotional health and happiness.
R. at 1533.
The court found that Brad was very attuned to education and its importance in the
c!

• •

s:
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The court finds that Defendant will be a positive influence on the children
if he is given an opportunity to have substantial contact so that he can help
the children with their homework, monitor their grades and provide good
fundamental motivation. Defendant's work schedule has large periods of
time when he can spend time with the children and flexibility needs to be
realized in his visitation schedule.
Finding of Fact No. 17, R. at 1535.
The court then awarded defendant visitation three weekends each month, from Friday
to Sunday or Saturday to Monday, holiday visitation pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-335, and one visit each month from the time the children get home from school to 8:00 p.m. in
the evening, to take place in the week prior to or the week following the weekend when Brad
would not have weekend visitation. The court further provided for make up visitation when
necessary and an equal division of the children's summer vacation—each party taking the
children for two weeks at a time. Finding of Fact No. 23, R. at 1536-39.
Although the visitation awarded to Brad exceeded the standard visitation provided for
in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35 (Supp. 1997), the schedule does not take into account either
the recommendation of the custody evaluator that Brad continue to have the same amount of
visitation, or the court's finding that Brad should be involved in the children's educational
life. Because Brad only has one weeknight visitation per month, he does not truly have an
opportunity to monitor the children's homework or their education. Because the weekend
visitation is three days, from Friday at 4:00 p.m. on school days to Sunday evening, or from
Saturday at 9:00 a.m. to Monday at 7:30 p.m., Brad does have an opportunity to work with
the children on weekends concerning their educational requirements, but simply does not
have the opportunity for the consistent contact that would be necessary for him to truly assist
with the children's education.
Nor does the visitation order take full advantage of Brad's flexible work schedule.
Because of that flexible work schedule, Brad is available to spend time with the children
during the week, but the visitation schedule does not allow that to take place.
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The trial court's factual findings do i lot draw the necessary relationship between the
visitation schedule ordered and facts of the case. For that reason, they are inadequate.
Ill

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPUTE
INCOME TO REBEKAH FOR PURPOSES OF CALCULATING
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.

that she had made only $5.00 per hour prior to the parties' marriage and that she should
remain at home to care for the parties' children. The trial court said:
Because of the tender years of the children and because of the interest that each party
has in seeing that they are nurtured properly and considering the expenses of work,
additional clothing and day care, it may not be highly profitable for the plaintiff to
work, although the Court finds that plaintiff should obtain employment or go to
school.
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The court also said "it ma> not be in the best interests of plaintiff to return
immediately to work

Based upon the current financial circumstances the Court imputes no

income to plaintiff at this time . .

I lie Court observes that the alimony award that the Court

will award in this case won't last very long." Finding of Fact No. 26, R. at 1540.
"-: ^
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>p. 199/j
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calculating child support iik a»un Miouid impute income ft- a pare*.; a lw>t at the federal
minimum wage level for a forty-hour workweek. The court is not required to impute income
* •the custodial parent can earn

*

:

>me

However, in this case, Rebekah was already using surrogate

care for the children. In fact, her monthly budget included an item for child care. I he court
made no findii ig that the costs of child care • oi ild exceed the ai noi int. R ebek:ll * :

, J ;I

i

*•

Rebekah had two years of college paid for by Brad since her last ..r j: ^ - .»«. per
hour. She had ample opportunity during the separation to return to work or employment, but
simpi

.

.

!

iere was no basis for the trial court's refusal to impute income

to her at least at the minimum wage level.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE
ADEQUATE FINDINGS AS TO THE APPROPRIATE CHILD
SUPPORT AMOUNT.

In this case, the trial court made the following findings of fact concerning child
support:
27.
With respect to child support based upon the defendant's
income, the Court finds it is fair and reasonable that the defendant pay to
plaintiff child support in the amount of $1,000 per month for each of the three
children for a total of $3,000 per month. That sum is to be payable one-half
on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day of each month unless the parties
mutually agree otherwise. Child support under the Decree of Divorce should
commence with the month of July, 1996.
As additional support defendant should be ordered to provide health
insurance so long as the same is available to him through his employment.
Each party should be responsible for one-half of the uninsured medical and
dental expenses except routine office visits which should remain the
responsibility of the plaintiff. Plaintiff should not incur any non-emergency
extraordinary medical expenses which would include medical, dental,
orthodontia and counseling expenses without giving the defendant notice and
an opportunity to be heard first.
R. at 1540-41.
Child support in Utah is governed by the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-1 et seq. (1953, as amended). That Act contains guidelines for the
calculation of child support. However, when the parties' combined income exceeds the
highest level specified in the child support guidelines, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12 (1996)
requires that "an appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case
basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest level specified in the table for
the number of children due support."
In this case, Brad's annual income was found by the court to be $278,000, or $23,167
per month. Obviously, that income is higher than $10,100 per month, the highest income
dealt with in the table. For three children, the highest amount of child support set forth in the
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table is $1,808. Thus, the trial court was required to award at least $1,808 per month as child
support for the three children, but was not required to award more than that amount.
In tl lis cas z the trial c< il11 ,r l » l: « ^ "'" >< •1| '" »< lings ;ai ^ ' •" m >vi< U •< 1 1 io explanatioi l foi its award
of $1,000 per month, per chih

tiaii. ^12 P.2d a; \r,: - this court held that, when the

parties' income exceeds the highest monthly combined adjusted gross income listed on the
statutoi > table, "a ti ial ji i igc: iiii ist consider and make specific findings on all 'appropriate
and just' factors."
In this case, the trial court failed to make any findings whatsoever to justify its child
support of $1,000 per month, per child. Accordingly, thai child support award must be
reversed.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE
ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD
OF ALIMONY.

This court has repeatedly set forth the standards for a trial court's award of alimony:
in determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount,
the trial court must consider (1) the financial conditions and needs of the
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to provide for him or
herself; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted).
When the trial court has failed to make findings on the three factors
listed above, [this court will] reverse, unless pertinent facts in the record are
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment
iony award are conclusory
and do not meet the standards set by this court.
A

Fhe Trial Cciii n I: Dl ::l I" J : I: I \ lake • I dequate Findings to Support the Needs
of Rebekah.

With respect to the needs of the recipient spouse, the trial court made the following
findings:
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29.
With respect to alimony the Court finds that the plaintiffs
present standard of living based upon her reasonable needs and consistent with
what appeared to be the standard of living of the parties in the past, was the
monthly need of $7,225 . . . .
31.
Based upon plaintiffs demonstrated need, which the Court
finds to be reflected in the plaintiffs Submission of Detailed Expenses as set
forth in her Exhibit P-10 which appear to be reasonable . . . .
R. at 1541-42.
Exhibit 10, which the court relied upon in determining Rebekah's needs, included a
monthly house payment of $2,460. However, the court did not award the house to Rebekah.
Likewise, many of the expense items listed were related to the house—property taxes of $234
per month, homeowner's insurance of $83 per month, home repairs of $400 per month. The
court did not consider, nor make findings, as to Rebekah's projected expenses in a different
home.
In addition, the court did not consider whether any of the claimed expenses were
inflated or unreasonable. It is clear that most of the expenses were estimated and not tied to
records or an actual accounting. For example, $300 per month for recreation, plus $120 for
an athletic club, plus $200 for vacation is duplicative and excessive. Likewise $50 per month
for toys, plus $100 per month for gifts also seems duplicative.

The claim of $100 for

"incidentals" was also unsubstantiated. The court even ignored the fact that Rebekah was
claiming $250 per month for child care, when she does not work outside the home, her
children were in school, and the fact that the preschool charge of $50 per month would
disappear when the younger boy entered kindergarten in a few months.
The Utah Court of Appeals has required that trial courts make detailed findings to
support their alimony awards. E.g., Bell 810 P.2d 489. The findings of need made by the
court here do not satisfy that standard.
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B.

The Trial Court Did Not Make Adequate Findings as to Brad's Ability to
Pay or Rebekah's Ability to Contribute to her own Support.

The trial court found that Brad's annual gross income was $278,000, or $23,167 per
month

Finding of Fact No. 25, R at 15^9. The court made no finding as to Brad's net

income.
With

o

her because of the presumption that she should not work and should care for the children.
Finding of Fact No. 26, R at 1539-40.
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expenses and found that he could meet these expenses even after paying taxes, alimony, and
child support. Finding of Fact No. 30, R at 1542
Since tl

.a :k no findings as to Brad' 's net

' .v income or his taxes, it is

impossible to determine whether its finding as to his ability to pay is correct. Implicit in that
finding is the assumption that Brad would have at least $8,300,

^7,225, or $15,525

available as net monthly income, but there was no such finding.
In addition, the finding that Rebekah is incapable of contributing to her own support

award will not last very long and "to the extent possible she needs to be either advancing her
education or advancing her employment' Finding of Fact No 10, R at 1533.
The coi ii I: sh :>i ll ;:! ha \ e made a finding as to the extent t :) 1 \ hid I R ebekal I is capable of
contributing to her own support, aside from her child care responsibilities, especially given
the fact that her youngest child would reach school age within a few months of the trial date.
C.

The Trial Court Failed to Make Adequate Findings of Fact Supporting
the Duration of the Alimony Award.

With respect to the duration of the alimony award, the court made the following
finding:
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Alimony under the Decree of Divorce should commence with the month of
July 1996, and be paid one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day of
each month unless the parties mutually agree otherwise.
Finding of Fact No. 31, R. at 1541-43.
Plaintiffs entitlement to alimony shall terminate on the 30th day of
June, 2001, or sooner upon the remarriage or cohabitation of plaintiff or the
death of either party or by operation of law. The amount of alimony can be
reviewed before the expiration of five years if there is a substantial and
material change of the circumstances of the parties.
Finding of Fact No. 33, R. at 1543.
The trial court did not include in its findings any of its reasoning concerning the
duration of alimony. Obviously, the trial court must have tied alimony to the duration of the
marriage. The parties were married in September of 1989, and separated in the fall of 1994.
At the time of trial, Rebekah had been receiving temporary alimony for approximately one
and one-half years.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1997) provides that: "Alimony may not be
ordered for a duration longer than the number of the years that the marriage existed unless, at
any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that
justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time." Thus, the court could not have
awarded alimony longer than the duration of the marriage. However, because the court did
not explain the duration of alimony it did award, its findings of fact on that issue were
inadequate and should be reversed.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CERTAIN
ITEMS OF BRAD'S PREMARITAL PROPERTY HAD BEEN
CONSUMED DURING THE MARRIAGE.

In Utah divorces, "[t]he general rule is that equity requires that each party retain the
separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any appreciation of the
separate property. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)." Dunn, 802 P.2d
at 1320.
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Brad had practiced medicine for several years before his marriage to Rebekah and had
accumulated substantial premarital assets. At the time of the marriage, those assets included
tl le follow ing:
Key Bank, checking account no. 000577510

$ 21 286

Fidelity Investments USA account X29-002453

50,829

1706 R ossDrr e I >n >ceeds from Sale

50,470

Fidelity Investments, IRA account T022114548
IRA Rollover (129074128 as of 6/30/93)
IRA Contributory (129079790 as of 12/31 93)
Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Retirement Plan
(Deposited-Fidelity Inv,, acct. no. T06214

131,481
74,197
30,000
^)

Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Accounts Receivable
at 8/31/89 ($498,210 + 3,240 - 4 x 80%)
1986 Jeep Cherokee

100,289
10,025

Cash in. I: I isiness a v ailable to Bi ad

35,901

Brent Bohman (personal loan from brother paid during marriage)

10,000

Rebekah Bohman (personal loan still outstanding)

17,000

Winetou

Minerals Corp. (2,1)00 shares)

Buenaventura Resources Corp. (249,333 shares)
Bohman Ranch
Business interest in Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology
BB Ranchers
Furniture, fine arts & silverware
1980 S^
1989 Jeep Cherokee Ltd.
Defi sndanl 's Exhibit' 14 i
The trial court awarded to Brad all his premarital assets that had not changed form:
the stocks, his interest in the family ranch, his Porsche, and the 1989 Jeep Cherokee. The
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trial court also awarded Brad the amounts in his two IRA accounts to the dates indicated
because the accounts had been maintained as separate to those dates, despite the fact that the
accounts were later changed.
However, the trial court ruled that the Key Bank checking account, the Fidelity
Investments USA account, the 1986 Jeep Cherokee, the $35,901 cash credit in Brad's
business, the loan repaid by Brad's brother, and the loan to Rebekah had all been consumed
during the marriage. In so finding, the trial court erred.
A.

Key Bank Checking Account and Fidelity Investment Account.

Brad's uncontroverted testimony was that he had $21,286 in his Key Bank checking
account at the time of his marriage to Rebekah. R. at 652. He produced a bank statement
showing the balance in September 1989, the date of marriage. Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 44a.
Likewise, Brad testified that he had $50,289 in his Fidelity Investment account, a money
market checking account, at the time of the marriage and he produced a statement for that
account. R. at 652, Exhibit 2 to Exhibit 44a.
The court found that the two accounts were consumed, "taken from the individual
name of defendant and put into the family income stream and used. They are consumed and
gone and no premarital credit should be allowed." Finding of Fact No. 36a, R. at 1544.
At the time of the trial of the divorce action, however, the court found that Brad had
$23,687 in a First Security checking account and approximately $180,000 in a Fidelity
Investment account, which was also a checking account.3

Thus, while Brad had

approximately $72,000 in cash in checking accounts at the beginning of the marriage, there
was at least $200,000 in cash in such accounts at the end of the marriage. The cash that
existed in September 1989 had not been consumed; instead, more funds had been
accumulated.

The evidence simply did not support the trial court's conclusion that the

accounts had been consumed.

3

Other accounts, such as the Charles Schwab Family Trust account, also contained substantial liquid assets.
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Apparently, the trial court believed that, because tl

segregate

i

kept in the same account in which it was held at the beginning the marriage, Brad should not
r-«v.

; not require that premarital assets be kept segregated in

the same account to be considered separate property. In Bm t, 799 P.2d 1166, the court said:
"Conversion from one investment medium to another does not, by itself, destroy the integrity
of segregation ' ' i \ I at 116 5" I ikew ise the fact that Brad chai lged tl ic location :)f a checking
account or the number of his money market account with Fidelity Investment, does not mean
that the funds have been consumed. The trial court should have granted a premarital credit
foi these accounts
The trial court's reasoning as to segregation of premarital propertv not only penalizes
the party who comes into the marriage with assets; it also punishes a par* • n^ does not
maintain strict segregati

-

r

t

found to have been consumed in this case had a total value of $145,401. Because Brad did
not maintain those assets in strictly segregated form or in the same accounts, he now suffers a
financial penalty while Rebekah receives a winu...

relatively short marriage of

$72,521.50.
IB

Brad testified that, at the time of the marriage, he owned a 1986 Jeep Cherokee with a
value of $10,025. He further testified that the Jeep was sold and the proceeds deposited into
his accounts. R at 655.
The court found that the Jeep Cherokee was "gone and consumed and for it defendant
should receive no premarital credits " Finding of Fact \*»
time of the divorce, tl ic par ties o\ v lie d ./ ehicles of sub

R a? 1 ; +4. However, at the
...

.

"sche 1 * < itl I a « 'ah lie

of $43,225 and a van with a value of $14,691. Although the 1986 Jeep was itself sold, its
value augmented the marital estate. If Brad had not owned that vehicle at the time of the
marriage, and if the parties had otherwise conducted theii financial at lairs in I he same
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manner, the value of their total estate would have been smaller. Brad should have received a
credit for the value of the Jeep.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Grant a Credit for the Cash in Rocky
Mountain Anesthesiology to which Brad Was Entitled at the Time of the
Marriage and by Failing to Deduct the Deficit that Existed at the Time of
the Divorce,

Brad testified that, as of the date of his marriage to Rebekah, he had cash in his
personal account with his business partnership, Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology, in the
amount of $35,901. Exhibit 44a, R. at 656. As of the time of trial, Brad testified, he had no
cash in his account with the business (R. at 656), and in fact owed $7,417, which would have
to be made up from earnings before any distributions could be made to Brad. Exhibit 45a.
The court found that the $35,901 in Brad's business account in 1989 was "gone and
consumed" (Finding of Fact No. 36e, R. at 1545) and ignored the deficit of $7,417 existing in
1996.
Ironically, however, the court recognized that the accounts receivable of Rocky
Mountain Anesthesiology were a premarital asset for which Brad should receive a premarital
credit of $100,289, and that the current accounts receivable were a marital assets with a value
of $93,349, and that there was a balance sheet asset of $2,798 which should also be charged
to Brad. Finding of Fact No. 37b, R. at 1547.
It is impossible to follow the trial court's reasoning on this issue.

First, Rocky

Mountain Anesthesiology was itself a premarital asset. If the change in the value of a
premarital asset is to be considered at all in determining the various values that make up the
marital estate, it should be the change in the whole value, not just selected portions of the
asset.
Clearly, the trial court should have awarded a credit to Brad for the $35,901 held in
the cash account with his business at the time of the marriage and should have debited the
$7,417 deficit amount.
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D.

The Loan to Brad's Brother Brent and the Loan to Rebekah.

Brad's uncontroverted testimony was that he had loaned $10,000 to his brother, Brent

the marriage. This was an asset owned by Brad prior to the marriage. The fact that Brent
repaid it during the marriage augmented the marital estate in the amount of $10,000. Again,
all c ther things being eqi ial. the parties had $10 000 ' " ": " assets at the end of the marriage
than they would have had if Brent had not repaid the k>ai, For that reason, Brad should have
been granted a premarital credit for the amount of the l^an
Likew ise, it * as Bi ad' 's i m :ontro \ • ei ted testimon> that 1 it ha 1 loai led $1 1 000 to
Rebekah prior to the marriage. This amount had not been repaid

If Brad and Rebekah had

not married, this loan was an asset to which he would have been entitled. The trial court
presented no reasoning as to why the loan should not be recognized. Rather, the court simply
said that "the loan to Rebekah Bohman of $17,000 loaned prior to the marriage of the parties
is gone and for \\ hich defendant shoi lid receive no pi emai ital credit " I:; ii idi*
36g,

-

* •. : No.

The court gave no explanation for its ruling on this issue.

Because the trial court's findings of fact with respect to the two loans are inadequate,
ai I ;:1 becai ise Brad shoi il :!!

il

court's findings of fact on those issues should be reversed.
E.

The I rial Court E n e • ci in Gi anting a $5,000 Ci c -dit il: : Re 'Ill: • = i i ; .1 i If : r
Premarital Property.

Rebekah initially te stifled that at the time of the marriage, she owned property with a
value of $16,000, for which she sought credit in the distribution of the parties'1 property.
Exhibit 23. I he property consisted of furniture, a Porsche, household goods, and gins irom
friends Later, cross-examination revealed that Rebekah still had possession of the gifts from
friends (R. at 622), that she had sold the Porsche prior to the marriage, and that she still had

instead of $16,000.
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Rebekah testified that the couch listed on Exhibit 23 had been sold to her mother and
that the bedroom sets, to which she had assigned a value of $5,000, were located at Brad's
family ranch. R. at 622-23. Brad testified that he had actually purchased the bedroom sets
from Rebekah prior to the marriage.
Not only is it difficult to determine how bedroom sets many years old could possibly
be worth $5,000, it is impossible to reconcile the trial court's treatment of Rebekah's
premarital assets with Brad's. With respect to Brad's cash accounts, the court held that they
were consumed. With respect to Rebekah's claim for a premarital credit, the court ignored
the gaps in the evidence, as well as the fact that the personal property at issue still existed and
could have been returned to Rebekah, and awarded her a credit of $5,000 for her premarital
property. Neither the evidence nor the law support that result.
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS CONCERNING
VALUES OF CERTAIN PERSONAL PROPERTY
INADEQUATE.

THE
ARE

"To permit appellate review of a trial court's property division, the lower court must
have made adequate factual findings. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 425. The findings should be
"'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" Walters, 812 P.2d at 67. In this
case, the court failed to make such findings as to a number of issues concerning personal
property.
A.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Regarding the Value of the Van are
Inadequate.

The trial court found that the value of the van owned by the parties was $14,691.
Rebekah testified as to that value; Brad testified that the value was $19,385. In addition,
Brad asked that the van be awarded to him at the higher value and was willing to accept that
higher value on his side of the ledger. The trial court awarded the van to Rebekah without
explanation, and also accepted the value she assigned to it. No factual findings were made.
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B.

The Trial Court Did Not Make Adequate Findings as to the Value of
Brad's First Security Checking Account.

The trial court erred in finding that the balance in Brad's First Security checking
account was $23,687. Brad had a checking account with First Security Bank, account no.
2021027327, into which his paychecks were deposited. Shortly before trial, a mistake had
been made by his corporation and an extra $10,810 had been deposited. R. at 1047-48. For
that reason, the last statement available for the account showed a balance of $23,687.
However, Brad testified, without contradiction, that the $10,816 deposit was a mistake and
that he had written a check back to Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology to correct the incorrect
deposit. R. at 1047. Brad had also updated the balance in the account by deducting checks
and adding deposits that had been made since the date of the last available statement. As of
the date of trial, the balance in that account was $19,854.
Because the evidence as to the balance in the account was uncontradicted, the court
erred in failing to use the $19,854 figure in computing the value of the account for purposes
of computing the marital estate.
C.

Ross Drive Proceeds

The trial court recognized that Brad was entitled to a premarital credit for the Ross
Drive house, but found that the amount of the credit should be $40,000, "based upon the
testimony of the parties and the exhibits introduced." Finding of Fact no. 36b, R. at 1544.
However, the only evidence introduced as to the value of Brad's interest in the Ross Drive
house was the evidence indicating that the net proceeds of its sale were $50,470.

The

$40,000 figure apparently came from Rebekah's Exhibit 22, which contained figures
indicating that the value of the Ross Drive home at the time of the marriage was $150,000
and the mortgage balance was $40,000. However, those figures were not supported by any
documentary evidence or testimony.
Because the only competent evidence as to the value of Brad's interest in the Ross
Drive house was $50,470, the trial court erred in finding the value to be $40,000.
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VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
OBLIGATION TO BB RANCHERS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO
A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD, BASED ON THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
Brad testified that BB Ranchers was a family partnership established as the operating
entity for his family's ranch. Brad further testified that he had an agreement with his family
members, pursuant to which he had been allowed to claim the tax savings attributable to the
ranch operations over a period of years, and that he then owed the partnership the amount of
the tax savings he had enjoyed. R. at 664-65. This testimony was uncontroverted.
At the time of trial, the amount owed to BB Ranchers for the obligations incurred
during the marriage was $77,098. This amount represented the tax savings that the parties
had enjoyed for the years 1989 through 1995. However, although the court recognized the
obligation, it decided that the amount of the obligation should be limited to the tax savings
enjoyed by the parties for the years 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. The court found that:
"Defendant's claim for a longer period should be denied because of the statute of
limitations." Finding of Fact No. 37hh, R. at 1553.
The court did not refer to any particular statute of limitations, but presumably had in
mind UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996), which provides for a four year statute of
limitations for oral contracts. The court made no factual findings on which to base its
conclusion that this statute barred claims for the tax savings for years prior to 1992, nor was
evidence presented that any such defense to the obligation had ever been asserted.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25 (1996) provides that "[a]n action may be brought
within four years: (1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument
in writing." The statute further provides "that action in all of the foregoing cases may be
commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last payment is
received." § 78-12-25(1) (1996).
In this case, the last charge at issue was made for the tax year 1995. For that reason,
the statute of limitations had not run by the time of trial. The court erred in finding that the
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statute of limitations had run to bar the obligations for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991. Thus,
Brad should have been entitled to a premarital credit in the amount of $77,098 for the BB
Ranchers obligation.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE VALUE OF REBEKAH'S WEDDING RINGS
IN VALUING THE MARITAL ESTATE.

The court ruled that the jewelry acquired during the marriage should be divided along
with the other personal property of the parties, but that the wedding rings should be excluded
because they were gifts to Rebekah.
Rebekah valued the wedding rings at $12,000. R. at 572.
The court did not cite any legal principle or controlling law in determining that the
wedding rings should not be included in the marital estate. Obviously, they have substantial
value and were property acquired during the marriage. Gifts between husbands and wives are
not necessarily excluded from the marital estate. Accordingly, the court's ruling on that issue
should be reversed.
X.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING BRAD TO PAY A
PORTION OF REBEKAH'S ATTORNEY'S FEES.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 (1995) authorizes trial courts to award attorney's fees in
divorce proceedings. Such an award "must be based on evidence of the financial need of the
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees." Citations omitted. Bell, 810 P.2d at 493.
In determining whether the fees are reasonable, the court may consider, among other
factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness of
the hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality, the amount involved
in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved.
Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988). Bell 810 P.2d at 494.
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In this case, Rebekah was represented by two highly experienced domestic relations
attorneys: one attorney handled the financial aspects of the case; the other handled the
custody issues. As a result, Rebekah's fees and costs totaled approximately $42,000. R. at
1094. Brad had only one attorney and his fees and costs totaled approximately $23,000.
In its findings, the trial court made no effort to reconcile the disparity in the fees or to
apply any of the factors listed above. Instead, the court simply found that the requested fees
were reasonable "based on the respective financial circumstances of the parties and
defendant's greater income capacity." Finding of Fact No. 40, R. at 1560.
With respect to Rebekah's need for assistance with her fees, the court recognized that
Rebekah would receive a substantial amount of cash in the property distribution (actually
approximately $192,109, that Brad had already paid $7,500 of fees on a temporary basis, and
that she had used marital funds of $4,000 to pay fees. Notwithstanding those facts, and
notwithstanding the fact that Rebekah would receive $7,225 per month as alimony and child
support, the court found "there is some need" and ordered Brad to pay an additional $5,000.
Finding of Fact no. 40, R. at 1560.
With respect to Brad's ability to pay fees, the court simply said that "there is some
limited ability to pay." Finding of Fact No. 40, R. at 1560.
As in Bell the trial court in this case gave "no explanation" for its finding that the
fees were reasonable, that a need existed, and that Brad had the ability to pay. For that
reason, the trial court's findings do not meet the standards set forth in Bell and are
inadequate.
CONCLUSION
In seeking custody of his two children, Brad faced an insurmountable obstacle.
Because he had had a career during the marriage and Rebekah had not, the custody evaluator
and eventually the court both assumed that Rebekah had served as the primary caretaker for
the children. An analysis of all the evidence and of the court's findings of fact in this case
makes its clear that the fact that Rebekah was found to be the primary caretaker for the
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children was outcome determinative. Although the court questioned her stability, in light of
her prior relationships, the problems of her older children, her excessive drinking, her
profligate spending, her "distractions" (Finding of Fact No. 16, R. at 1534), all those factors
were overcome by the finding that she had been the children's primary caretaker.
There was nothing that Brad could do to prove otherwise. Although he offered strong
evidence to the court that Rebekah had not been in the home during the last several years of
the children's lives, including documentary evidence such as her cellular telephone bills, all
that evidence was swept away based on the presumption that because she did not work
outside the home, Rebekah must be caring for the children. The reasoning of this case
virtually assures that a parent who is employed always faces an enormous disadvantage in a
custody determination, no matter how good a parent he or she may be and how strong his or
her efforts to care for his or her children may have been.
The trial court failed to support its award of alimony and child support with adequate
findings of fact. Instead, the trial court simply awarded Rebekah the amounts she sought for
alimony and child support, without a critical examination of her needs and Brad's ability to
pay.
With respect to the premarital property, the trial court failed to apply consistent
principles. It recognized that Brad was entitled to premarital credits for retirement accounts,
but failed to give premarital credits for cash accounts, loans, and other items. The court
granted a premarital credit of $5,000 to Rebekah for furniture without sufficient evidentiary
support.
The trial court applied the statute of limitations to limit Brad's obligation to BB
Ranchers, without making any findings as to why that statute should apply. Under plain
language of the statute, since the last charge was made less than four years before Brad
sought to have the obligation recognized, the statute of limitations does not apply.
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The trial court also failed to make adequate findings to support the valuation of
certain assets, including the equity in the premarital home, the van, the jewelry, and the First
Security checking account.
Likewise, the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its award
of attorneys' fees.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's rulings on the issues set forth above
should be reversed and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for the entry of
adequate findings of fact.
With respect to the BB Ranchers' obligations, this court should find, as a matter of
law, that the statute of limitations does not apply and the full amount of that obligation
should be considered in computing the value of the marital estate.
DATED this

/ 7 day of December, 1997.
Respectfully submitted,
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2034

ELLEN MAYCOCK
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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BRADFORD K. BOHMAN,
DEFENDANT.
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*****

10

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY FOR

11

HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON, JUDGE, SITTING

12

AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 14TH DAY OF JUNE 1996.

13

WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:

14
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SHARON DONOVAN
ELLEN MAYCOCK
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REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR
847 E. 2800 N.
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414
OFS. 399-8405, HM. 782-3146

2
OGDEN. UTAH
THE COURT:

JUNE 14. 1996
GOOD MORNING.

11:00 A.M.

LET ME JUST PUT YOU ON

THE SPEAKER PHONE SO EVERYONE CAN HEAR.
MS. MAYCOCK:

YES.

MS. DONOVAN:

YES.

MR. DART:

WE CAN HEAR FINE.

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

CAN YOU HEAR OKAY?

I ASSUME THAT ALL THREE

COUNSEL ARE PRESENT?
MS. MAYCOCK:

THAT'S RIGHT.

MS. DONOVAN:

YES.

MR. DART:

THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT:

ARE THE PARTIES PRESENT OR JUST THE

LAWYERS?
MS. MAYCOCK:

YOUR HONOR, DR. BOHMAN IS OUT OF TOWN

AND WASN'T ABLE TO BE WITH US TODAY.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

IS MRS. BOHMAN PRESENT?

DID

ANYONE HEAR ME?
MR. DART:

YES.

MAYBE YOU DIDN'T HEAR ME.

BECKY

BOHMAN IS HERE.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

MRS. BOHMAN IS PRESENT.

THE RECORD MAY SHOW THEN THAT

DR. BOHMAN IS OUT OF TOWN.

THE

LAWYERS ARE PRESENT IN THEIR OFFICES AND I'M IN MY CHAMBERS
WITH MY COURT REPORTER AND THE DECISION THAT I'M GIVING IS NOW
ON THE RECORD.

THIS IS A DECISION FROM A CASE THAT I HAVE

PREVIOUSLY TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT.

1

THE COURT FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:

THAT THE PLAINTIFF

2

AND DEFENDANT ARE RESIDENTS OF WEBER COUNTY AND WERE SO FOR AT

3

LEAST THREE MONTHS NEXT PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE DIVORCE

4

ACTION AND ALSO THE COUNTERCLAIM.

5

SEPTEMBER 20TH, 1989.

6

COURT FINDS THAT IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES HAVE IRRETRIEVABLY

7

BROKEN THE MARRIAGE.

8

TO BECOME FINAL UPON ENTRY OF THE DECREE.

9

THEY WERE MARRIED ON

THEY SEPARATED IN THE FALL OF 1994.

THE PARTIES ARE GRANTED A MUTUAL DIVORCE

THE PARTIES ARE THE PARENTS OF THREE CHILDREN:

ANGELA,

10

WHO WAS BORN OCTOBER 30TH, 1981.

11

IS A CHILD FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S PREVIOUS MARRIAGE; HOWEVER,

12

DR. BOHMAN ADOPTED HER.

THEY HAVE AS ISSUE OF THEIR MARRIAGE

13

NATURALLY TWO CHILDREN:

BRAXTON, WHO WAS BORN APRIL 17TH,

14

1990 AND IS SIX YEARS OF AGE.

15

1991, WHO IS FOUR.

16
17
18

SHE IS 14 YEARS OF AGE. SHE

BRYSON, WHO WAS BORN JULY 25TH,

THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN PRIMARILY A HOMEMAKER DURING THE
MARRIAGE.

DR. BOHMAN IS AN ANESTHESIOLOGIST.

COURT WILL OBSERVE THAT IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE COURT

19

CANNOT ORDER JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY IN THIS CASE.

COURT FINDS

20

THAT EACH PARENT HAS STRENGTHS WHICH COMBINED WITH ONE ANOTHER

21

IN A JOINT CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT, AND THE FLEXIBILITY OF DR.

22

BOHMAN'S WORK SCHEDULE, WOULD REALLY INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF

23

THESE CHILDREN.

24

CUSTODY, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS BEEN

25

SOMEWHAT TEMPESTUOUS DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT THESE

HOWEVER, THERE IS NO AGREEMENT FOR JOINT

4
PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN PENDING, HAS BEEN PUNCTUATED BY A
HISTORY OF UNCOOPERATION AND, THEREFORE, THE COURT WILL
DECLINE TO MAKE ANY JOINT CUSTODY AWARD.
ALTHOUGH THIS IS A CLOSE CASE, THE COURT FINDS THAT IT IS
IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE BOYS THAT THEY BE AWARDED TO
THEIR MOTHER.

CUSTODY IS SUBJECT TO LIBERAL VISITATION BY DR.

BOHMAN AS OUTLINED IN PLAINTIFF'S WRITTEN PROPOSAL.

AND I'M

SPEAKING SPECIFICALLY OF THE ONE, MISS DONOVAN, THAT YOU
PREPARED THAT OUTLINES THREE WEEKENDS A MONTH THEY WILL SPEND
WITH THEIR FATHER.
HOWEVER.

I'M GOING TO ADD TO THAT SOME CHANGES,

HE IS ENTITLED TO HAVE 3 0 DAYS OF VISITATION DURING

THE SUMMER.

THOSE CAN BE A STRAIGHT PERIOD OF TIME OR THEY

CAN BE BROKEN INTO TWO-WEEK INCREMENTS.

I DON'T REALLY CARE,

I'LL LEAVE THAT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE PARTIES AFTER THEY
RECEIVE THE SOUND ADVICE OF THEIR LAWYERS.

HOWEVER, DURING

THE 3 0 DAYS THAT HE HAS THEM, THEY WILL HAVE RECIPROCAL
VISITATION ON THE WEEKENDS WITH THEIR MOTHER.

IN OTHER WORDS,

IF HE WERE TO HAVE THEM FOR A MONTH, SHE WILL ALSO HAVE THEM
THREE WEEKS, THREE WEEKENDS OUT OF THE MONTH.

NOW, IF YOU

DON'T LIKE THAT, YOU CAN DO WHATEVER YOU WANT TO WORK OUT, BUT
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGREEMENT, THAT'S WHAT THE COURT WILL
ORDER.
WE'VE HAD SEVERAL HEARINGS ON THE ISSUE OF ALLOWING DR.
BOHMAN LIBERAL VISITATION BY HAVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO WATCH
THESE CHILDREN WHEN THE PLAINTIFF HAS OTHER ACTIVITIES GOING.

1

AND I SENSE THAT THE TWO-HOUR ARRANGEMENT WHERE THEY WOULD

2

BE -- IF SHE IS GOING TO BE GONE FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IN

3

EXCHANGE -- OR BE GONE FOR TWO HOURS OR FOR A PERIOD GREATER

4

THAN TWO HOURS, THAT HE BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO WATCH THEM.

5

AND MAYBE THAT ISN'T WORKABLE.

6

SURE THAT JUST RESTRICTING IT TO AN OVERNIGHT VISITATION WILL

7

ACCOMPLISH WHAT THE COURT WANTS TO ACCOMPLISH IN THE BEST

8

INTERESTS OF THESE CHILDREN.

9

THEY NEED TO HAVE A LOT OF CONTACT WITH THEIR FATHER.

BUT AT THE SAME TIME, I'M NOT

I AM ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT
I THINK

10

THAT HE LENDS SOME STRENGTHS THAT WILL BE REALIZED ONLY IF HE

11

CAN HAVE A LOT OF ACCESS TO THEM.

12

ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT ERRATIC AT TIMES, STILL HAS LARGE PERIODS OF

13

TIME WHERE HE CAN SPEND TIME WITH THEM, AND THAT FLEXIBILITY

14

NEEDS TO BE REALIZED IN HAVING VISITATION.

AND HIS WORK SCHEDULE,

15

I AM GOING TO SUGGEST -- AND I'LL HEAR FROM BOTH LAWYERS

16

RIGHT NOW, NOT EXTENSIVELY, BUT JUST WHETHER THAT'S SOMETHING

17

THAT YOU THINK YOU CAN WORK WITH OR NOT, BUT I WOULD SUGGEST

18

THAT MAYBE WE EXPAND THE TWO-HOUR TO A FOUR-HOUR OTHER PARENT

19

CARE PROVISION.

20

A PERIOD OF TIME LONGER THAN FOUR HOURS, AT THAT POINT THEN

21

SHE MUST FIRST OFFER THE CHILDREN TO HIM RATHER THAN OFFER

22

THEM TO SURROGATE CARE.

IN OTHER WORDS, IF SHE'S GOING TO BE GONE FOR

23

ANY HEARTBURN WITH THAT ON EITHER SIDE?

24

MS. MAYCOCK:

I DON'T HAVE ANY, YOUR HONOR.

25

THE COURT:

MISS DONOVAN?

6
MS. DONOVAN:

NO, YOUR HONOR, WE DON'T HAVE A PROBLEM

WITH THAT.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

LET ME JUST SAY TO YOU, MISS

BOHMAN, SINCE YOU'RE PRESENT, THAT I WAS DEAD SERIOUS AT THE
CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE ABOUT OPERATING BY THE GOLDEN RULE.
THIS WAS A CLOSE CASE. AND I DON'T KNOW THAT IT WAS SO CLOSE
THAT BY THE SKIN OF YOUR TEETH YOU DID GET CUSTODY, BUT THERE
WAS ENOUGH GOOD EVIDENCE THAT I HAD TO TAKE SOME CAREFUL
THOUGHT TO CONSIDER WHAT WOULD BE REALLY IN THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THESE CHILDREN.

AND I BELIEVE THAT THEY NEED TO HAVE A LOT

OF CONTACT WITH THEIR DAD.

AND WHAT I WANT YOU TO DO IS TRY

TO TREAT HIM THE WAY THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO BE TREATED HAD I
AWARDED CUSTODY TO HIM.

AND I WANT YOU TO ALWAYS JUST USE

THAT AS SORT OF A TOUCHSTONE, AND I THINK THAT IF DO YOU THAT,
THE LIVES OF THESE CHILDREN WILL BE BLESSED.

AND I THINK

THAT'S WHAT'S REALLY AT ISSUE IS WHAT'S IN THEIR BEST
INTERESTS, NOT IN TERMS OF WHAT WE MIGHT WANT OR WHAT MIGHT BE
CONVENIENT AND BEST FOR US.
NOW WITH RESPECT TO ANGELA, I'M GOING TO AWARD JUST
STANDARD VISITATION TO DR. BOHMAN.

BECAUSE OF THE STRAINED

RELATIONSHIPS THERE, HE WILL PROBABLY JUST HAVE TO WORK OUT
THAT VISITATION AS HE CAN.

BUT I AM REQUESTING, MRS. BOHMAN,

THAT YOU ENCOURAGE THAT RELATIONSHIP.
NOW, IN MAKING THESE ORDERS, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE
PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN THE PRIMARY CARE GIVER OF THESE CHILDREN,

1

ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANT HAS CONTRIBUTED MEANINGFULLY,

2

ESPECIALLY THE LAST FEW YEARS.

3

DOING WELL AND HAVE ADAPTED TO THEIR SEPARATE HOMES APART FROM

4

THEIR PARENTS.

5

I FIND THAT THE CHILDREN ARE

I FIND THAT BOTH PARENTS ARE EQUAL OR WOULD BE EQUAL IN

6

PROMOTING VISITATION AND, THEREFORE, I DON'T SEE ANY ADVANTAGE

7

ONE WAY OR THE OTHER AS I EVALUATED THAT FACTOR.

8
9

I FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS THE GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO
PROVIDE PERSONAL CARE FOR CHILDREN BECAUSE SHE HAS NO

10

EMPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH THAT NEEDS TO CHANGE.

11

TO GO TO SCHOOL OR GET EMPLOYMENT, AND I'LL ADDRESS THAT

12

LATER.

13

SHE EITHER NEEDS

I FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYMENT ENABLES HIM TO GIVE

14

GENEROUSLY TO THESE CHILDREN AND, THEREFORE, ON THAT ISSUE

15

IT'S A SOMEWHAT CLOSE QUESTION.

16

MISS MAYCOCK, AS I PROMISED YOU, I WOULD LOOK AT THE

17

EVIDENCE OBJECTIVELY WITHOUT GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF WEIGHT TO

18

WHO'S HAD THE CHILDREN DURING THE CUSTODY DETERMINATION

19

PERIOD.

20

OUT OF THE EQUATION WHAT EFFECT THAT HAD AND CAME TO MY

21

DECISION INDEPENDENT OF WHO'S HAD THEM SINCE THEY'VE BEEN

22

SEPARATED, AND BY DOING SO I FOUND THAT IT WAS A CLOSE CASE,

23

BUT NONETHELESS, THAT THE MOTHER MET MORE OF THE FUNCTION

24

RELATED FACTORS THAN THE DEFENDANT DID.

25

PASSED THAT HURDLE AND THEN CONSIDERED THAT SHE HAS HAD THEM

AND SO AS I EVALUATED THIS CASE, I SPECIFICALLY HELD

HOWEVER, ONCE I HAD

8
DURING THE TIME THAT THESE PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN PENDING, AND
RECOGNIZING THE VALUE IN NOT BOUNCING THESE CHILDREN BACK AND
FORTH, BUT IN PROVIDING SOME CONSTANCY IN THEIR LIVES, THEN IT
MADE VERY GOOD SENSE THAT SHE HAVE CUSTODY OF THESE CHILDREN.
I FIND THAT THEY ARE HAPPY AND WELL ADJUSTED AND DOING
VERY WELL.

BUT I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS

CONTRIBUTED VERY MEANINGFULLY TO THEIR STATE OF EMOTIONAL
HEALTH AND HAPPINESS.
I FIND THAT THE STABILITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT OF EACH
PARENT REALLY MADE THIS CASE CLOSE.

THE PLAINTIFF IS LEAVING

HER FORTH MARRIAGE, ALTHOUGH SHE IS JUST 38 YEARS OF AGE. AND
ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT SHE'S HAD IN PREVIOUS
MARRIAGES I SENSE WERE NOT ENTIRELY OF HER OWN MAKING AND
THERE WERE INSTANCES OF ABUSE AND OTHER PROBLEMS, THAT HIS
SOMEWHAT MADE HER A VICTIM OF THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES,
NONETHELESS, HER HAVING NOW GONE THROUGH FOUR MARRIAGES DOES
NOT LEND A LOT OF CONSTANCY IN HER LIFE.
I FIND ALSO THAT SHE DRINKS EXCESSIVELY.

AND THERE IS

ALSO, THEREFORE, THAT POTENTIAL FOR AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE
CHILDREN.

HOWEVER, I FIND NO EVIDENCE OF THAT NEGATIVE

IMPACT, ALTHOUGH WE COULD CERTAINLY PERHAPS DRAW SOME CONCERNS
BY JUST A NATURAL INFERENCE.

I WOULD JUST POLITELY SUGGEST,

MRS. BOHMAN, THAT YOU NEED TO PERHAPS CONSIDER YOUR WAYS AND
EVALUATE WHERE YOU'RE HEADING AND SEE IF THERE IS SOME ROOM
FOR SOME CORRECTION.

9
I ALSO FIND THAT MRS. BOHMAN IS A PROFLIGATE SPENDER.
THAT THAT WAS PART OF THE PROBLEM IN THE MARRIAGE.

AND THAT

HER EXTRAVAGANT SPENDING CAUSED THE COURT SOME REAL CONCERNS
ABOUT HER STABILITY AND HER ABILITY TO MANAGE TO STAY ON A
BUDGET WHERE THINGS ARE GOING TO BE SOMEWHAT LIMITED FOLLOWING
THIS MARRIAGE.

I GIVE AS A EXAMPLE OF HER IMPRUDENT SPENDING

THAT SHE WENT OUT AND BOUGHT A $13,000 BABY GRAND PIANO AFTER
THE PARTIES HAD SEPARATED.

THAT IS TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE.

ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, I FIND THAT SHE IS A VERY LOVING,
CARING PARENT WHO REALLY HAS AT HEART THE BEST INTERESTS OF
HER CHILDREN.

AND THAT ALTHOUGH SHE CAN BE DISTRACTED BY A

LOT OF OTHER ACTIVITIES, THAT FUNDAMENTALLY SHE DEEPLY CARES
AND LOVES THESE CHILDREN AND WOULD ALSO PUT THEM FIRST.

AND

I, THEREFORE, HAVE EVERY EXPECTATION THAT SHE WILL BE A GOOD
MOM AND WILL BE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE CHILDREN.

BUT SHE

NEEDS TO BE CAUTIOUS IN THE AREAS THAT THE COURT HAS
IDENTIFIED.
I FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS MANY STRONG QUALITIES, AND
THAT HE'S VERY ATTUNED TO EDUCATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN HIS
CHILDREN'S LIVES. AND THAT HE WILL BE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON
THESE CHILDREN IF HE IS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A LOT OF
CONTACT SO THAT HE CAN HELP THEM WITH THEIR HOMEWORK, MONITOR
THEIR GRADES, AND PROVIDE JUST GOOD FUNDAMENTAL MOTIVATION.
I FIND THAT HE IS A VERY MATURE, STABLE PARENT WHO WILL
PROVIDE A LOT OF CONSTANCY AND CONSISTENCY.

HE HAS A STRONG

10
1

PERSONALITY AND CAN SOMETIMES BE CONTROLLING, BUT THERE IS NO

2

EVIDENCE THAT THAT HAS REDOUNDED TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE

3

CHILDREN.

4

I FIND THAT ANGELA WANTS TO LIVE WITH HER MOTHER AND THAT

5

THE DEFENDANT ACCEPTS THIS.

6

WHERE THEY WANT TO LIVE.

THE BOYS ARE TOO YOUNG TO DECIDE

7

I FIND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE STABILITY AND

8

EMOTIONAL SUPPORT OF THESE BOYS, HAVING JUST GONE THROUGH A

9

SEPARATION FROM THEIR PARENTS OR FROM THEIR PARENTS LIVING

10

TOGETHER, THAT THEY ALSO LIVE TOGETHER WITH ONE ANOTHER AND

11

THAT THEY ALSO LIVE WITH ANGELA.

12

THAT THEY MIGHT SENSE EXISTS BETWEEN THEIR PARENTS, THAT

13

ANGELA WOULD PROVIDE SOME STABILITY AND EMOTIONAL SECURITY.

14

AND THAT IS ANOTHER REASON WHY I FEEL THAT IT'S IMPORTANT THAT

15

THEY GO WITH THEIR MOTHER.

16

THAT APART FROM THE TENSION

THAT IS, I'M SPEAKING OF THE BOYS.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A STRONG BOND BETWEEN THE CHILDREN

17

AND BOTH PARENTS, ALTHOUGH THE PLAINTIFF IS THE PRIMARY

18

PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT, ACCORDING TO DR. JOHNSON.

19

I FIND THAT BOTH PARENTS ARE EQUAL IN MORAL CHARACTER.

20

THE DEFENDANT WILL IN THE LONG RUN OFFER A MORE STABLE

21

FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT THAN WILL THE PLAINTIFF, BUT WITH CHILD

22

SUPPORT, ALIMONY, AND THE INCOME THAT SHE WILL EVENTUALLY BE

23

ABLE TO EARN, SHE WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATELY FOR THE

24

CARE OF THE CHILDREN AND, THEREFORE, THAT IS NOT AN ISSUE.

25

IN CONCLUSION OF THIS POINT ON CUSTODY, AND DESPITE

11
1

WHATEVER SLANTS THERE WERE ON THE EVIDENCE PORTRAYED BY EACH

2

PARTY, I FOUND THAT THIS CASE BOILED DOWN TO A CHOICE BETWEEN

3

A VERY GOOD PARENT AND ONE WHO WAS JUST SLIGHTLY BETTER.

4

AGAIN, I WOULD JUST COUNSEL BOTH PARTIES TO FORGET THEMSELVES

5

AND ALWAYS ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN.

6

ENCOURAGE THE PLAINTIFF TO LIVE IN THE SAME SCHOOL DISTRICT AS

7

THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE I THINK IT WILL FACILITATE THIS LIBERAL

8

VISITATION THAT THE COURT IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT.

9

THINK THAT IT DEMONSTRATES AN EFFORT TO PUT THE NEEDS OF THE

10
11

AND

I WOULD

AND I

CHILDREN AHEAD OF THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES.
I WILL ENTER AN ORDER THAT MRS. BOHMAN WILL NOT LEAVE THE

12

AREA BEYOND 150 MILES WITHOUT GIVING REASONABLE NOTICE TO DR.

13

BOHMAN.

14

NOW, WITH RESPECT TO INCOME, THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES

15

THAT THE DEFENDANT EARNS APPROXIMATELY $278,000 A YEAR,

16

PRIMARILY ON THE STRENGTH OF HIS HISTORICAL INCOME. ALTHOUGH

17

THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT REMUNERATION FOR PHYSICIANS MAY BE

18

CHANGING, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW THAT IMPACTS DR. BOHMAN.

19

COURT FEELS THAT IT IS JUST TOO SPECULATIVE FOR THE COURT TO

20

DEAL WITH THAT ISSUE AT THIS POINT.

21

MODIFY LATER IF HIS DIRE PREDICTIONS COME TRUE.

22

THE DEFENDANT CAN MOVE TO

COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO INCOME, THOUGH

23

SHE'S ACQUIRED TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE DURING THE MARRIAGE.

24

COURT HAS NO IDEA WHETHER SHE CAN IMPROVE HER PLACE IN THE

25

MARKET, IN THE JOB MARKET WHEN --IF SHE WERE TO RETURN TO

12
EMPLOYMENT.

BEFORE SHE MARRIED DR. BOHMAN, HER HIGHEST WAGE,

AS I RECALL, WAS ABOUT FIVE DOLLARS AN HOUR.
WHETHER SHE CAN EARN MORE THAN THAT OR NOT.

I HAVE NO IDEA
GIVEN THE SMALL

AGES OF THE CHILDREN AND WHAT I WOULD SENSE WOULD BE A MUTUAL
CARING THAT THEY BE NURTURED PROPERLY, IT MAY NOT BE IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF MRS. BOHMAN TO RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO WORK,
ALTHOUGH I THINK THE LAW PROBABLY WOULD REQUIRE THAT.

I THINK

IT MIGHT MAKE SOME SENSE FOR HER TO ASSIDUOUSLY PURSUE HER
STUDIES AND FINISH COLLEGE SO THAT SHE IN THE LONG RUN CAN
IMPROVE HER STATION.
THE COURT WILL OBSERVE THAT THE ALIMONY THAT THE COURT IS
GOING TO AWARD WON'T LAST VERY LONG.
WITH RESPECT TO CHILD SUPPORT, BASED ON THE DEFENDANT'S
INCOME, I BELIEVE IT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE THAT HE PAY THE
PLAINTIFF CHILD SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,000 PER MONTH FOR
EACH OF THE THREE CHILDREN FOR A TOTAL OF $3,000.

THAT SUM IS

PAYABLE ONE-HALF ON THE 5TH AND ONE-HALF ON THE 20TH OF EACH
MONTH UNLESS THE PARTIES MUTUALLY AGREE OTHERWISE.
AS ADDITIONAL SUPPORT, HE SHALL PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE
SO LONG AS SAME IS AVAILABLE THROUGH HIS EMPLOYMENT.

EACH

PARTY SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE-HALF OF THE UNINSURED
MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES, EXCEPT ROUTINE OFFICE VISITS
WHICH SHALL REMAIN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF.
PLAINTIFF SHALL NOT INCUR ANY NON EMERGENCY EXTRAORDINARY
MEDICAL EXPENSES -- THAT'S MEDICAL, ORTHODONTIA, COUNSELING,

13
1

SO FORTH -- WITHOUT GIVING THE DEFENDANT NOTICE AND AN

2

OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD FIRST.

3

RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE-HALF OF THE WORK RELATED OR EDUCATION

4

RELATED DAY CARE EXPENSES, AND SHALL SUBMIT TO THE DEFENDANT

5

SATISFACTORY PROOF OF THOSE EXPENSES.

THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE

6

THE DEFENDANT SHALL MAINTAIN LIFE INSURANCE FOR THE

7

BENEFIT OF THE CHILDREN IN AN AMOUNT NOT LESS THAN WHAT WOULD

8

BE SUFFICIENT AT THAT TIME TO SEE THAT SUPPORT IS MAINTAINED

9

FOR THE CHILDREN AT THE RATE THROUGH THEIR MAJORITY.

10

WAS THAT CLEAR?

11

MS. MAYCOCK:

YES.

12

THE COURT:

OKAY.

WITH RESPECT TO ALIMONY, COURT

13

FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF -- I STRUGGLED WITH THIS ONE,

14

FRANKLY, AND I WORKED ON THIS LAST NIGHT AT HOME, MOST OF THIS

15

DECISION, AND I COULDN'T FIND AN EXHIBIT, BUT CONCLUDED AS

16

BEST I COULD FROM MY NOTES AND MY RECOLLECTION THAT HER

17

STANDARD OF LIVING WAS MOSTLY ARRIVED AT THROUGH THE ONE

18

BUDGET THAT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AN ACCOUNTANT AND BY WHAT

19- HAD SEEMED TO BE THE PARTIES' PRESENT STANDARD OF LIVING.
20

BASED ON THAT, I FOUND THAT BASED ON HER REASONABLE NEEDS,

21

THAT I INFERRED FROM THOSE THINGS THAT -- AND CONSISTENT WITH

22

WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE PARTIES IN

23

THE PAST, THAT SHE HAD REASONABLE MONTHLY NEEDS OF $7,225. I

24

FIND THAT SHE PRESENTLY HAS ONLY A LIMITED ABILITY TO

25

CONTRIBUTE BECAUSE OF HER UNEMPLOYMENT WITH NO SIGNIFICANT

14
1

WORK HISTORY.

HER LAST GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT BEFORE THE MARRIAGE

2

GAVE HER FIVE DOLLARS AN HOUR.

3

AND OUGHT TO CONTINUE HER STUDIES BECAUSE THE AWARD OF ALIMONY

4

THE COURT IS GOING TO AWARD WILL BE BRIEF.

5

TENDER YEARS OF THE CHILDREN AND THE INTEREST THAT I THINK

6

THAT EACH PARTY HAS IN SEEING THAT THEY ARE NURTURED PROPERLY,

7

AND IN CONSIDERING THE EXPENSES OF WORK, ADDITIONAL CLOTHING,

8

DAY CARE, IT MAY NOT BE HIGHLY PROFITABLE FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO

9

WORK, ALTHOUGH THE COURT IS GOING TO ORDER THAT SHE OBTAIN

SHE HAS TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE,

BECAUSE OF THE

10

EMPLOYMENT OR GO TO SCHOOL.

AND AT SUCH TIME AS EITHER OF

11

THOSE CREATE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE, MATERIAL CHANGE OF

12

CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT WILL BE WILLING TO TAKE A LOOK AGAIN

13

AT ALIMONY.

14

THE COURT WILL OBSERVE THAT IT WAS DISAPPOINTED DURING

15

THE TRIAL THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PLAINTIFF DID

16

ANYTHING THIS PAST YEAR OR SO WHILE THIS DIVORCE PROCEEDING

17

WAS PENDING TO OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT OR TO GO TO SCHOOL.

18

MY OPINION THIS WAS SOMEWHAT SHORTSIGHTED BECAUSE EVEN WITH

19

THE AWARD OF ALIMONY, THAT WON'T LAST VERY LONG, AND WHEN IT

20

CHANGES, THERE WILL BE A DRAMATIC ADJUSTMENT, NOT ONLY IN HER

21

LIFE, BUT IN THE LIVES OF THE CHILDREN BECAUSE INEVITABLY SOME

22

OF THE MONEY THAT WILL BE GIVEN FOR ALIMONY INDIRECTLY

23

BENEFITS THE CHILDREN.

24
25

IT WAS

THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT'S REASONABLE LIVING
EXPENSES ARE APPROXIMATELY BETWEEN EIGHTY-FIVE TO EIGHTY-NINE

15
HUNDRED DOLLARS A MONTH, PROBABLY -- EXCUSE ME, EIGHTY-THREE
HUNDRED TO EIGHTY-NINE HUNDRED DOLLARS A MONTH, AND PROBABLY
MORE CLOSE TO THE $8,300.

AFTER MAKING ADJUSTMENTS FOR TAXES,

CHILD SUPPORT, PROJECTED ALIMONY -- EXCUSE ME, MY NOTES ARE SO
TERSE AND I GUESS I WAS GETTING TIRED LAST NIGHT.
MR. DART:

YOU TAKE YOUR TIME, YOUR HONOR.

YOU

GAVE US ALL THE TIME IN THE WORLD.
MS. MAYCOCK:

THAT'S THE TRUTH.

THE COURT:

I KNOW WHAT I WANTED TO SAY. AFTER I

TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION WHAT I ANTICIPATED HIS TAXES TO BE,
WHAT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT --OR
ALIMONY AND DEDUCTING ALSO THE CHILD SUPPORT, I CONCLUDE THAT
HE CAN MEET THE NEEDS THAT -- THE REASONABLE LIVING NEEDS THAT
I'VE IDENTIFIED FROM HIS SALARY OF $278.

IN SHORT, I GUESS

WHAT I'M SAYING IS I THINK THERE'S ENOUGH TO GO AROUND.

AND

THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR $4,225 A MONTH ALIMONY
IS GRANTED.

THAT'S ESSENTIALLY HOW I ALSO I ARRIVED AT THAT

SINCE THERE WAS NOT THE SAME KIND OF PRECISE BUDGET THAT THE
DEFENDANT HAD PREPARED.

AND I WILL ORDER THAT THAT $4,225 A

MONTH BE PAID ONE-HALF ON THE 5TH, ONE-HALF ON THE 20TH UNLESS
THE PARTIES MUTUALLY AGREE OTHERWISE.
I BELIEVE THAT THIS SUPPORT LEVEL SHOULD GENERALLY
EQUALIZE THE STANDARD OF LIVING BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE
EXTENT THAT THAT CAN EVER OCCUR AFTER A DIVORCE.
THIS AWARD OF ALIMONY SHALL TERMINATE ON JUNE 1ST, 2 001

16
UNLESS TERMINATED SOONER BY OPERATION OF LAW OR THE DEATH OF
EITHER PARTY.
THE DEFENDANT SHALL MAINTAIN LIFE INSURANCE IN A FACE
AMOUNT THAT IS EQUAL TO HIS REMAINING OBLIGATION AT ANY TIME
TO THE PLAINTIFF.

SO THAT EACH YEAR HE COULD REDUCE THE

AMOUNT OF HIS INSURANCE IF HE WANTED TO.
THAT THIS OBLIGATION IS TAKEN CARE OF.

I WANT TO MAKE SURE
I DON'T KNOW HOW THAT

SORTS OUT, MR. DART, FRANKLY, FROM A TAX CONSEQUENCE BECAUSE I
THINK ONE OF THE I.R.S. CONDITIONS OF ALIMONY IS THAT IT BE
TERMINABLE UPON THE DEATH OF EITHER PARTY.

AND I HAD SOME

CONCERNS LAST NIGHT AS I WAS THINKING THAT THROUGH THAT THAT
PERHAPS BY PROVIDING INSURANCE, YOU MAY HAVE UNWITTINGLY
CREATED OR -- CREATED A PROPERTY SETTLEMENT INSTEAD OF AN
ALIMONY AWARD, BUT I'LL LET YOU AND YOUR ACCOUNTANT WORRY
ABOUT THAT.

YOU REQUESTED IT, AND I'VE DONE THIS A FEW TIMES

AND I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS IN ORDERING IT, BUT THERE MAY BE
THAT TAX CONSEQUENCE.
MR. DART:

IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS NOT --

THE INSURANCE IS NOT DEDUCTIBLE BY HIM, IT'S NOT TAXABLE TO
HER UPON --IN THE EVENT OF DEATH THAT THE PROCEEDS MAY COME
TO HER AGAIN NON TAXABLE.

THINK THAT WOULD BE I.R.S.

(UNINTELLIGIBLE) RAISES IT.
THE COURT:

YEAH, I THINK THAT'S RIGHT.

MS. MAYCOCK:

I THINK WE CAN STILL PROVIDE THAT

ALIMONY TERMINATES ON HIS DEATH AND HAVE THE LIFE INSURANCE --

17
1

OR ON HER DEATH, I SHOULD'SAY, YEAH, HIS DEATH AND HAVE THE

2

LIFE INSURANCE A SEPARATE MATTER, AND THEN THAT'S SORT OF THE

3

MAGIC WORD FOR I.R.S. PURPOSES.

4

THE COURT:

OKAY.

I WOULD AGREE WITH THAT, ELLEN,

5

IT'S A GOOD POINT. AS I'VE MENTIONED BEFORE, IF THE PLAINTIFF

6

OBTAINS SIGNIFICANT EMPLOYMENT, THEN AMOUNT OF THE ALIMONY CAN

7

BE REVIEWED, AND YOU ALL UNDERSTAND THAT.

8

TWO TO THREE YEARS, THE YOUNGEST CHILD WILL BE IN SCHOOL.

9

DON'T SEE ANY POINT THEN WHY THERE CAN'T BE SOME AGGRESSIVE

IN ANY EVENT, IN
I

10

EMPLOYMENT BY THE PLAINTIFF IN ADVANCE OF THAT FIVE-YEAR

11

PERIOD OF ALIMONY THAT I'VE AWARDED.

12

CAN BE REVIEWED, THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY CAN BE REVIEWED BEFORE

13

THE EXPIRATION OF THE FIVE YEARS IF THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL AND

14

MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

15

BUT IN ANY EVENT, THAT

NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTY, AND I APPRECIATED OUR

16

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE THIS MORNING BECAUSE IT -- I STRUGGLED

17

JUST MIGHTILY LAST NIGHT AND -- BUT I FOUND OUT THAT I DIDN'T

18

PACK HOME ALL OF MY COURTESY COPIES, AND AFTER WE SPOKE, I

19

DISCOVERED IN THE STACK OF THE COURT'S EXHIBITS THE DOCUMENT

20

THAT I WAS LOOKING FOR. AS WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THESE I.R.A.

21

ROLLOVERS AND THE I.R.A. CONTRIBUTORY ACCOUNTS I SENSED THAT

22

THERE WAS NOT ANY CONTEST ABOUT THOSE AMOUNTS, AND YET I

23

COULDN'T GLEAN FROM SOME OF THE EXHIBITS, THAT I'D MADE A LOTS

24

NOTES AND COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY, AND I WAS JUST LOST, BUT

25

WHAT I FOUND THAT I DIDN'T HAVE LAST NIGHT AND I DISCOVERED

18
1

AFTER WE SPOKE WAS EXHIBIT P-75. ON MY EXHIBIT AT HOME IT WAS

2

ORIGINALLY CALLED P-77, AND I COULDN'T FIND IT. AND I DIDN'T

3

HAVE P-75 EITHER, BUT ONCE I HAD THAT, THEN WITH MY NOTES THEN

4

A LOT OF THINGS FELL INTO PLACE.

5

THROUGH AND NOW ADDRESS THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS, AND I'LL BEGIN,

6

FIRST OF ALL, WITH THE PREMARITAL PROPERTY THAT I'M GOING TO

7

AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN.

8
9

AND SO LET ME JUST GO

FIRST OF ALL, I FIND THAT THE KEY BANK AND THE FIDELITY
INCOME TRUST WERE CONSUMED DURING THE MARRIAGE.

THOSE

10

ACCOUNTS WERE TAKEN FROM AND PUT INTO THE FAMILY INCOME STREAM

11

AND JUST USED.

12
13

IT'S CONSUMED, IT'S GONE.

I FIND THAT 40,000 OF THE ROSS PROPERTY IS A PROPER -- A
PROPER PREMARITAL ASSET.

14

I FIND THAT THE I.R.A. ROLLOVER ACCOUNT OF 131,481 IS A

15

PROPER PREMARITAL ASSET.

LIKEWISE, THE I.R.A. CONTRIBUTORY

16

ACCOUNT OF 74,197, AND THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN PENSION PLAN OF

17

30,000.

18

I FIND THAT THE JEEP CHEROKEE IS GONE.

19

THE CASH IN THE BUSINESS THAT WAS IDENTIFIED OF 35,901 IS

20 GONE.
21

AND THAT THE LOAN THAT BRENT BOHMAN PAID HIS BROTHER

22

DURING THE MARRIAGE IS ALSO GONE.

23

REBEKAH BOHMAN.

24
25

AND LIKEWISE, THE LOAN TO

AND I THINK YOU'RE BOTH IN AGREEMENT ON THAT.

WITH RESPECT TO THE PREMARITAL PROPERTY THAT NEVER
CHANGED IN TERMS OF CHARACTERISTICS, THE WINETOU -- LET ME
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JUST -- I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANY REAL ISSUE ON ANY OF THAT.
I THINK YOU'RE ALL IN AGREEMENT WITH THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION
OF TWO THINGS, AND ONE WAS THE BUSINESS INTEREST IN THE ROCKY
MOUNTAIN ANESTHESIOLOGY.

THAT WAS THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE,

AND THERE WAS A DISPUTE OVER WHAT COLLECTION RATE WOULD BE
APPLICABLE, AND I FIND THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
INDICATES THAT IN 1989 IT WAS 80 PERCENT AND THAT TODAY IT IS
60 PERCENT.

SO THAT WILL CHANGE THAT 347 FIGURE THAT WAS ON

EXHIBIT P-75.

NO, EXCUSE ME, IT WON'T.

IT REMAINS THE SAME.

I THINK YOU COMPUTED THAT AT THE 80 PERCENT AS I LOOK AT THIS
EXHIBIT.
I FIND THAT THE -- OH, WHAT DID I DO WITH THE JEEP
CHEROKEE?

I MADE A NOTE ON ANOTHER EXHIBIT.

ANYWAY, I GIVE

THAT -- AND I'LL ADDRESS THIS LATER, BUT I RECOGNIZE THAT JEEP
CHEROKEE AS A PREMARITAL ASSET.

SO THAT WILL CHANGE THAT

FIGURE OF 347,678 BY THE AMOUNT OF THAT AND I'LL GIVE YOU THAT
FIGURE IN A MINUTE.
NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE REST OF THE ASSETS, I FIND THAT
THE HOME HAS A VALUE OF $534 -- OR EXCUSE ME, $534,000. AND
THERE WAS DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO APPRAISALS, BUT THE ONE
APPRAISAL DID NOT INCLUDE ANOTHER BATHROOM, AND I FELT THAT
THE BETTER EVIDENCE WAS THAT THE HOME WAS WORTH THE GREATER
FIGURE.

I AWARD THAT HOME TO DR. BOHMAN.

AND THE REASON THAT

I DO THAT IS THAT I THINK THAT IN THE LONG RUN, THE PLAINTIFF
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AFFORD THE MORTGAGE PAYMENT.

FOR THE NEXT

20
FIVE YEARS THAT SHE CAN, BUT I THINK IT'S HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT
AFTER FIVE YEARS THAT SHE WILL BE ABLE TO AFFORD THIS HOME AND
SHE'LL END UP HAVING TO SELL IT, ANYWAY.

AND SO AT THAT

POINT, THE CHILDREN'S LIVES ARE GOING TO BE DISRUPTED ANYWAY.
AND THEY'RE ONLY GOING TO BE OLDER AND MORE CEMENTED IN THEIR
FRIENDSHIPS, AND I THINK IT IS JUST GOING TO CAUSE A TURMOIL
AT THAT TIME.
I ALSO FIND THAT SINCE THEY'VE BEEN SEPARATED, SHE'S HAD
SOME DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING THE MORTGAGE CURRENT.

AS I'VE

MENTIONED ALSO, I FIND THAT SHE IS EXTRAVAGANT IN HER SPENDING
AND THIS PUTS AT RISK HER MEETING THIS OBLIGATION.

AND THERE

IS NO WAY THIS HOME CAN BE REFINANCED TO REMOVE DR. BOHMAN'S
LIABILITY.

AND THEREFORE, NOTWITHSTANDING PAYING ALIMONY AND

CHILD SUPPORT, HE MAY HAVE TO STEP IN TO TAKE CARE THAT
OBLIGATION FROM TIME TO TIME, IS THE COURT'S CONCERN, AND THAT
JUST WOULDN'T BE FAIR.
I ALSO FIND THAT BASED ON THE LIBERAL VISITATION THAT THE
COURT CONTEMPLATES, THE CHILDREN ARE GOING TO ENJOY THE HOME A
GREAT DEAL ANYWAY BECAUSE THEY'LL BE SPENDING A LOT OF TIME
WITH HIM, AND THAT THAT ADDS TO THE STABILITY OF THAT
RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM OF RETURNING TO THAT HOME.
SO ON THAT SIDE OF THE EQUATION, HE WILL RECEIVE $187,635
IN EQUITY.
HE OF COURSE IS AWARDED HIS INTEREST IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN
ANESTHESIOLOGY, INC.
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THE COURT -- NOW, I'M GOING TO JUST MAKE SOME ARBITRARY
ASSIGNMENTS, BUT IT MIGHT MAKE SENSE ON A FEW OF THESE TO MOVE
THEM BACK AND FORTH IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE EQUATION BECAUSE I
HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO GO THROUGH AND BALANCE THIS OUT.

I AM

JUST GOING MAKE SOME FINDINGS AND I THINK WE'VE GOT ENOUGH
EQUITY IN THE CHARLES SCHWAB ACCOUNT AND IN THE FIDELITY
U.S.A. ACCOUNT THAT YOU CAN JUST DO SOME ADJUSTING WITH SOME
OF THOSE FUNDS TO ULTIMATELY EQUALIZE THE MARITAL ESTATE,
WHICH IS MY OBJECTIVE.

BUT IN ANY EVENT, I'M GOING TO GIVE

HIM THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLES, WHICH I FIND TO BE $93,349.
ALSO THE BALANCE SHEET ASSETS ON THE 1994 TAX RETURN OF
$2,798.

AND THE W.N.C. TAX CREDIT OF $12,784.

NOW, IF YOU WANT IT PUT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE
EQUATION, IN MY MIND IT SEEMS TO ME I MAY HAVE SEEN THAT
SOMEPLACE THAT WAY, BUT THAT'S UP TO YOU.
I AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN OF COURSE THE BOHMAN RANCH AND B.B.
RANCHERS.
I WILL LET THE PARTIES BID ON THE HOUSEBOAT, AND THE
HIGHEST BIDDER CAN TAKE IT.

BUT IT STRUCK ME RATHER FORCIBLY

THAT IF THE PARTIES -- WELL, I DON'T WANT TO PUT IT THAT WAY
BECAUSE IT SOUNDS PEJORATIVE, BUT THIS IS A WONDERFUL
OPPORTUNITY FOR THESE KIDS TO USE THAT HOUSEBOAT, AND THIS IS
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO GO DOWN WITH BOTH PARENTS AND ENJOY
THAT HOUSEBOAT.

OUR FAMILY HAS HAD A CONDOMINIUM UP IN BEAR

LAKE FOR A LOT OF YEARS THAT WE'VE JUST ABSOLUTELY LOVED, AND
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1

AS THE CHILDREN HAVE BEEN REARED, WE HAVE SO MANY FOND

2

MEMORIES OF THAT, AND I SUSPECT THAT THOSE CHILDREN CAN HAVE

3

THOSE SAME FOND MEMORIES IF THIS INTEREST IN THE HOUSEBOAT IS

4

SHARED AND EXPENSES ARE SHARED.

5

OPPORTUNITY TO GO TO LAKE POWELL ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION

6

PERHAPS WITH BOTH PARENTS AT SEPARATE OCCASIONS OF COURSE AND,

7

THEREFORE, ENJOY THAT EXPERIENCE WITH THAT ASSET.

8

A SUGGESTION ONLY, IT WOULD BE THAT YOU SHARE THE INTEREST IN

9

THAT HOUSEBOAT AND ITS EXPENSES.

10

AND THAT WAY, THEY HAVE AN

SO JUST AS

COURT FINDS THAT THE MARITAL ASSET IN THE CHARLES SCHWAB

11

ACCOUNT IS $87,267 ON EACH SIDE OF THE EQUATION.

12

HAVE TO ADJUST THAT A LITTLE BIT TO MAKE THAT EQUITABLE.

13

AND YOU MAY

I FIND THAT THE FIDELITY IRREVOCABLE FAMILY TRUST IS NOT

14

A MARITAL ASSET.

15

CONTROL OVER IT AND, THEREFORE, IT IS NOT PART OF HIS ESTATE.

16

AND IT IS NOT A MARITAL ASSET.

17

IT'S AN IRREVOCABLE TRUST.

HE HAS NO

I'M GOING TO CONFESS THAT BASED ON MY NOTES AND MY

18

RECOLLECTION THAT I CAN'T TELL YOU WHAT THE VALUE IS OF THE

19

FIDELITY -- OH, JUST A SECOND.

20

STILL A DIFFERENCE.

21

FIDELITY U.S.A. ACCOUNT AND I BELIEVE THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S

22

EVIDENCE WAS THAT IT WAS $198,974. AND THAT THE DEFENDANT

23

FELT THE ACCOUNT WAS 180,960. AND I'LL JUST FLATLY CONFESS TO

24

BOTH OF YOU, I CAN'T RESOLVE THAT BECAUSE I JUST DON'T HAVE

25

ENOUGH DETAIL ON THE ANNOTATIONS I MADE ON THE EXHIBITS AND IN

WELL, NO, I THINK THERE IS

YEAH, THERE IS.

I'M L O O K I N G A T T H E

23
1

LOOKING AT MY TRIAL NOTES AT THIS POINT IN TIME TO HELP YOU.

2

AND IF YOU WANT TO BOTH REFRESH MY MEMORY, I'LL DO MY BEST TO

3

GIVE A FAIR RULING.

4

MR. DART:

I'LL BE GLAD TO DO THAT, YOUR HONOR.

5

OUR FIGURE WAS TAKEN FROM THE LAST MONTHLY STATEMENT ON THAT

6

ACCOUNT.

7

THE COURT:

IN MARCH?

8II

MR. DART:

YEAH.

9

FOLLOWING THAT STATEMENT, THE

DOCTOR HAD DRAWN ON THE ACCOUNT AND AT THE TIME OF TRIAL

10

TESTIFIED THAT IT HAD THE BALANCE SHOWN ON THEIR EXHIBIT. OUR

11

ARGUMENT WAS THAT WITH HIS INCOME STREAM, HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN

12

ABLE TO COVER DEBT WITHOUT REDUCING THAT ACCOUNT.

13

ARGUMENT WAS THAT HE HAD TO MEET DEBT, AND THAT IT WAS

14

APPROPRIATE TO DRAW DOWN.

15

THE LAST MONTHLY STATEMENT.

16

THE QUESTION --

17

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

18

MR. DART:

-- IS WHETHER THE DRAW DOWN IS

19
20

THEIR

SO THE DIFFERENCE IS ONE FIGURE IS
THE ONE IS THE DATE OF THE TRIAL.

APPROPRIATE OR NOT APPROPRIATE.
THE COURT:

YEAH, I REMEMBER THAT NOW, AND I'M GOING

21

TO RULE THAT -- AND DO SO I THINK ON THE STRENGTH OF CASE LAW

22

THAT SAYS I MUST VALUE ASSETS AT THE TIME OF THE MARRIAGE, AND

23

I WAS NOT IMPRESSED AT THE TIME THAT THIS WAS AN IMPROPER USE

24

OF THOSE FUNDS.

25

GENEROUS SUPPORT ORDER, AND SO I WILL ADOPT THE 180,960.

I THINK THE PLAINTIFF RECEIVED A VERY

24
YOU'LL SHARE THAT EQUALLY OR ALLOCATE THE FUNDS IN A WAY,
AGAIN, THAT CAN BE KIND OF A FLOATER, A FLOATING EQUALIZER.
NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE BANK ACCOUNTS, I FIND THAT THE
FIRST SECURITY BANK ACCOUNT IS $23,687, AND I'LL AWARD THAT TO
HIM.

IN OTHER WORDS, I'M NOT ADOPTING THE $19,854.

SHE HAS

ON HER SIDE OF THE EQUATION THE WEBER STATE CREDIT UNION
ACCOUNT.

THE CHILDREN HAVE THEIR OWN ACCOUNTS THAT ARE

IDENTIFIED ON PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 13-A.

I FIND THAT THE AUDI

VEHICLE, ALTHOUGH IN HIS NAME, WAS PURCHASED WITH HIS OWN
MONEY, AND THAT HE THEN GAVE IT TO THE CORPORATION IN EXCHANGE
FOR THE JEEP AND IT, THEREFORE, BELONGS TO ROCKY MOUNTAIN.
IT'S NOT A MARITAL ASSET.
I FIND THAT THE PORSCHE CABARET IS A MARITAL ASSET.
ALTHOUGH THERE WAS TESTIMONY THAT IT WAS GIVEN TO HER AS A
GIFT, A LOT OF TIMES PEOPLE IN MARRIAGE BUY THINGS THAT ARE
ALSO NEEDED FOR THE FAMILY AND JUST COINCIDE THOSE THINGS WITH
GIFTS AS BIRTHDAYS AND CHRISTMASSES AND THINGS.

BUT THAT IS

SUCH A SUBSTANTIAL ASSET THAT IT WOULD BE IMPROPER IN THE
COURT'S VIEW TO JUST SAY THAT THAT'S JUST HERS.

SO IF SHE

WANTS IT, AND I THINK SHE DOES, SHE HAS FORTY-THREE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ON HER SIDE OF THE EQUATION.
MR. DART:

THAT FIGURE AGAIN IS WHAT, YOUR HONOR?

THE COURT:

$43,225.

IF I'M MISTAKEN ON THAT, LET

ME KNOW, BUT I THINK THAT'S WHAT I PICKED UP OUT OF MY NOTES
OR OFF ONE OF THE EXHIBITS.
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1

MS. MAYCOCK:

THAT'S CORRECT.

2

THE COURT:

THE 1980 PORSCHE IS HIS.

3

PREMARITAL PROPERTY.

4

EXCLUDED THAT FROM THE EQUATION, BUT I DIDN'T FOLLOW THROUGH

5

AND MAKE A NOTE ON THAT.

6

ANYWAY, I DELETED THAT.

7

PREMARITAL ASSET.

8
9
10
11

IT WAS

THE 1989 JEEP BELONGS TO -- BOY, I HAVE

I MAY HAVE TO COME BACK TO THAT, BUT
MY THINKING IS THAT THAT IS A

I FIND THAT THE 1992 G.M.C. VAN HAS A VALUE OF $14,691
BASED ON THE AVERAGE N.A.D.A. AND THE EXTRAS THAT WERE
IDENTIFIED.
I AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN THE POLARIS SNOWMOBILES HAVING A

12

VALUE OF $2,500 AND THE SNOWMOBILE TRAILER HAVING A VALUE OF A

13

THOUSAND.

14

MRS. BOHMAN IS AWARDED THE HORSE TRAILER FOR 4,000.

15

WE RESERVED THE ISSUE OF THE FURNITURE AND FURNISHINGS.

16
17

I ASSUME YOU'VE WORKED THAT OUT?
MR. DART:

WE HAVE NOT, YOUR HONOR.

WE IN ALL

18

CANDOR HAVE BEEN TO A POINT WHERE OTHER CASES INTERVENED AND

19

WE'VE HAD SOME COMMUNICATION, BUT THAT'S STILL AN OPEN ITEM.

20

IT'S ONE THAT I REQUEST THAT WE BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO

21

WORK OUT AND IF NEED BE, WE CAN COME BACK BEFORE THE COURT

22

AGAIN ON IT.

23

GUIDANCE HERE TODAY --

24
25

BUT I THINK UNLESS THE COURT WANTS TO GIVE US

THE COURT:

I DON'T.

IN FACT, YOU KNOW, THIS WHO IS

GETTING THE HOME MIGHT FACILITATE SOME OF THAT.

MRS. BOHMAN'S

26
GOING TO HAVE A FAIR AMOUNT OF EQUITY, YOU KNOW, CASH THAT SHE
CAN GO OUT AND BUY A NEW HOME.

IT MAY BE THAT SHE WILL BUY

SOMETHING THAT IN THE LONG RUN MIGHT BE MORE AFFORDABLE AND
THAT MIGHT DICTATE SOMEWHAT WHAT SHE WANTS TO BUY BY WAY OF
FURNITURE.

SHE MAY AT THAT POINT NOT WANT SOME OF THE THINGS

OUT OF HOUSE.

SHE MAY WANT SOMETHING THAT MIGHT JUST BE MORE

SUITABLE FOR WHAT SHE'S GOING TO BUY.
MS. MAYCOCK:

YOUR HONOR, I WOULD REQUEST THAT WE GIVE

OURSELVES SOME KIND OF DEADLINE TO DEAL WITH THIS OR GET BACK
IN FRONT OF THE COURT SO WE DON'T JUST DRIFT WITH IT.
THE COURT:

WHAT WOULD YOU RECOMMEND, ELLEN?

MS. MAYCOCK:

BERT, CAN WE DO THAT WITHIN THE NEXT 20

MR. DART:

YES.

THE COURT:

OKAY.

DAYS?

OKAY.

THAT WOULD BE GREAT, AND I

SHOULD BE BACK FROM VACATION BY THAT TIME AND BE IN.

IF YOU

NEED SOME HELP, WE COULD PERHAPS GET TO IT.
MS. MAYCOCK:

THANK YOU.

THE COURT:

I ASSUME ART IS INCLUDED IN THE SAME

CATEGORY AS THE FURNITURE AND FURNISHINGS?
MS. MAYCOCK:

I THINK THE ART WAS ALMOST ALL BRAD'S

PREMARITAL PROPERTY, AND I DON'T THINK THAT'S DISPUTED.
THE COURT:
REALLY DIDN'T KNOW.

OKAY.

I DON'T HAVE MUCH ON THAT.

AND

THERE WERE NO VALUES THAT WERE ASSIGNED

TO ANY OF THAT AND MAYBE THAT'S WHY.

ALL RIGHT.
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1

MR. DART:

AGAIN, IF WE CAN'T (UNINTELLIGIBLE) SAME

2

CATEGORY.

3

WAS SOME DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER SOME WAS MARITAL, PREMARITAL,

4

SO LIKE THE FURNITURE BE LEFT AN OPEN ITEM (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

5

MY RECALL IS SOME OF THE ART IS MARITAL AND THERE

THE COURT:

OKAY.

NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE JEWELRY,

6

THIS IS JUST A JUDGMENT CALL, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT A

7

WEDDING RING WHICH IS -- OR AN ENGAGEMENT RING, WHICH IS

8

USUALLY THE MOST VALUABLE RING, IS A GIFT CONDITIONED UPON

9

MARRIAGE.

AND ONCE THE CONDITION HAS BEEN SATISFIED, I THINK

10

THAT GIFT BECOMES ABSOLUTE.

11

GIVE HER ABSOLUTELY THE VALUE OF HER WEDDING RING.

12

AND FOR THAT REASON, I'M GOING TO

WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER JEWELRY, I'LL CONSIDER THAT

13

MARITAL PROPERTY, AND TO THE EXTENT THE PARTIES CAN APPRISE

14

SOME VALUE TO IT, YOU CAN DO THAT OR IF YOU WANT, YOU CAN LET

15

DR. BOHMAN TAKE FIRST PICK, AND THEN MRS. BOHMAN, AND

16

SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE.

17

HAVE HER WEDDING RINGS.

18
19
20

BUT I DO FEEL IT'S APPROPRIATE SHE

WITH RESPECT TO THE HORSES, I AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN, DUSTY
AND TO MRS. BOHMAN, PAIGE AND THE FOAL.
THE LIFE INSURANCE HAS NO VALUE EXCEPT FOR LIBERTY LIFE

21

AND THERE'S AN IDENTIFICATION OF THE POLICY AND I THINK WE ALL

22

KNOW WHAT THAT IS. THERE'S A CASH VALUE 9,318.

23

THAT.

24
25

HE CAN HAVE

MRS. BOHMAN NEEDS TO SIGN OFF ON THAT.

AWARD TO DR. BOHMAN THE CHARLES SCHWAB I.R.A. ACCOUNT
THAT I'VE PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED.

THAT WAS THE ONE THAT WAS

28
THE CONTRIBUTORY -- OH, LET'S SEE, WHERE IS THAT EXHIBIT?
THAT IS CORRECT, ISN'T IT?

IT'S THE CONTRIBUTORY ACCOUNT?

MS. MAYCOCK:

RIGHT.

MR. DART:

181 (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

THE COURT:

RIGHT.

AND THEN THE ROLLOVER ACCOUNT,

AND THEN THERE WAS SOME ADDITIONAL MONEYS ADDED TO IT, AND
SHE'S GETTING 57,256, IS THAT CORRECT?

AND HE'S TAKING

257,63 9, IS THAT WHAT WAS AGREED?
MR. DART:

IT WAS PROPOSED, WE WERE USING THIS AS

THE AREA OF THE LUMP FIGURE OR THE -THE COURT:

OKAY, THAT'S RIGHT.

YOU'RE CORRECT.

ALL RIGHT.
MR. DART:

I THINK WHAT WE NEED TO DO, YOUR HONOR,

IS TAKE WITH THE HOUSE SHIFT AND THIS IS GOING TO REQUIRE US
LOOKING TO OTHER ASSETS AND SEE WHETHER WE CAN GET TO SOME -THE COURT:
WITH THAT.

YEAH, YOU ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT.

I AGREE

THAT'S A BIG ITEM OF EQUITY AND --

MR. DART:

I CAN MAKE A PROPOSAL TO ELLEN OF HOW,

USING YOUR FIGURES, WE WORK OUT A DIVISION THEN ELLEN CAN
EITHER AGREE OR COME BACK AND AT LEAST LET US HAMMER AT IT.
IF WE'RE ABLE TO WORK IT OUT, FINE.

IF NOT, LET'S PUT THAT IN

THIS SAME 20-DAY GAP WE PROPOSED.
THE COURT:
SENSE.

ALL RIGHT.

OKAY, YEAH.

I THINK THAT MAKES GOOD

I GIVE TO HIM THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN

ANESTHESIOLOGY PENSION PLAN OF $56,058.
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1
2
3

I GIVE TO MRS. BOHMAN THE 1994 INCOME TAX REFUND OF
12,259.
NOW, JUST TO HELP YOU, AND IF YOU HAVEN'T ALREADY DEDUCED

4

THIS, I'VE USED THIS AS KIND OF A STARTING POINT, PLAINTIFF'S

5

EXHIBIT 13-A.

6

WAS, FRANKLY, EASIER FOR ME TO FOLLOW THAT.

7

OVERLOOKED SOMETHING, JUST INCLUDE THAT UNLESS THERE'S SOME

8

DISPUTE, AND YOU CAN GET BACK TO ME.

9

INCOME TAX REFUND I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT THEY BE SPLIT

10
11
12
13
14

AND I'VE KIND OF OPERATED OFF THAT BECAUSE IT

MRS. BOHMAN WILL ASSUME THE CLIFF CHEVRON AND THANE HALES
EXPENSES OF 854 AND 698 RESPECTIVELY.
MR. DART:

IS SHE GETTING A CREDIT EQUALIZATION OF

ASSETS AND LIABILITIES THAT'S SHOWN ON THAT EXHIBIT?
MS. MAYCOCK:

16

HAS ALREADY PAID THOSE.

18
19

OTHERWISE, THE 1995

EQUALLY.

15

17

AND SO IF I'VE

THE COURT:

YOUR HONOR, OUR POSITION IS THAT BRAD

I AGREE, YEAH, AND THAT'S - - H E PAID HER

SUPPORT AND THIS IS HER OBLIGATION.
NOW, IN ADDITION TO THIS, COURT FINDS THAT BECAUSE OF

20

MRS. BOHMAN'S EXPENSES AND NOT STAYING WITHIN WHAT WAS

21

REASONABLY NECESSARY BY WAY OF SUPPORT, DR. BOHMAN LOANED HER

22

$20,000.

23

TO THE PREMARITAL - - O R EXCUSE ME, ADDED TO HER SIDE, SHE HAS

24

THE $20,000 NOTE FROM DR. BOHMAN AND SHE EXECUTED ON MARCH

25

8TH, 1995.

AND I AM GIVING THAT TO HER AS AN ASSET.

SO ADDED
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I ALSO FIND THAT SHE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LAKE POWELL
EXPENSE OF 2,906.
I FIND THAT SHE --AT LEAST THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATED
THAT SHE STOCKPILED HER GROCERIES, SO THE SMITH'S BILL IS
ALSO, 32,000 -- $3,240 IS ALSO HERS.

AND I FIND THAT WAS

THREE TIMES THE NORMAL AMOUNT THAT WAS APPROPRIATE.
I FIND ALSO THAT THE PROPERTY TAXES PAID FOR MRS. BOHMAN
BY DR. BOHMAN SHOULD BE GIVEN CREDIT TO HIM.
I FIND THAT UNDER THE TEMPORARY ORDER SHE WAS REQUIRED TO
PAY THESE EXPENSES.
ASSET.

SHE DIDN'T.

HE STEPPED IN TO PROTECT THE

AND HE SHOULD BE BEGIN CREDIT FOR 2,408.

SO ON HER

SIDE SHE NEEDS TO BE GIVEN CREDIT FOR 20,000, 2,906, $3,240,
AND 2,408.

THAT'S IT.

MR. DART:

QUESTION I HAVE, ATTORNEY'S FEES.

THE COURT:

YES.

THIS WAS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR ME

AND I STRUGGLED WITH THIS NOT KNOWING WHAT WOULD BE THE FAIR
THING TO DO.

I FIND THAT PLAINTIFF REPRESENTS REASONABLE FEES

AND COSTS OF 42,615.
HAVING TWO LAWYERS.

I FIND THAT THERE IS SOME DUPLICATION BY
AND THE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL THEMSELVES

ACKNOWLEDGE THAT A $5,000 DEDUCTION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.
THERE IS WHERE I STRUGGLED.

AND

AND LET ME JUST INDICATE THAT AT

THIS POINT, THERE'S $3,716 AFTER THE $5,000 CREDIT FOR
DUPLICATION.

WITHOUT HAVING TO GET DOWN AND MAKE SOME

JUDGMENT OF -- BASED ON WHAT EVIDENCE I RECEIVED, WHAT WAS
REALLY -- WHETHER THERE REALLY WAS DUPLICATION AND I, FRANKLY,
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1

HAVE SOME CONCERNS BECAUSE OF THE AMOUNT OF MISS MAYCOCK'S

2

FEES.

3

IS HER HOURLY RATE.

4

ADDRESS THAT BECAUSE, I DON'T KNOW, SOMETIMES WE ALL WORK AT

5

DIFFERENT PACES AND HIRE THE LAWYER THAT WE HIRE.

6

TO ME THAT THERE IS ENOUGH THERE THAT IS NONETHELESS

7

REASONABLE THAT THE COURT CAN TAKE EVEN A REASONABLE BASIS OR

8

REASONABLE AMOUNT AND SAY, THERE'S SOMETHING THAT OUGHT TO BE

9

CONSIDERED HERE BY WAY OF FEES.

AND I KNOWLEDGE THAT HER FEES ARE SOMEWHAT LESS.

THAT

BUT WITHOUT HAVING TO REALLY GET IN AND

IT APPEALS

I FIND THAT, THAT THERE IS

10

SOME NEED, NOT A GREAT DEAL ON THE PART OF MRS. BOHMAN,

11

BECAUSE SHE'S GOING GET A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF CASH IN THIS

12

MARRIAGE.

13

INTO A HOME, A HOME THAT OUGHT TO SOMEWHAT APPROXIMATE WHAT

14

SHE'S BEEN USED TO.

15

I DOUBT THAT SHE WILL DO THAT BECAUSE SHE HAS GOT TO KNOW THAT

16

IN FIVE YEARS ALIMONY'S GOING TO TERMINATE AND SHE'S GOT TO

17

FACE THAT INEVITABILITY AND, THEREFORE, IT MIGHT MAKE A LOT

18

MORE SENSE TO GET INTO SOMETHING MORE MODEST, THAT SHE CANNOT

19

ONLY AFFORD NOW, BUT IN FIVE YEARS.

20

SOME OF WHICH, THOUGH, SHE'S GOING TO NEED TO GET

SHE'S CERTAINLY ENTITLED TO DO THAT, BUT

WITH THAT IN MIND, I HAVE ELECTED TO SAY THAT THERE IS

21

SOME NEED THERE.

ON THE OTHER SIDE, HOWEVER, I FIND SOME

22

LIMITED ABILITY TO PAY.

23

SHAKE OUT BY THE TIME HE TAKES THE HOME AND TO TRY TO GIVE HER

24

A LOT OF CASH TO EQUALIZE SOME OF THESE ASSETS, AND SOME OF

25

HIS MONEY IS TIED UP IN RETIREMENTS AND THOSE KIND OF THINGS.

I'M NOT SURE HOW ALL THIS IS GOING TO
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AND MAYBE I OUGHT TO JUST KIND OF SEE HOW ALL THAT SHAKES OUT
AFTER YOU'VE HAD A CHANCE TO EQUALIZE EVERYTHING.
JUST MAKE THIS OBSERVATION:

BUT LET ME

THAT HE PREVIOUSLY HAS PAID HER

$7,500, AND I BELIEVE ALSO THERE WAS ABOUT $4,000 IN THE
ACCOUNT THAT SHE TOOK RIGHT WHEN THEY SEPARATED THAT COULD
HAVE BEEN USED FOR FEES.
AS RETAINER FOR FEES.

BUT FOR CERTAIN, HE GAVE HER $7500

AND UNLESS PARTIES FEEL REALLY STRONGLY

ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT HE PAY HER
ANOTHER $5,000.

AND I DO THAT SOMEWHAT HESITATINGLY BECAUSE I

DON'T KNOW WHAT HIS CASH FLOW WILL BE BY GIVING HIM THE HOME.
BUT UNLESS THERE IS SOME OBVIOUS INEQUITY, MISS MAYCOCK, I'LL
ORDER THAT HE PAY HER $5,000.

I THINK THERE'S A LITTLE ROOM

EVEN IN HIS INCOME TO DO THAT.
IF HE DID THAT, THAT'S $12,500 TOWARD HER FEES.
THINK THAT'S FAIR.

AND I

AND I DO THAT FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS.

ONE, ALTHOUGH SHE HAS EQUITY IN THE MARITAL ESTATE, SHE
SHOULDN'T HAVE TO DEPLETE THAT ANY MORE THAN HE DOES.
AND I THINK THAT HE IN THE LONG RUN WILL HAVE MORE POTENTIAL
TO EARN INCOME AND, THEREFORE, COULD PAY THOSE FEES.

THAT'S

IT.
MR. DART:

I HAVE TWO QUESTIONS IF I MAY, YOUR

HONOR.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

MR. DART:

ONE OF THE CONCERNS I HAD IS THAT GIVING

THIS ALIMONY AWARD BASED UPON THE LIFE STYLE AND GIVING HIM
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THE HOUSE AND HER MOVING TO SOMETHING LESS EXPENSIVE HAS A -AT LEAST HIM HAVING IN MIND THAT HE CAN COME BACK ON A
MODIFICATION, I TAKE IT THAT YOUR AWARD OF ALIMONY IS WITH THE
EXPECTENCY THAT SHE MAY BE BUYING SOMETHING LESS EXPENSIVE AND
THAT WOULD NOT BE A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE.
THE COURT:

THAT'S ABSOLUTELY CORRECT.

NOW, AT

LEAST IN MY MIND, THAT'S THE WAY I THOUGHT THAT THROUGH LAST
NIGHT.

NOW, MISS MAYCOCK, IF YOU SEE THAT DIFFERENTLY --

SHE'S IN KIND OF A CATCH 22 BECAUSE SHE HAS ABSOLUTELY A RIGHT
TO ENJOY THE LIFE STYLE TO WHICH SHE HAS BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO,
AND I STRUGGLED WITH THAT.

BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THERE

IS GOING TO BE AN UPHEAVAL IN HER LIFE IN FIVE YEARS UNLESS
SHE HAPPENS TO MARRY WELL AGAIN.
PURE SPECULATION.

AND, YOU KNOW, THAT'S JUST

AND THOSE BOYS HAVE A RIGHT TO ENJOY WHAT

THEY HAVE HAD, BUT I -- JUST REALISTICALLY, I EXPECTED HER TO
BUY SOMETHING MORE MODEST, SOMETHING THAT SHE CAN AFFORD.
SHE'S GOT A CHANCE TO HAVE SECURITY IN A HOME FOR THE REST OF
HER LIFE IF SHE IS CAREFUL.

BUT I DON'T THINK IT'S

APPROPRIATE TO TURN AROUND AND USE THAT AGAINST HER IF SHE
HAPPENS TO BE MORE PRUDENT.

DO YOU FEEL THAT OR SEE THAT

DIFFERENTLY?
MS. MAYCOCK:

NO.

I THINK YOU ARE RIGHT, YOUR HONOR,

BECAUSE THIS IS ALL A PART OF THE SAME AWARD.

AND I THINK

THAT OUR CASES TELL US IT HAS TO BE A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT WASN'T CONTEMPLATED WHEN THE DECREE WAS ENTERED AND --
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THE COURT:

THAT'S WONDERFUL.

MS. MAYCOCK:

THIS IS ONE THAT IS CONTEMPLATED.

THE COURT:

YEAH, EXACTLY, THOSE ARE WONDERFUL WORDS

THAT ARE USED IN THE CASES, AND I THINK THEY APPLY IN THIS
CASE, AND THANK YOU.
MR. DART:

ALL RIGHT.

YOUR NEXT QUESTION PLEASE.

NEXT QUESTION IS, DATE OF OCCUPANCY OF

THE HOUSE AND THE DATE OF PAYMENT TO EQUALIZE THE VALUE.
THE COURT:

THAT WAS ONE I THOUGHT ABOUT A COUPLE OF

DAYS AGO, BUT DIDN'T THINK ABOUT IT LAST NIGHT WHEN I ACTUALLY
ROUGHED OUT THIS DECISION.

I HAD IN MIND SOMETHING BETWEEN

MAYBE THREE TO SIX MONTHS.

I DON'T THINK SHE OUGHT TO BE

IMMEDIATELY EVICTED.

I THINK SHE NEEDS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOP

SO THAT SHE CAN DO THE RIGHT THING.

I STILL THINK IT'S A

BUYER'S MARKET OUT THERE, ISN'T IT?
MR. DART:

SALT LAKE HAS BEEN A SELLER'S MARKET.

I'M NOT THAT FAMILIAR WITH OGDEN.
MS. MAYCOCK:

I DON'T KNOW THE OGDEN MARKET EITHER,

YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:
A NICE HOME.

I THINK IF YOU'VE GOT CASH, YOU CAN BUY

AND I -- DO YOU WANT TO TRY TO WORK THAT OUT

BETWEEN YOU AND BRING THAT BACK TO ME OR DO YOU WANT ME JUST
TO ENTER SOME KIND OF ARBITRARY DECISION THIS MORNING?
MR. DART:

RATHER YOU GIVE US A DATE WITH THE RIGHT

TO COME BEFORE THE COURT IF CIRCUMSTANCES PROVE THAT THAT DATE
HAS A DIFFICULTY.
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MS. MAYCOCK:

MY SUGGESTION WOULD BE, YOUR HONOR, THAT

YOU DIRECT MISS BOHMAN TO MOVE FORWARD IN GOOD FAITH AND THEN
GIVE HER A PRETTY REASONABLE DEADLINE, BUT THAT SHE BE
EXPECTED TO BEGIN TAKING STEPS RIGHT AWAY TO FIND A NEW HOME.
THE COURT:
TO DO THAT.

I AGREE WITH THAT, AND I THINK SHE NEEDS

AND, YOU KNOW, SHE MAY NEED A DAY OR TWO JUST TO

SORT THINGS OUT IN HER OWN MIND.

BUT I THINK, MRS. BOHMAN,

YOU DO NEED TO PROMPTLY START --OR ENGAGE A REALTOR TO SEE
WHAT'S AVAILABLE OUT THERE.

IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR HER

TO WAIT EVEN THOUGH ON THAT UNTIL YOU HAVE BALANCED THINGS
OUT.

SHE OUGHT TO KNOW WHAT SHE'S GOT TO FINANCIALLY WORK

WITH.
MR. DART:

WE COULD LEAVE THIS AS AN OPEN ITEM,

THAT IF WE'RE NOT ABLE TO AGREE THAT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) ONE OF
THE THINGS WE COME BACK BEFORE YOU IN 2 0-DAY ITEM TO SEE IF WE
CAN SORT IT.

OTHERWISE, BE PREPARED WITH OUR REASONS.

THE COURT:

YES, LET'S DO THAT.

AND AT THIS POINT,

I'M GOING TO TRUST THAT MRS. BOHMAN WILL WORK IN GOOD FAITH TO
FIND A NEW HOME AND THAT DR. BOHMAN WILL BE PATIENT AND
UNDERSTANDING.

I TRUST THAT, YOU KNOW, THE PROPERTY WILL BE

LEFT IN GOOD CONDITION AND, YOU KNOW, THOSE SORT OF THINGS.
WHAT ELSE?
MR. DART:

THAT COVERS IT, YOUR HONOR.

FOR YOU TIME AND DELIBERATION.
THE COURT:

WELL, THANK YOU.

THANK YOU
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MS. MAYCOCK:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT:

YOU BET. BYE.

MS. MAYCOCK:

BYE.
*****
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOOOooo
REBEKAH R. BOHMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BRADFORD K. BOHMAN,

Civil No. 944901996

Defendant.

Judge Michael D. Lyon
oooOOOooo

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on
April 22, 23, 24 and 26, 1996, plaintiff appearing in person and by
her attorneys, B. L. Dart and Sharon A. Donovan and defendant
appearing in person and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock, and the
Court having heard testimony of several witnesses, exhibits having
been introduced and stipulations having been made and items in
dispute having been argued and submitted and the Court having taken
the matter under advisement and having made its ruling by telephone
conference on the 14th day of June, 1996.

Thereafter, defendant

filed a Motion to Amend or Clarify the Court's ruling with respect
to visitation which was argued on July 30, 1996, and the Court
having ruled on that matter and thereafter defendant having filed
Objections to plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
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of Law and the Court having ruled on that matter and these rulings
having been incorporated in the following Findings and the Court
being fully advised, hereby does make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff

and defendant

are residents of Weber

County, State of Utah and were so for at least three months prior
to the filing of this divorce action and also the Counterclaim.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other

in Park City, Utah on the 20th day of September, 1989, and since
that time have been husband and wife.

They separated in the Fall

of 1994.
3.
irretrievably

The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have
broken this marriage and the parties should be

granted a mutual divorce one from the other to become final upon
entry.
4.

The parties are the parents of three minor children,

to wit: Angela (Angie), age 14, born October 30, 1981, plaintiff's
child from a former marriage adopted by defendant; the parties have
as natural issue of their marriage two children, Braxton, age 6,
born April 17, 1990 and Bryson, age 5, born July 25, 1991.

In two

or three years the youngest child will be in school.
5.

The Court

finds that

a custody

evaluation was

performed by Mr. Philip B. Johnson, M.S., pursuant to Court Order.
6.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has been primarily a

homemaker during the marriage.

Defendant is an anesthesiologist.
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7.

The Court observes that it is unfortunate that it

cannot order joint legal custody in this case.

The Court finds

that each party has strengths, which combined with one another in
a joint custody arrangement and the flexibility of Defendant's work
schedule, would really inure to the benefit of the children.
However, the parties do not agree to an Order for joint custody,
and

the

relationship

between

the

parties

has

been

somewhat

tempestuous during the period of time that these proceedings have
been pending and has been punctuated by a history of uncooperation
and, therefore, the Court will decline to make any joint custody
award, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. §30-3-10.
8.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has been the

primary caregiver of these children, although the Defendant has
contributed meaningfully, especially during the last few years.
The Court further finds that the children are doing well and have
adapted to their separate homes apart from their parents.
9.

The Court finds that both parties are equal or would

be equal in promoting visitation and, therefore, the Court does not
see any advantage one way or the other in evaluating that factor.
10.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has the greater

flexibility to provide personal care for the children because she
has no employment, although the Court finds that Plaintiff needs to
go to school or obtain employment at some time.

It may not be in

the best interests of Plaintiff to return immediately to work. The
law certainly would give her leeway to stay home to take care of
her children, at least until they were in school.

On the other

3
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hand, there is a concern that the Court has that to the extent
possible

she

needs

to be

either

advancing

her

education

or

advancing her employment because this alimony is going to terminate
in five years.

On the one hand the Court is very concerned about

the welfare of these children and yet on the other hand she has got
to take care of them but she has to be farsighted enough to look
down the road and how she does that, the Court will leave to her
sound judgment. To the extent reasonably possible, she needs to do
what she can to help support herself but she ought not be expected
to do that by sacrificing the welfare of the children.

The Court

finds that Defendant's employment enables him to give generously to
these children, and therefore, on that issue it is a somewhat close
question.
11.

The Court finds that this was a close case, but

nonetheless, Plaintiff met more of the "function related" factors
than Defendant did.

The Court considered that Plaintiff has had

the children during the time that these proceedings have been
pending and has found that the children are functioning very well
in Plaintiff's home.

In light of the need for stability in the

children's lives, the Court finds it is in their best interests for
Plaintiff to be awarded custody of the children.
12.

The Court finds that the children are happy and well

adjusted and doing very well.

However, the Court also recognizes

that the Defendant has contributed very meaningfully to their state
of emotional health and happiness.
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13.

The

Court

finds

that

the

stability

of

environment of each parent really made this case close.

the
The

Plaintiff is leaving her fourth marriage, although she is just 38
years of age and although some of the problems that she has had in
previous marriages the Court senses were not entirely of her own
making and there were some instances of abuse and other problems
that

somewhat

made

her

a

victim

of

those

circumstances.

Nonetheless, her having now gone through four marriages does not
lend a lot of consistency

in her

life.

On the other hand,

defendant, himself, is leaving his second marriage.
14.

Defendant presented testimony concerning behaviors

of Plaintiff that he felt were having a negative impact on the
children.

The Court does find that Plaintiff drinks excessively

and that there
children.

is a potential

for an adverse

impact

on the

However, the Court finds no evidence of that having a

negative impact on the children.
15.

The Court

finds that Plaintiff

is a profligate

spender and that that was part of the problem in the parties1
marriage.

Plaintiff's extravagant spending caused the Court some

real concerns about Plaintiff's stability and her ability to manage
to stay on a budget where things are going to be somewhat limited
following this marriage.
16.

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff is a very

loving, caring parent who really has at heart the best interests of
her children.

Although Plaintiff can be distracted by a lot of

other activities, the Court finds that fundamentally she deeply
5
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cares and loves these children and would always put them first.
The Court has every expectation that Plaintiff will be a good
mother and will be a positive influence on the children.
17.
qualities

and

The Court finds that the Defendant has many strong
that he

is very

attuned

to

education

and

its

importance in the children's lives. The Court finds that Defendant
will be a positive influence on the children if he is given an
opportunity to have substantial contact so that he can help the
children with their homework, monitor their grades and provide good
fundamental

motivation.

Defendant's work

schedule

has

large

periods of time when he can spend time with the children and that
flexibility needs to be realized in his visitation schedule.
18.

The Court finds that Defendant is a very mature,

stable parent who will provide constancy and consistency.
Court

finds that Defendant

has a strong

personality

The

and can

sometimes be "controlling,M but there is no evidence that that has
been to the disadvantage of the children.
19.

The Court finds that Angela wants to live with her

mother and that the Defendant accepts this. Braxton and Bryson are
too young to decide where they want to live.
20.

The

Court

finds

that

it

is

important

for

the

stability and emotional support of Braxton and Bryson, having just
gone through a separation from their parent's living together, that
they also live together with one another and that they also live
with Angela.

The Court finds that apart from the tension that

Braxton and Bryson might sense exists between their parents, Angela
6
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would provide some stability and emotional security.

The Court

finds that it is important that custody of Bryson and Braxton be
with their mother. The evidence supports a strong bond between the
children and both parents, although Plaintiff is the primary
psychological parent, according to Dr. Philip B. Johnson.

The

Court finds that both parents are equal in moral character.
21.

The Court finds that Defendant will in the long run

offer a more stable financial environment than will the Plaintiff,
but with child support, alimony and the income that Plaintiff will
eventually be able to earn, Plaintiff will be able to provide
adequately for the care of the children and, therefore, that is not
an issue that the Court gave any weight.
22.

The Court finds that despite whatever slants there

were on the evidence portrayed by each party, this case boiled down
to a choice between a very good parent and one who was just
slightly better.

The Court orders that neither party should leave

the area beyond 150 miles, without giving reasonable notice to the
other.
23.

The Court finds that it is in the best interests of

the parties' minor children, Braxton and Bryson, that Plaintiff be
awarded sole custody, subject to liberal visitation on behalf of
Defendant, as follows:
(a)

Week-End

Visitation.

Defendant

should have visitation with the children three
weekends each month, from Friday at 9:00 a.m.
to

Sunday

at

7:30

p.m.,

or

depending

on

7
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Defendant's

work

schedule

from

Saturday

9:00 a.m. to Monday at 7:30 p.m.

at

When Friday

is a school day, visitation should begin after
school and Defendant should pick the children up
from home at 4:00 p.m.
The Court specifically reserves the issue
as to the 5th weekend of the month visitation for
further agreement of the parties or order of the Court.
(b)
should

Holiday

h^ve

Visitation.

alternate

Defendant

holiday

visitation,

pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. §30-3-35, only.
No other holidays should be divided.
of

the

Standard

Visitation

A copy

Schedule

attached hereto, as Exhibit "A."

is

The parties

have agreed that the holiday visitation schedule
may be reversed so that defendant should have
the holiday visitation specified for "oddnumbered" years in the even-numbered years and
vice versa.
(c)

Mid-Week Visitation.

Defendant is

entitled to one mid-week visitation each month
from

the

time

the

children

get

school to 8:00 p.m. that evening.

home

from

This mid-

week visitation is to be either the week prior
to

or

the

week

following

the

weekend

when

defendant does not have weekend visitation and

8

1537

is to be scheduled by defendant for a night
mutually acceptable to the parties or, if they
cannot agree, to be set by the defendant upon
providing

to plaintiff

three

or more

advance notice of the visitation.
midweek

visitation

is

weeks

Insofar as

affected

by

weekend

visitation, the court reserves that issue for
further agreement of the parties or order of
the court.
(d)
be

Surrogate Care.

required

provide

to

care

surrogate

for

care,

allow

The parties should

the

the

other

children,

when

that

party

to

lieu

of

in

party

cannot

personally care for the children for a period
of four hours or more.
(e)

Make-up

Visitation.

Defendant

anticipates that occasionally he may need to
work

during

should

know

his

weekend

his

schedule

month in advance.

visitation

and

approximately

he
one

On an occasional basis, if

Defendant is required to work and is unable to
exercise

his

visitation,

he

will

notify

Plaintiff, with as much notice as he possibly
can,

and

will

be

entitled

to

make-up

visitation during the week for the length of
time that he missed.

The Court finds that if

9

this becomes a problem, the Court will review
the make-up visitation issue.
(f)

Summer Visitation.

The Court finds

that the summer be divided equally, with each
party taking the children for two weeks at a
time, with the other parent having telephone
contact.
24.

The Court finds that Defendant should be awarded

standard visitation with the parties1 minor child, Angela.

The

Court finds that because of the strained relationship between
Defendant and Angela, Defendant will probably have to work out that
visitation, as he can. Plaintiff should encourage the relationship
between Angela and Defendant.
25. With respect to income of defendant, the Court finds
that the evidence preponderates that defendant earns approximately
$278,000 a year, primarily
income.

on the strength of his historical

Defendant did introduce evidence that remuneration for

positions may be changing but it remains to be seen how that will
impact the defendant in the future and the Court feels it is just
too speculative for the Court to deal with that issue at^this
point.

The defendant

can move to modify

later

if his dire

predictions come true. Therefore, the Court finds that defendant's
current income capacity is the amount of $278,000 a year or $23,167
a month.
26.

With respect to income of the plaintiff, the Court

finds that plaintiff has no income currently though she acquired
10
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two years of college during the marriage.

The Court has no basis

to determine whether she can improve her place in the job market if
she were to return to employment.

Before plaintiff

defendant her highest income was about $5.00 an hour.

married

The Court

has no basis for determining that she can earn more than that given
the small ages of the children and what the Court senses is a
mutual caring that they be nurtured properly.

As stated in

paragraph

interests of

10 above, it may not be in the best

plaintiff to return immediately to work.

Based upon the current

financial circumstances the Court imputes no income to plaintiff at
this time.
The Court observes that the alimony award that the
Court will award in this case won't last very long.
27.

With

respect

to

child

support

based

upon

the

defendant's income, the Court finds it is fair and reasonable that
the defendant pay to plaintiff child support in the amount of
$1,000 per month for each of the three children for a total of
$3,000 per month.

That sum is to be payable one-half on the 5th

and one-half on the 20th day of each month unless the parties
mutually

agree otherwise.

Child support under the Decree of

Divorce should commence with the month of July, 1996.
As additional support defendant should be ordered to
provide health insurance so long as the same is available to him
through his employment.

Each party should be responsible for one-

half of the uninsured medical and dental expenses except routine
office

visits

which

should

remain

the

responsibility

of

the

11
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plaintiff.

Plaintiff

should

not

incur

any

non-emergency

extraordinary medical expenses which would include medical, dental,
orthodontia and counseling expenses without giving the defendant
notice and an opportunity to be heard first.
Defendant should be ordered to be responsible for
one-half of the work-related or education-related day care expenses
and plaintiff should submit to the defendant satisfactory proof of
those expenses.
So long as defendant is current on his obligation
for child support he should be entitled to declare the minor
children as his exemptions for income tax purposes and plaintiff
should execute the necessary affidavit to allow this exemption to
be declared by defendant.
28.

Defendant

should

be

ordered

to

maintain

life

insurance for the benefit of the children in an amount not less
than what would be sufficient at that time to see that support is
maintained for the children at the rate of $1,000 per month per
child to their majority.
29.

With respect to alimony the Court finds that the

plaintiff's present standard of living based upon her reasonable
needs and consistent with what appeared to be the standard of
living of the parties in the past, was the monthly need of $7,225.
The Court further finds that plaintiff presently has only a limited
ability

to

contribute

because

significant work history.

of

her

unemployment

with

no

Plaintiff's last gainful employment

before the marriage gave her $5.00 an hour.

Plaintiff has two

12
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years of college and ought to continue her studies because the
award of alimony the court is going to award will be brief.
Because of the tender years of the children and
because of the interest that each party has in seeing that they are
nurtured properly and considering the expenses of work, additional
clothing and day care, it may not be highly profitable for the
plaintiff to work, although the Court finds that plaintiff should
obtain employment or go to school. At such time as either of those
create a substantial, material change of circumstances, the Court
would be willing to look again at alimony.
30.

The Court finds that the defendants reasonable

living expenses are approximately between $8,300 to $8,900 a month
and

probably

more

close

to

the

$8,300

figure.

Based

upon

defendant's income he is capable of meeting these living expenses,
child support and the alimony hereinafter to be awarded, even
taking into consideration what his anticipated taxes will be on
this income.
31.

Based upon plaintiff's demonstrated need, which the

Court finds to be reflected

in the plaintiff's Submission of

Detailed Expenses as set forth in her Exhibit P-10 which appear to
be reasonable; further based upon her lack of ability to meet that
need and defendant's ability to meet her need, the Court finds it
is reasonable that plaintiff should be awarded alimony in the
amount of $4,225 a month.

Alimony under the Decree of Divorce

should commence with the month of July, 1996 and be paid one-half
on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day of each month unless the
13
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parties mutually agree otherwise.

The Court further finds that in

the event plaintiff moves to another home and because of the short
duration of the alimony elects to move to a home which is more
modest and of lesser cost, the Court finds this would be an
appropriate decision by her which is anticipated by the Court and
would not be a change of circumstances in a review of the alimony
award herein.

If plaintiff is prudent and appropriate in the

expenditure of money, this should not be used against her.
32.

The Court finds that this support level to the

plaintiff should generally equalize the standard of living between
the parties to the extent that they can ever occur after a divorce.
33.

Plaintiff's entitlement to alimony shall terminate

on the 3 0th day of June, 2 001, or sooner upon the remarriage or
cohabitation of plaintiff or the death of either party or by
operation of law. The amount of alimony can be reviewed before the
expiration of five years if there is a substantial and material
change of the circumstances of the parties.
34.

Defendant

should

be

ordered

to

maintain

life

insurance with the plaintiff as beneficiary in a face amount that
is equal to his remaining obligation at any time to the plaintiff
for alimony. This obligation to carry life insurance should not be
an obligation for alimony and should not be deductible by defendant
or taxable to plaintiff as alimony.
35.
reviewed

The amount of alimony awarded to plaintiff may be

before

the expiration

of

five years

if there

is a

substantial material change of circumstances.
14
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36.

With regard to the issues of property, the Court

needs to first address the claims of premarital assets.

The

differences between the parties position regarding defendant's
claims for premarital assets are set out in plaintiff• s Exhibit 75
and as to those, the Court finds as follows:
a.

The Key Bank account, 577510 and the Fidelity

Income Trust X29-002453 were consumed during the marriage.

Those

accounts were taken from the individual name of defendant and put
into the family income stream and used.

They are consumed and gone

and no premarital credit should be allowed.
b.

The Court finds that defendant owned an equity

at 1706 Ross Drive for which he should receive premarital credit
and based upon the testimony of the parties and the exhibits
introduced, the Court finds that the proper premarital credit
should be $40,000.
c.

The parties stipulated that defendant should

have credits in his IRA rollover account in the amount of $131,481;
his IRA Contributory account of $74,197; and his Rocky Mountain
Pension Plan of $30,000.
d.

There was a 1986 Jeep Cherokee which under

Exhibit P-75 appeared not to be contested.

Defendant, however,

supplemented that Exhibit with Exhibit P-75(a), which raised issue
regarding the Jeep Cherokee.

The Court finds that this Jeep

Cherokee is gone and consumed and for it defendant should receive
no premarital credits.
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e.

The Court finds that the cash in the business

that was identified in the amount of $35,901 is gone and consumed
and for which defendant should receive no premarital credit.
f.

The Court finds that the loan that defendant

gave to his brother during the marriage is also gone and consumed
and for which defendant should receive no premarital credit.
g.

The Court finds that the loan to Rebekah Bohman

of $17,000 loaned prior to the marriage of the parties is gone and
for which defendant should receive no premarital credit.
h.

The

Court

finds

that

as

to

the

accounts

receivable in Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology the weight of the
evidence that in 1989 it had a collection rate of 80% and, as such,
defendant should receive a premarital credit of $100,289.
i.

The Court further finds that the currently

existing assets of Winetau International Minerals Corporation,
Buena Ventura

Resources

(Crown Energy),

the Bohman Ranch, BB

Ranchers, the 1980 silver Porsche and the 1989 Jeep Cherokee are
premarital assets which should be awarded to defendant free of any
marital claim of plaintiff.
j.

Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court

finds that defendant should receive credit for premarital assets in
the amount of $375,967 based upon the following calculation:
1706 Ross Drive
IRA Rollover account
IRA Contributory account
Rocky Mountain Pension Plan
Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology

$ 40,000
131,481
74,197
30,000
100,289

Total:

$375,967
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37.

As to the currently existing property, liabilities

and adjustments the Court finds they should be awarded as follows:
a.

The house

and

real property

Osmond, Ogden, Utah, has a value of

at

2829

East

$534,000 based upon the

defendant's appraisal, less a current outstanding mortgage of
$346,362, leaving an equity of $187,638, which should be awarded to
defendant for the reason that the Court does not think in the long
run plaintiff will be able to afford the mortgage payment and will
probably end up having to sell it anyway.

At that point the

childrens' lives are going to be disrupted anyway and they are only
i

going to be older and more cemented to their friendships and the
Court thinks that it is just going to cause turmoil at that time.
The Court also finds that since the parties have been separated
plaintiff has had some difficulty in keeping the mortgage current
which may put her at risk of meeting this obligation and there is
no way the home can be refinanced to remove defendant's liability.
The Court finds there is a risk notwithstanding paying alimony and
child support defendant may have to step in and take care of the
mortgage obligation from time to time and the Court's concern is
that this would not be fair.
The Court further finds that based upon the
liberal visitation the Court contemplates, the children are going
to enjoy the home a great deal anyway because they will be spending
a lot of time with defendant and that would add to the stability of
their relationship with him of returning to that home.
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This

home

is

currently

occupied

by

the

plaintiff under the Temporary Order and plaintiff should continue
to have the right to occupy this home for a reasonable period of
time while she is seeking other housing which the Court feels
should be a period of between three to six months. The Court finds
that if the parties cannot agree upon a reasonable period of time
for plaintiff to occupy the home, then either party could come back
before the Court based upon the then existing circumstances for a
determination of a specific time. Plaintiff should be taking steps
in good faith to locate a new home at her earliest convenience.
So long as plaintiff occupies the home, she
should be responsible for payment of property taxes and insurance
and these expenses should be prorated as of the date of change of
occupancy from plaintiff to defendant.

She should leave the home

in good condition, reasonable wear and tear accepted.
b.

With respect the defendant's business in Rocky

Mountain Anesthesiology, Inc., the Court finds that the accounts
receivable at a 60% collectability has a value of $93,349.00 which
the Court awards to defendant.

Also the balance sheet assets on

the 1994 tax return reflect a value of $2,798.00 which should be
awarded to defendant.
c.

The Court further finds that the parties have

a WNC tax credit which at the time of trial was $12,784.

This

credit has been diminished by the amount of deduction taken on the
1995 joint income tax return as a tax credit in the amount of

18

1547

$4,478.

This leaves a remaining tax credit of $8,3 06 which should

be awarded to defendant at this value.
d.

As stated above, the Court finds that defendant

should be awarded free of any marital claim of plaintiff the Bohman
Ranch and BB Ranchers with no marital value ascribed as these
assets are premarital.
e.

The parties own an interest in a houseboat and

based upon further discussion of the parties the Court finds that
the agreed value of this houseboat interest is $21,500 which should
be awarded to defendant.
f.

The Court finds that there was an account at

Charles Schwab, No. 16865838, called The Family Trust Account which
had a value as of the time of the trial of $174,534 which account
should be divided equally between the parties with each party to
receive $87,267.
g.

The Court finds that the Fidelity Irrevocable

Family Trust account, No. TO71932704, is not a marital asset as
defendant has no control over it and it is, therefore, not part of
his estate. h.

The Court finds there was a Fidelity USA

X29-002453 account which at the time of the trial in this case had
a value of $180,960, which is a marital asset and which can be used
as an equalizer account to equalize assets.

In order to equalize

the assets of the parties, the Court awards to plaintiff $101,220
of this account and to defendant $79,740 of this account.
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i.
Corporation),

at

Buena
69,505

Ventura
shares

Resources

(Crown

is a premarital

Energy

asset of the

defendant.
j.

The First Security Bank account No. 2021027327,

should be awarded to defendant at a marital value of $23,687.00.
k.

The First Security Bank account No. 2021022146

which is a pass through account of plaintiff should be awarded to
her at no marital value.
1.

The

Weber

State

Credit

Union

account

No.

799001318862 should be awarded to plaintiff at a marital value of
$25.00.
m.

The Court finds that the 1999 Audi Quattro

while in defendant's sole name, was given to the corporation and,
therefore, belongs to Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology and is not a
marital asset.
n.

The Court finds that the Porsche Cabriolet,

even though given to plaintiff as a birthday present, is a marital
asset. A lot of times people in marriages buy things that are also
needed for the family and just coincide those things with gifts for
birthdays and Christmas.

This is such a substantial asset that it

would be improper in the Court's view to just say that it is
plaintiff's.

This asset should be awarded to plaintiff at a

marital value of $43,225.00.
o.

The 1980 Porsche 911SC was defendant's prior to

the marriage and is a premarital asset and to which no marital
value is ascribed.
20
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p.

The 1989 Jeep Cherokee Ltd. was a premarital

asset of defendant's and to which no marital value is ascribed.
q.

The 1992 GMC van has a value of $14,691.00 and

should be awarded to plaintiff at that value.
r.

Defendant

should

be

awarded

the

Polaris

snowmobile at a value of $2,500.00 and the snowmobile trailer at a
value of $1,000.00.
s.

Plaintiff should be awarded the horse trailer

at a value of $4,000.00.
t.

With regard to furniture, furnishings, artwork

and jewelry, the parties following the trial of this case agreed to
binding arbitration with Brian R. Florence and each party submitted
to him their respective positions regarding these items.

Mr.

Florence has now made his ruling dated March 16, 1997, modified by
his letter of June 21, 1997, both of which are attached hereto as
Exhibit

"B"

and

Exhibit

"C"

and

incorporated herein by reference.

adopted

by

the

Court

and

These items of property are

awarded and are to be divided consistent with the decision of Brian
Florence. The effect of this decision is that plaintiff is awarded
items of property in these categories in the value of $11,803 more
than those awarded to defendant and this should be reflected as a
charge against her in the equalization of assets as hereinafter set
forth.
the

The Court further reserves any further dispute regarding

division

of

personal

property

or

enforcement

of

the

arbitrator's decision for agreement by the parties or further order
of the Court, consistent with prior rulings of the Court and
21
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consistent with the arbitration agreement entered into by the
parties.
u.
awarded

Page

With respect to the horses, plaintiff should be

and the foal

at a marital

value of $4,500.00.

Defendant should be awarded Dusty at a marital value of $lf000.00.
v.

Defendant should be awarded all of his life

insurance policies including Kemper Life Policy No. FK2037564 with
a $500,000.00 face amount and no cash value; the Liberty Life
Insurance Policy No. XL10331120 with a $500,000.00 face amount and
no cash value.
w.

Defendant should be awarded the Charles Schwab

IRA account No. 1686-6226 at a value of $181,454.00.
x.

The Charles Schwab retirement account No.

1686-6227 which is an IRA rollover account which had a value as of
March 31, 1996 of $314,895. This account should be awarded between
the parties in a fashion to allow plaintiff to be awarded one-half
Df the marital values in the retirement accounts.
The total amount of value of the retirement
accounts reflected in this subparagraph and subparagraph (w) and
subparagraph (y) immediately before and after this subparagraph
total

$552,407.

Of

this

amount

$235,678

was

premarital

contribution of defendant, leaving $316,729 of marital contribution
in these accounts.

An equal division of this amount would be

$158,365 to each party.

Plaintiff should receive her portion of

the marital values out of this account in the amount of $158,365
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and the remainder of the account in the amount of $156,530 should
be awarded to defendant.
y.

Defendant should be awarded his Rocky Mountain

Anesthesiology pension plan held in Fidelity account No. T098310364
with a value of $56,058.00.
z.

Each of the parties should be awarded one-half

of the 1994 state income tax refund when received.
aa.

The

1995

income

tax

refunds

when

received

should be divided with plaintiff to receive the state income tax
refund and with defendant

to receive

an amount

of the

federal

income tax refund equal to the amount received by plaintiff for the
state income tax refund.

The remainder of the federal income tax

refund should be divided equally between the parties.

Each of the

parties should be responsible for one-half of any costs in the
preparation of these returns.
bb.

Plaintiff

should

be

responsible

for

the

obligations owing to Cliff's Chevron and Dr. Thane Hales, DDS as
her responsibilities.
cc.
defendant

during

Plaintiff
this

executed

proceeding

and

a

promissory
that

note

note

to

should

be

extinguished under an arrangement that defendant should receive a
credit of $20,000.00 and plaintiff should be charged $20,000.00.
dd.

Defendant paid expenses of plaintiff for a Lake

Powell trip in the amount of $2,906.00 and defendant should receive
a credit of $2,906.00 and plaintiff should be charged $2,906.00.
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ee.

Defendant paid expenses of plaintiff at Smiths

in the amount of $3,240.00 and defendant should receive a credit of
$3,240.00 and plaintiff should be charged $3,240.00.
ff.

Defendant paid property taxes while plaintiff

was in the home in the amount of $2,408.00 and defendant should
receive a credit of $2,408.00 and plaintiff should be charged
$2,408.00.
gg.

Defendant should be awarded credit for his

premarital assets as provided in paragraph 36 (j) above in the
amount of $375,967.00.

Plaintiff should be awarded credit for her

premarital assets as reflected on her Exhibit 23(a) in the amount
of $5,000.00.
hh.

During

this

marriage

the

parties

had

the

benefit of income tax depreciation on their federal and state
income tax returns resulting in substantial tax savings which the
Court finds to be an obligation now owed back to BB Ranchers which
should be assumed by defendant and for which defendant should
receive credit for the four tax years 1995, 1994, 1993 and 1992.
Based upon defendant's Exhibit 45(c), these obligations are as
follows:
1995
1994
1993
1992

federal
federal
federal
federal

- $(18,894)
- ( 9,932)
- ( 7,714)
-0$(36,540)

1995 state - $(3,090)
1994 state - (1,522)
1993 state - (1,105)
1992 state -0$(5,717)

These amounts come to a combined total of $42,257.
Defendant's claim for a longer period should be denied because of
the statute of limitations.
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ii.

At the time of trial defendant had a negative

cash balance in his Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology account of $7,400
which the Court finds is a marital debt of defendant and for which
defendant should receive credit*
jj.

The Court finds that the plaintiff submitted

three insurance claims totaling $6,999 (Schedule P of Exhibit 45A)
to replace a lost purse containing personal items, a lost makeup
bag containing jewelry and unidentified
garage.
$3,000

items stolen from the

Additionally, she received insurance reimbursements of
for

lost golf

clubs.

Plaintiff

received

all of the

insurance reimbursements during the time the parties were separated
pending the divorce.
To the extent that the insurance proceeds were
used to replace plaintiff's lost personal assets, for example her
jewelry and golf clubs, the proceeds should be deemed non-marital
assets on the basis that each party would normally be awarded his
or her personal property (unless it was extraordinarily valuable
such as a coin or gun collection and represented an inordinate
amount of marital asset investment).

To the extent, however, that

the proceeds were reimbursement for lost marital property, (e.g.,
a stolen lawn edger from the garage), then these proceeds should be
deemed to be marital assets and should be divided between the
parties.
Likewise, the proceeds were marital assets if they
went for living expenses since defendant has already paid plaintiff
alimony and child support for her reasonable living expenses.
25
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However, the Court does not recall specific evidence (and believes
none was presented) as to the portion of the proceeds that were
spent on general living expenses.

The best evidence presented is

that "most" of the money was used to replace the items lost or
stolen leaving an inference that at least some of the insurance
proceeds may have been used for living expenses.

If there is

record evidence estimating the amount of the insurance proceeds
that went for general living expenses, then that amount should be
a marital asset.

In the absence of specific evidence, however,

plaintiff may keep the proceeds other than the amount of money that
was allocated

to replace marital

assets because

it would be

inappropriate for the Court to speculate about the amount of money
that may have been used for living expenses.

Either party may

bring back before the Court further motions regarding this item
once there has been an opportunity to review this ruling and gather
evidence relevant thereto.
kk.

Each of the parties should be awarded any

increase or decrease in the account balances awarded to them
resulting from interest earned or change in market conditions from
the date of the exhibits on which the figures used

in these

Findings are taken to the date of distribution between the parties.
On any account in which there is a proration between the parties,
the gains and losses, together with the cost of administering the
account

should

be

prorated

on

the

same

percentage

as

the

distribution between the parties.
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38.

The Court finds that there are accounts that have

been set up at First Security Bank for the childrens' college funds
as follows:
Angie #2028060247
Braxton #2028214635

$22,569.00 (stm. 6/95)
$18,869.00 (stm. 6/95)

Bryson #2028093544

$18,869.00 (stm. 6/95)

These accounts are not marital assets but are the
assets of the children and pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties should be distributed only upon the joint signatures of
both parties.
There

is

a

Liberty

Life

Insurance

Policy

No.

XF10331121 with a $500,000.00 face amount and which has a cash
value of $9,318.00 which is owned by an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of the minor children. This policy is not a marital asset.
The children are to remain the beneficiaries on this policy and no
substitute

beneficiary

is

to

be

named.

Based

upon

this

understanding, plaintiff should execute the necessary papers to
allow for the removal of her name as beneficiary.
39.

The award of assets, liabilities and adjustments as

set forth in the next three foregoing paragraphs is set forth in
the following accounting:
DEFENDANT

PLAINTIFF

Real Estate
House and real property at
2829 E. Osmond, Ogden
(Appraisal $534,000 less mortgage $346,362)

$187,638
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DEFENDANT

PLAINTIFF

Business Interest
Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Inc.—
Current Accounts Receivable $944,035
at 1/6, 60% collectible $93,349

93,349

Balance sheet assets, 1994 Tax Return—
$16,789 @l/6

2,798

RMA Bank account $30,000 §1/6 share
WNC Tax Credits XXI

8,3 06

Partnership Interests
Bohman Ranch, L.P. (Gifted)
BB Ranchers ($300,000 invested before marriage)
Powell Recreation L.C. (Houseboat)

21,500

Stock and Investment Accounts
Charles Schwab #1686-5838 Family Trust

87,267

87,267

79,740

101,220

(together with any earamgi from the time of the trial of this case)

Fidelity T071932704 Irrev. Family Trust
Fidelity USA X29-002453
(together with any earainga from the time of the thai of this case)

Crown Energy Corp, 69,505 sh. (premarital)
Bank Accounts
First Security Bank #2021027327

23,687

First Security #2021022146

-0-

Weber State Credit Union #799001318862

25

First Security Bank children's college funds:
Angi #2028060247
$22,569 (stmt6/95)
Braxton #2028214635 18,869 (stmt6/95)
Bryson #2028093544
18,869 (stmt6/95)
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DEFENDANT

PLAINTIFF

Vehicles/Personal Property
1990 Audi Quattro (corporate asset)
1990 Porsche 911 C4 Cabriolet (Birthday gift)

43,225

1980 Porsche 911SC (Brad's premarital)
1989 Jeep Cherokee Ltd. (Brad @Ranch)
1992 GMC Van (Becky)

14,691

Polaris 500 snowmobile

2,500

Snowmobile trailer

1,000

Horse trailer

4,000

Furniture and furnishings
(Divided pursuant: to ruling of Brian Florence)
Art
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence)
Jewelry exclusive of wedding ring
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence)
Value of personal assets received by plaintiff
exceeding that of defendant
Horses:
Dusty
Page and foal
Life Insurance

—

—

11,803
1,000
4,500

fall owned by Family Trust)

Kemper Life #FK2037564
Liberty Life #XL10331120

$500,000 term
$500,000 term

L i b e r t y L i f e #XF10331121 $500,000 (Cash value 3/4
$9,318 - c h i l d r e n ' s a s s e t
Retirement Plans
Charles Schwab #1686-6226 IRA C o n t r i b . 0/31/96)

$181,454
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DEFENDANT
Charles Schwab #1686-6227 IRA Rollover

156f530

PLAINTIFF
158,365

(3/31/96-5314,895)
(together with any euningi from the time of the trud of this cue)

Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Pension Plan
Fidelity #T098310364 a/23/96)

56f058

Miscellaneous
1994 State Income Tax Refund
3,597
1995 Income Tax Refunds
Federal

1/2

7,194
(3,597)
1/2

Insurance proceeds
Liabilities
Cliff's Chevron
R, Thane Hales, DDS
Debt to Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology account
Premarital

(7,400)

and other Credits

Premarital assets, Brad Bohman
— s e e exhibit 77A

(375,967)

Premarital assets, Becky Bohman
— s e e exhibit 23A

(5,000)

$20,000 Note between parties re debts

(20,000)

20,000

Lake Powell expense paid by Brad

(2,906)

2,906

Smiths bill paid by Brad

(3,240)

3,240

Property taxes paid by Brad

(2,408)

2,408

Liability to BB Ranchers for tax credits
TOTALS

(42,257)
$452,246

$452,247
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40.

Plaintiff incurred attorney's fees and costs in this

action in the amount of $42,615.00 which the Court finds are
reasonable

fees

and

were

appropriate

prosecution of this action.

and

The Court

necessary

for

the

finds there was some

duplication of having two lawyers and plaintiff's own counsel
acknowledges that there should be a $5,000.00 reduction from this
bill in the request for attorney's fees from defendant for this
duplication.

The Court finds that it is reasonable based upon the

respective financial circumstances of the parties and defendant's
greater income capacity.

The Court finds that there is some need

but not a great deal on the part of plaintiff because she is going
to get a substantial amount of cash in this marriage, some of
which, though, she is going to need to get into a home, a home that
ought to somewhat approximate what she has been used to as she is
entitled to that.
With the foregoing in mind, the Court finds that
there is some need.

On the other side, however, the Court finds

there is some limited ability to pay.

The Court further observes

that defendant has previously paid $7,500.00 of plaintiff's fees
and also that there was approximately $4,000.00 in the account
taken by plaintiff when the parties separated that could have been
used

for attorney's

fees.

Based

upon

all

of the

foregoing

circumstances the Court finds it is reasonable that defendant be
ordered to pay to plaintiff an additional $5,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees and costs.
41.

The

Court

finds

that

any

further

request

for

attorney's fees related to the Motion to Amend and/or Clarify the
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is denied.

Plaitiff has made request for supplemental attorney's

fees for other matters which is currently under advisement and not
included in this ruling.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Each of the parties is entitled to a Decree of

Divorce one from the other on the grounds of

irreconcilable

differences, which Decree shall become final upon signing and
entry.
2.

The custody of and visitation with the three minor

children of the parties shall be awarded as set forth in paragraphs
4 through 24 of the Findings of Fact.
3.

Plaintiff is awarded child support from defendant in

an amount and upon the terms set forth in paragraphs 25, 26 and 27
of the Findings of Fact.
4.

Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance for

the benefit of the minor children as set forth in paragraph 28 of
the Findings of Fact.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded alimony from defendant in an

amount and upon the terms set forth in paragraphs 29, 30, 31, 32,
33 and 35 of the Findings of Fact.
6.

Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance for

the benefit of the plaintiff as set forth in paragraph 34 of the
Findings of Fact.
7.

Defendant is awarded premarital property as set

forth in paragraph 36 of the Findings of Fact.
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8.

The marital property and liabilities of the parties

are awarded as set forth in paragraphs 37 and 39 of the Findings of
Fact.
9.

The college bank savings accounts of the children

are awarded to the children as set forth in paragraph 38 of the
Findings of Fact.
10.

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment from defendant for

attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $5,000.00.
11.

Each party is ordered to execute any documents and

perform any acts necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of
Divorce when entered.
DATED this

V

day of

KAAUXW*

, 1997.

COURTV

MICHAEE D. L Y O N 1
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

£,^/AfA
ELLEN MAJCOCK
Attorned for Defendant
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EXHIBIT "A

1563

UTAH CODE ANN $30-3-35

The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, beginning with kindergarten.
If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule shall be considered the minimum visitation to which
the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled:
a.
one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.;
b.
alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m.
on Sunday continuing each year;
c.
holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the
alternating weekend visitation schedule;
d.
if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the "child's
attendance at school for thanrchooi day;
e.
if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that
the child is free from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier
holiday period;
f.
in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(1)
child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion
of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(2)
Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(3)
Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(4)
Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(5)
July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(6)
Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and
(7)
the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and
Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided;
g.
in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(1)
child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent,
he may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(2)
New Year's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(3)
President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(4)
July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(5)
Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(6)
the. fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday
until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent
is completely entitled;
(7)
Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(8)
Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and
(9)
the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b). plus Christmas day
beginning at i p.m. until 9 p.ml, so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
h.
Father's Day shall be spend with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the
holiday;
i.
Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the
holiday;
j.
extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be:
(1)
up to four weeks consecutive at the* option of the noncustodial parent;
(2)
two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and
(3)
the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with these guidelines;
k.
the custodial parent shall#have an identical two week period of uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation
from school for purposes of vacation;
1.
if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of the vacation
time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
m.
notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child shall be provided at IMC» i n A~..~ -— -* •
other narftnt* anH

EXHIBIT "B

1565

REVIVED
MEDIATION SERVICES
Brian R. Florence
Home
479-3942

1943 E. 6200 So.
Ogden. Utah 84403

)&' A-iiii.scin :* : ".iuvar
Office
399-9291

March 16, 1997

Brad Bohman
2829 East Osmond Drive
Ogden, Utah 84403
Becky Bohman
6485 By bee Drive
Ogden, Utah 84403
Dear Brad & Becky:
I have mailed a copy of this decision to your lawyers. I have carefully reviewed the
additional materials that each of you have submitted. As a part of this decision I am
incorporating the earlier provisions of your agreement as stated in my letter to you dated
December 22, 1996. In order to provide the entire decision into one document, I am
restating below the provisions of that earlier letter.
According to the agreement you made on November 6, 1996, Becky is to receive
the following items listed on the Family Affairs appraisal: 18; 19 A, B, K, M and O; 20, 21,
29 (this is the refrigerator--! know that Brad changed his mind about this being a marital
asset at our second meeting, but I am going to leave it in Becky's column); 32 B; 33, 34, 35,
40 B; 47 (Brad agreed at our second meeting that this was premarital); 55; 61; 69 A, B and
C; 74 A; 79; 92; 107; 108 D; 128; 131 and 151.
Brad will receive the following items: 16 on the list of property in his possession; 12;
13; 15; 19 C, D, F and L; 30; 31; 32 A; 36; 37; 48 (Becky agreed in our second meeting this
was premarital); 59 A, B and C; 62; 68 (excluding the wheelbarrow and one ladder 70
(including the storage box); 74 B and C; 80 A, B and C; 108 A, B and C; 109; 132 and 133.
At our second meeting, Becky also agreed that some additional items were probably
premarital and was willing to have those awarded to Brad without allocation of value.
Those items include: 87; 93; 94 and 99.
You have agreed that despite the values listed on the Family Affairs appraisal, each
of you will be awarded the items listed above as if they were equal in value.
Of the items identified above as being awarded to Brad, he states that many of them
were missing. For instance: #30 he did not get many of the small appliances including the
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green blender from the bar, waffle maker, mixers, crockpot/wok, electric fryer and deep
fryer.
#31
#36
#37
#68
#70
#74
#80C
#108

Some knives are missing.
Missing bowls and cups;
He says these were supposed to be the new phone not the old ones.
Missing the hoe, extension cords, blowers, gas can, good hoses and shovels
No chemicals were left and the hand-skimmer is missing;
Missing the ball hopper;
Center cube missing, other parts damaged;
Brad says this set was to include the contemporary gun metal lamps;

At our last meeting, Becky acknowledged that she may have taken some of these
items inadvertently. To the extent that she has them they are to be returned.
Before addressing the dispute regarding the balance of the personal property, I want
to make a few observations. The controversy of the personal property has consumed more
energy and funds than is warranted given the value of the items. Both of you have the
resources to move on with your life without devoting this much attention to such petty
matters. In my view, Brad has been primarily responsible for addressing claims over minor
items. He wants items of personal property returned and then complains that parts are
missing or damaged. On the other hand, Becky has basically been in control of most of the
items of personal property throughout your controversy and has made unilateral decisions
as .to what she will take without making any effort to reach a reasonable division absent
considerable lawyer involvement and this mediation.
Neither of you are going to be happy with this decision. It is time to put the
controversy behind you. Get on with your lives. You will both be better off for it.
The balance of the personal property on the Family Affairs appraisal will be awarded
and valued as stated below. This decision is based on each of your comments at our last
meeting when we went through each item. I have also considered the written submissions
I have received from you following that meeting. I have attempted to balance the respective
equities and claims as fairly as possible.
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The personal property identified in the appraisal as» being in Brad possession is
awarded to him as follows:
VALUE

NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10-12
13
14
15
17
18
19
20
21r25
26.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Brad says these were a gift. In any event each have some and
Becky's have not been valued.

Each have one. Becky's has not been valued.
Becky's have not been valued.
Decided in Court.
Each should get one of the wet suits.
Children's items will not be valued here or elsewhere.
Decided in Court.

Decided in Court.

-0$
-0$
-0$
15.00
$
-0$
-0$
20.00
$
5.00
$
-0$
-0$
42.00
$
25.00
$
-0$
$ 400.00
18.00
$
-0$
10.00
$
-0$
-0$
$ 90.00
$ 25.00
$ 150.00
5.00
$
75.00
$
-0$
6.00
$
.50
$
-0$
9.00
$
3.00
$
9.00
$
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39
40

$
$

These items total

4.00
12.00

$ 963.50

The balances of the items that were in Becky's possession at the time of the
appraisal are awarded as follows:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

To be returned to Brad—premarital

This was purchased during separation. The contract
shows a purchase price of $23,955.00 with a trade in
value of $3,500.00, cash of $2,000.00 and a remaining
due on the contract of $14,000.00. Equity

10
11
14
1617
19E
19G
19H
191
19J
19N
19P
19G
22
23-25
26
27
To be returned to Brad —premarital
28

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-025.00
18.00
8.00
4.00
12.00
6.00
65.00

$9,000.00
$
-012.00
$
24.00
$
12.00
$
20.00
$
50.00
$
25.00
$
-0$
-0$
-0$
80.00
$
$ 336.00
60.00
$
-0$
-0$
-0$
-0$
25.00
$
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38
To be returned to Brad—premarital
$
39
$
40A Brad has this
$
40C&DOmitted from further discussion
$
40E
$
41
Brad has this
$
42
$
43
Brad has this
$
44
$
45
Each of you claim the other has these. No further award
$
46
Brad has these
$
49
$
50-51
$
52
Was included as part of the earlier agreement related to
items #68B
$
53
$
54
$
56
Brad has this
$
57
Brad has this
$
58
Brad has this
$
60
$
63
Brad has this
$
64
Brad has this
$
65
Brad has this
$
66-67 These are to be returned to Brad
$
71
Only item I am including as being purchased with $20,000.00
loan from Brad
$
72
At the home
$
73
Appraised with the home
$
75
There is a dispute as to whether a couch taken by Brad was
included as part of this appraisal and whether it was premarital.
Becky claims that this was purchased during separation and
financed with the loan. Whatever division concerning these sofas
and couches has taken taken place shall remain and a positive
value assigned to Becky.
$
76

You agreed to split these

$

-0-0295.00
-09.00
150.00
60.00
25.00
20.00
-015.00
30.00
-0-0-010.00
18.00
-042.00
24.00
50.00
75.00
175.00
60.00
-0-0-0-

400.00
-0-

I
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Each of you have some of these. The division shall remain as is.
77
To
be returned to Brad—premarital
78
80D
80E Rented
80F
Brad has this
81
Brad has this
82
83
84
85
86
88
89
90
91
Shall remain as presently divided
95
96
97
98
100 To be returned to Brad—premarital
101
102 Brad has this
103 Brad has this
104105
106
110
111
112 Rented
113 Each claim the other has some. Shall remain as divided.
114
115
116 Brad has this
117
118
119
120

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

s

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-0-055.00
-0-045.00
18.00
-010.00
40.00
30.00
50.00
70.00
50.00
35.00
-020.00
25.00
-0-030.00
250.00
150.00
-0456.00
10.00
400.00
-0-0-025.00
20.00
70.00
40.00
30.00
65.00
-0-
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121
122
123
124
125
126,
127
129
130
134-135

136
137
138

Each of you claim the other has. It shall remain wherever it's
located.

139
140
141
To be returned to Brad
142 Brad has this
143
Brad has this
144
145-147
148
Brad has this
149
Becky says this was left in the home. Brad says it wasn't.
It shall remain with whomever has it
150A Brad has these although Becky has the turn table which
is to be returned to Brad.
152-154
155
156
157
158
159
Each of you are to get one. Brad is to get the desk that goes
with the unit attached to the wall.
160
161
162
163

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-040.00
20.00
10.00
8.00
3.00
5.00
10.00
4.00
-025.00
10.00

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-030.00
160.00
250.00
30.00
75.00
-0-0-0-

$

-0-

S 100.00
-0$
60.00
$
-0$
75.00
$
-0$
$
$
$
$
$

-040.00
25.00
-020.00
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164-165
166
167
168-190
191
192, Decided by Court

$
-0$
4.00
$ 20.00
$
-0$ 200.00
$
-0-

The value of the items being awarded to Becky total $12,645.00. The value of the
items awarded to Brad on this list total $1,878.00 which added with the items from the other
list of $963.50 make the total value of the items going to Brad at $2,841.50. The net
difference is $9,803.50.
With respect to the $20,000.00 dispute, the Post-Nuptial Agreement is fairly clear.
Other than the trampoline which I have previously acknowledged, there will be no further
credit given to Becky for any items of personal property. The $20,000.00 shall be
considered a debt owing Brad from Becky and as per the terms of the Post-Nuptial
Agreement is to decrease the amount of any property settlement.
Each of you have made claims that the other has property which was not part of the
formal appraisal. Each of you have made claims that some of the items are premarital or
should not have been included in the appraisal for one reason or the other. Brad has made
claims concerning Becky's jewelry. Becky has made claims concerning items of personal
property Brad has purchased, but then placed at the ranch for use. There is absolutely no
way of ever being able to determine conclusively which of you is more factually correct.
Accordingly, all of the rest of the personal property of whatever nature shall be awarded to
the person presently in possession without further value being assigned.
As per the terms of the values assigned above, Becky owes Brad the difference of
$29,803.50. If there are other aspects of your property division that have not been resolved
then this amount can be included in that overall division. If not, then judgment should be
awarded to Brad in the amount indicated.
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There was some discussion concerning family photographs. If either of you has
photographs that the other may want, then they are to be copied and costs shall be shared.

:

lorence

BRF:jt
cc:
B. L. Dart, Esq.
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
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Brad Bohman
2829 East Osmond Drive
Ogden, Utah 84403
Becky Bohman
6485 Bybee Drive
Ogden, Utah 84403
Dear Brad & Becky:
Brad and Ellen have requested that I reconsider my decision of March 16, 1997.
Bert agreed they could make that request but made it clear he thought my decision should
stand and that it covered all of the issues. In response, I feel it necessary to more fully
explain my perspective so that both lawyers better understand what I have done.
It was initially agreed by each of you and your lawyers that I would act as a mediator
to help you reach a decision related to the division of your personal property. This had
been discussed with Judge Lyon who accepted the idea. That discussion appears on
pages 94 through 98 of your hearing transcript. During that discussion your lawyers
presented your respective views concerning the use of the $20,000.00 and property that
should be excluded as "gifts". Judge Lyon gave you some guidance on how he would
approach the gift dispute. It would be well for you to review his comments in that regard.
I attempted to follow his guidance in reaching my decision.
Our first meeting was November 6, 1996. You both seemed prepared to primarily
focus on the Family Affairs appraisal. During the general discussion at the start of our
meeting you each agreed there were substantial errors in the values assigned to some of
the items of personal property by that appraisal. You both claimed that the other person
was in possession of personal property that was not included in the Family Affairs appraisal.
You both claimed that the appraisal included property which should be excluded because
it was either premarital or a gift or, in Becky's instance, that it had been purchased with the
$20,000.00.
We agreed to deal with the items that were on the Family Affairs appraisal first and
then address your claims as to the items that were not listed. Each of you was given the
opportunity to exclude from discussion any item on that appraisal as not being part of the
marital estate. Through that process, we identified each item of personal property that you
both agreed was marital and subject to division.
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After reaching that agreement, you made considerable progress in dividing many
of those items. There was little regard to the actual value assigned in the formal appraisal
since both of you obviously had a better feel for the true value of many of those items. You
eventually reached a statement, partially because we were all tired and it was agreed that
we would meet again to take up the other matters. Our next meeting was set for December
9,, 1996.
During that first meeting I got the impression that both of you were likely to become
intractable concerning some of your positions and expressed that concern to your lawyers.
They agreed, with your consent, that I would thereafter act as an arbitrator to decide the
remaining issues. In hindsight, that may have been a mistake. At our second meeting you
each seemed to be more entrenched and less willing to make any concession, apparently
hoping that I would see things your way, nothwithstanding my waming that one or both of
you would likely be very unhappy with my decision if I were forced to make one as an
arbitrator. I continued to encourage you to try and reach an agreement so it would not be
necessary for me to make a binding decision.
Between the first and second meeting, two things happened which in my view set
the tone for future concerns and governed in large part how I came to view your respective
claims. First, Brad agreed at the initial meeting that the refrigerator (item 29 in the
appraisal) was marital and also agreed that it could go to Becky. Before the second
meeting he decided that was a mistake and that refrigerator was really premarital and
should go to him. This was the most obvious example to illustrate the point that you both
seemed to keep changing positions.
Second, by the next meeting Becky had moved, taking everything with her except
for those items that she agreed were to be awarded to Brad and some other items that she
obviously didn't care for and just left at the home. Becky even took those items which she
had intended to concede to Brad as his premarital property but was not a part of our formal
agreement in that first meeting. This unilateral action on her part didn't-help matters. More
importantly was Brad's claim that of the items that were left for him as per our agreement,
many were damaged or had parts missing. Becky denied this in large part.
From that, it became clear to me that if I were to make further attempts to divide the
property rather than make a cash adjustment, it would just lead to additional claims that the
property was being returned in a damaged condition or with missing parts. Notwithstanding
Brad's desire to have some of the other marital property actually divided, I believed it would
not work and would only lead to further controversy. This case needed closure.
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Our second meeting was December 9, 1996. We made absolutely no progress.
Each of you did admit however that the property issues could probably be settled with a
payment of cash from Becky to Brad but you had vastly differfent views as to how much that
should be. Despite repeated efforts on my part to have you approach this differently, you
each seemed intent on forcing a decision by me.
At that point I went through the Family Affairs appraisal, item by item, and made
notes regarding each of your claims concerning the origin and your respective desire with
respect to each item. I then listened to your claims concerning items of property that you
each contended the other had but which was not included in the Family Affairs appraisal.
I wrote down every item that Brad claimed was in Becky' possession and not
appraised. Becky denied she had some of these items. She claimed that Brad had much
of it in storage together with other property. Of the items she did acknowledge having, she
claimed that Brad also had a fair share such as saddles and accessories, water ski
equipment, golf equipment and other minor items of personalty.
I also wrote a similar list of the items that Becky claimed Brad had although
admittedly, her list wasn't as long.
There was a discussion concerning jewelry. Becky claimed that it was all gifts.
While Brad acknowledged that a few items may have been gifts, he claimed that the
balance had either been purchased as an investment or purchased by Becky without his
prior knowledge.
We concluded that second meeting by my again encouraging you to reach a
settlement without my having to make a binding decision.
I wrote you on December 22,1996, formalizing the agreements that had been made
in our first meeting and inviting you each to provide me any further documentation you
might have in support of your respective positions on the balance of the dispute.
To make certain that the scope of my role and authority was correctly understood,
we had a conference call on January 10, 1997 with the lawyers and Brad participating.
That was followed by a letterfromBert dated January 10,1997, a clarifying letter from Ellen
on January 13, 1997 and a correction letter from Bert on that same day. Those letters
defined my role and the issues I was to decide.
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Bert mailed me his written position on January 17, 1997 together with the exhibits
that had been used at trial which stated Becky's claims much more specifically than had
been provided me during our meetings.
I received a letter from Brad which is dated January 29, 1997 with some
supplementary materials but this was not received by me until February 27,1997 when it
was faxed from Ellen's office. I also received a letter from Brad dated February 13. 1997
together with a number of supporting documents. It was not clear to me whether Ellen or
Bert ever saw this letter or materials.
I then made a substantial effort to try and reconcile the materials that had been
supplied with your respective claims and tried to fit them in with the items or property that
were covered by the Family Affairs appraisal. The materials you furnished did nothing more
than clarify the hopelessness of your polarized positions. The exhibits used at trial were
helpful but your respective positions had changed some since then and were further
compromised by the agreements that were made in our first session which made it
impossible to reconcile those changes.
With that backdrop, I made the decision I did as contained in my letter to you dated
March 16, 1997.
Having reviewed everything once again, I am still satisfied that the overall decision
and the basis for it is fair and it shall stand with these exceptions.
It appears that during the course of the trial there may have been some items of
personal property that you each admitted was to be awarded to the other. These prior
understandings may not have been made adequately clear to me and my decision may
have resulted in one or both of you ending up with personal property that was originally
agreed to be awarded to the other. Having said that, I will not change my decision other
than to say that I would hope that if either of you are in possession of property that you
know was to go to the other, then I would hope that you would be honest enough to return
that without the formality of a specific decision.
The other area of concern involves the jewelry and the documentation that Brad has
produced demonstrating other assets purchased during the marriage that have not
appeared on Becky's list and Brad claims he does not have. Brad is also insistent that the
Court order requires the jewelry, other than Becky's wedding ring, to be divided. Other than
the Judge's comments which I have already alluded to, Ifindnothing in the Judge's decision
to support that position.
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Brad seems quite intent on having property returned to him rather than cash. For
the reasons stated above I will not do that. I am concerned about the documentation that
Brad has produced showing other purchases that have not b6en a part of the Family Affairs
appraisal and have not been specifically valued. Given your respective tack of trust as to
the other's honesty, I doubt that it would be possible to ever get truly complete facts to
make further modifications of my decision and I will not do so.
The jewelry is a little different matter. I have already stated your respective claims
concerning the purchase of the jewelry. Having reviewed the receipts Brad has produced
covering jewelry purchases during this marriage, it appears that the purchases exceeded
what might normally be consistent with Becky's claim that these were all gifts. Accordingly,
I am modifying my decision and awarding Brad an additional $2,000.00 cash.
As I have said before, this case needs closure. At least one of you will always be
dissatisfied with any decision that is made regarding these issues. It is not a matter of who
"gloats" or who feels that this decision will "perpetuate the gross inequity". The decision
must be made. It has been. You both have the ability and hopefully the maturity to get on
with your lives.
Cordially,

ferian R. Florence
cc:

B.L Dart, Esq.
Ellen Mavcock, ESQ.
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B. L. DART (818)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL

-i

.,.'! 0 57

DISTRICT

IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AUG

000OOO000
REBEKAH R. BOHMAN,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.
BRADFORD K. BOHMAN,
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 944901996

:

Judge Michael D. Lyon

000OOO000
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on
April 22, 23, 24 and 26, 1996, plaintiff appearing in person and by
her attorneys, B. L. Dart and Sharon A. Donovan and defendant
appearing in person and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock, and the
Court having heard testimony of several witnesses, exhibits having
been introduced and stipulations having been made and items in
dispute having been argued and submitted and the Court having taken
the matter under advisement and having made its ruling by telephone
conference on the 14th day of June, 1996.

?y

Thereafter, defendant

filed a Motion to Amend or Clarify the Court's ruling with respect
to visitation which was argued on July 30, 1996, and the Court
having ruled on that matter, and thereafter defendant having filed
Objections to plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions

i C Q l
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of Law and the Court having ruled on that matter and these rulings
having been incorporated into the Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce

one from the other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences,
which Decree shall become final upon entry.
2.

The parties are the parents of three minor children,

to wit: Angela (Angie), age 14, born October 30, 1981, plaintiff's
child from a former marriage adopted by defendant; the parties have
as natural issue of their marriage two children, Braxton, age 6,
born April
Plaintiff

17, 1990 and Bryson, age 5, born July

25, 1991.

is awarded the sole custody of Angela, Braxton and

Bryson, subject to liberal visitation with Braxton and Bryson on
behalf of defendant, as follows:
(a)

Week-End

Visitation.

Defendant

should have visitation with the children three
weekends each month, from Friday at 9:00 a.m.
to

Sunday

at

7:30

p.m.,

or

depending

on

Defendant's work schedule from Saturday at
9:00 a.m. to Monday at 7:30 p.m.

When Friday

is a school day, visitation should begin after
school and Defendant should pick the children
up from home at 4:00 p.m.
The Court specifically reserves the issue
as to the 5th weekend of the month visitation for
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further agreement of the parties or order of the Court,
(b)
should

Holiday

have

Visitation.

alternate

Defendant

holiday

visitation,

pursuant to Utah Code Ann,, §30-3-35, only.
No other holidays should be divided.
of

the

Standard

Visitation

A copy

Schedule

attached hereto, as Exhibit "A."

is

The parties

have agreed that the holiday visitation schedule
may be reversed so that defendant should have
the holiday visitation specified for "oddnumbered" years in the even-numbered years and
vice versa.
(c)

Mid-Week Visitation.

Defendant is

entitled to one mid-week visitation each month
from

the

time

the

children

get

school to 8:00 p.m. that evening.

home

from

This mid-

week visitation is to be either the week prior
to

or

the

week

following

the

weekend

when

defendant does not have weekend visitation and
is to be scheduled by defendant for a night
mutually acceptable to the parties or, if they
cannot agree, to be set by the defendant upon
providing

to plaintiff

three

or more

advance notice of the visitation.
midweek

visitation

is

affected

weeks

Insofar as
by

weekend

visitation, the court reserves that issue for

3

further agreement of the parties or order of
the court.
(d)
be

Surrogate Care.

required

provide

to

care

surrogate

for

care,

allow

The parties should

the

the

other

children,

when

that

party

to

lieu

of

in

party

cannot

personally care for the children for a period
of four hours or more.
(e)

Make-up

Visitation.

Defendant

anticipates that occasionally he may need to
work

during

should

know

his

weekend

his

schedule

month in advance.

visitation

and

approximately

he
one

On an occasional basis, if

Defendant is required to work and is unable to
exercise

his

visitation,

he

will

notify

Plaintiff, with as much notice as he possibly
can,

and

will

be

entitled

to

make-up

visitation during the week for the length of
time

that

problem,

he

the

missed.
Court

will

If

this

review

becomes
the

a

make-up

visitation issue.
(f)

Summer Visitation.

The Court orders

that the summer be divided equally, with each
party taking the children for two weeks at a
time, with the other parent having telephone
contact.
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3.

Defendant is awarded standard visitation with the

parties1 minor child, Angela. Because of the strained relationship
between Defendant and Angela, defendant will probably have to work
out that visitation, as he can.

Plaintiff is ordered to encourage

the relationship between Angela and defendant.
4.

Based upon the current financial circumstances of

the parties, defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff child support
in the amount of $1,000 per month for each of the three children
for a total of $3,000 per month.

That sum is to be payable one-

half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day of each month unless
the parties mutually agree otherwise.
commence with the month of July, 1996.
As

additional

support

This child

support shall

j
defendant

is

ordered

to

provide health insurance so long as the same is available to him
through his employment.

Each party is responsible for one-half of

the uninsured medical and dental expenses except routine office
Visits which shall remain the responsibility of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff shall not incur any non-emergency extraordinary medical
expenses which would

include medical, dental, orthodontia and

counseling expenses without giving the defendant notice and an
opportunity to be heard first.
Defendant is ordered to be responsible for one-half
of the work-related or education-related day care expenses and
plaintiff is ordered to submit to the defendant satisfactory proof
of those expenses.
So long as defendant is current on his obligation
5

IFifiS

for child support he should be entitled to declare the minor
children as his exemptions for income tax purposes and plaintiff
should execute the necessary affidavit to allow this exemption to
be declared by defendant.
5.

Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance for

the benefit of the children in an amount not less than what would
be sufficient at that time to see that support is maintained for

the children at the rate of $1,000 per month per child to their
majority.
6.

Based upon the current financial circumstances of

the parties, plaintiff is

awarded alimony from defendant in the

amount of $4,225 a month. Alimony shall commence with July, 1996,
and shall be paid one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th day
of each month unless the parties mutually agree otherwise.
Plaintiff's entitlement to alimony shall terminate
on the 30th day of June, 2001, or sooner upon the remarriage or
cohabitation of plaintiff or the death of either party or by
operation of law.

The amount of alimony awarded to plaintiff may

be reviewed before the expiration of five years if there is a
substantial material change of circumstances.
7.

Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance with

the plaintiff as beneficiary in a face amount that is equal to his
remaining obligation at any time to the plaintiff for alimony.
This obligation to carry life insurance shall not be an obligation
for alimony and shall not be deductible by defendant or taxable to
6
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plaintiff as alimony.
8.

Based upon the details set out in the Findings of

Fact, defendant is awarded credit for premarital assets in the
amount

of

$375,967.00

and

plaintiff

is

awarded

credit

for

premarital assets in the amount of $5,000.
9.

The currently existing property, liabilities and

adjustments are awarded as follows:

a.

The house

and

real

property

at

2829

East

Osmond, Ogden, Utah, is awarded to defendant at an equity of
$187,638.00.
This

home

is

currently

occupied

by

the

plaintiff under the Temporary Order and plaintiff shall continue to
have the right to occupy this home for a reasonable period of time
of between three to six months while she is seeking other housing
Plaintiff is ordered to take steps in good faith to locate a new
home at her earliest convenience.
So long as plaintiff occupies the home she
shall

be

responsible

for

the payment

of

property

taxes

and

insurance and these expenses shall be prorated as of the date of
change of occupancy from plaintiff to defendant.

She shall leave

the home in good condition, reasonable wear and tear accepted.
b.
Anesthesiology,

The defendant's business

in Rocky Mountain

Inc., has accounts receivable with a value of

$93,349.00 which shall be awarded to defendant.

Also the balance

sheet assets on the 1994 tax return reflect a value of $2,798.00
7
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shall be awarded to defendant.
c.

The WNC tax credit of $8,306 is awarded to

d.

As stated above, defendant is awarded free of

defendant.

any marital claim of plaintiff the Bohman Ranch and BB Ranchers
with no marital value ascribed as these assets are premarital.
e.

The interest in the houseboat $21,500 shall be

awarded to defendant.
f.

There was an account at Charles Schwab, No.

16865838, called The Family Trust Account which had a value as of
the time of the trial of $174,534.00, which account ordered to be
divided equally between the parties with each party to receive
$87,267.
g.

The Fidelity Irrevocable Family Trust account,

No. TO71932704, is not a marital asset as defendant has no control
over it and it is, therefore, not part of his estate.
h.

The Fidelity USA X29-002453 account which at

the time of the trial in this case had a value of $180,960.00, is
a marital asset and which can be used as an equalizer account to
equalize assets.

In order to equalize the assets of the parties,

the Court awards to plaintiff $101,220 of this account and to
defendant $79,740 of this account.
i.
Corporation),

at

Buena
69,505

Ventura
shares

Resources

is a premarital

(Crown
asset

Energy
of the

defendant.
j.

The First Security Bank account No. 2021027327,
8
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is awarded to defendant at a marital value of $23,687.00.
k.

The First Security Bank account No. 2021022146

which is a pass through account of plaintiff is awarded to her at
no marital value.
1.

The

Weber

State

Credit

Union

account

No,

799001318862 is awarded to plaintiff at a marital value of $25.00.
m.

The 1999 Audi Quattro belongs to Rocky Mountain

Anesthesiology and is not a marital asset.
n.

The Porsche Cabriolet, even though given to

plaintiff as a birthday present,

is a marital asset which is

awarded to plaintiff at a marital value of $43,225.00.
o.

The 1980 Porsche 911SC was defendant's prior to

the marriage and is a premarital asset and to which no marital
value is ascribed.
p.

The 1989 Jeep Cherokee Ltd. was a premarital

asset of defendant's and to which no marital value is ascribed.
q.

The 1992 GMC van has a value of $14,691.00 and

is awarded to plaintiff at that value.
r.

Defendant is awarded the Polaris snowmobile at

a value of $2,500.00 and the snowmobile trailer at a value of
$1,000.00.
s.

Plaintiff is awarded the horse trailer at a

value of $4,000.00.
t.

With regard to furniture, furnishings, artwork

and jewelry, the parties following the trial of this case agreed to
binding arbitration with Brian R. Florence and each party submitted
9

to him their respective positions regarding these items.

Mr.

Florence has now made his ruling dated March 16, 1997, modified by
his letter of June 21, 1997, both of which are attached hereto as
Exhibit

M

B"

and

"CM

Exhibit

and

incorporated herein by reference.

adopted

by

the

Court

and

These items of property are

awarded and are to be divided consistent with the decision of Brian
Florence. The effect of this decision is that plaintiff is awarded
items of property in these categories in the value of $11,803 more
than those awarded to defendant and this should be reflected as a
charge against her in the equalization of assets as hereinafter set
forth.
the

The Court further reserves any further dispute regarding

division

of

personal

property

or

enforcement

of

the

arbitrator's decision for agreement by the parties or further order
of the Court, consistent with prior rulings of the Court and
consistent with the arbitration agreement entered

into by the

parties.
u.
awarded

Page

With

and the

respect

to

the

horses,

foal at a marital

value

plaintiff

is

of $4,500.00.

Defendant is awarded Dusty at a marital value of $1,000.00.
v.
policies

including

$500,000.00

Defendant is awarded all of his life insurance
Kemper

face amount

Life

and

Policy

No.

FK2037564

with

no cash value; the Liberty

a

Life

Insurance Policy No. XL10331120 with a $500,000.00 face amount and
no cash value.
w.

Defendant is awarded the Charles Schwab IRA

account No. 1686-6226 at a marital value of $181,454.00.
10
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x.

The Charles Schwab retirement account No.

1686-6227 which is an IRA rollover account has a current value of
$314,895.

Of this account plaintiff shall be awarded $158,365 and

defendant shall be awarded the remaining $156,530.
y.

Defendant

is

awarded

his

Rocky

Mountain

Anesthesiology pension plan held in Fidelity account No. T098310364
with a marital value of $56,058.00.
z.

Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the

1994 state income tax refund when received.
aa.

The 1995 income tax refunds when received shall

be divided with plaintiff to receive the state income tax refund
and with defendant to receive an amount of the federal income tax
refund equal to the amount received by plaintiff for the state
income tax refund.

The remainder of the federal income tax refund

shall be divided equally between the parties.

Each of the parties

is ordered to be responsible for one-half of any costs in the
preparation of these returns.
bb.

Plaintiff is ordered to be responsible for the

Dbligations owing to Cliff's Chevron and Dr. Thane Hales, DDS as
bier responsibilities.
cc.
defendant

during

Plaintiff
this

executed

proceeding

and

a

promissory
that

note

note

to

shall

be

extinguished under an arrangement that defendant shall receive a
credit of $20,000.00 and plaintiff shall be charged $20,000.00.
dd.

Defendant paid expenses of plaintiff for a Lake

Powell trip in the amount of $2,906.00 and defendant shall receive
11
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a credit of $2,906.00 and plaintiff shall be charged $2,906.00.
ee.

Defendant paid expenses of plaintiff at Smiths

in the amount of $3,240.00 and defendant shall receive a credit of
$3,240.00 and plaintiff shall be charged $3,240.00.
ff.

Defendant paid property taxes while plaintiff

was in the home in the amount of $2,408.00 and defendant shall
receive a credit of $2,408.00 and plaintiff

shall be charged

$2,408.00.
gg.

Defendant is ordered to assume the obligation

to BB Ranchers in the amount of $42,257 which shall be a credit to
him in the division of the assets of the parties.

Defendant's

claim for a longer period is denied because of the statute of
limitations.
hh.

At the time of trial defendant had a negative

cash balance in his Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology account of $7,400
which is a marital debt of defendant and for which defendant should
receive credit.
ii.
claims.

Plaintiff

received

$9,999

from

insurance

To the extent these claims were for personal property of

plaintiff, they are awarded to her; to the extent they were for
marital assets

they

are to be deemed a marital asset.

Either party

shall have the right to bring back before the Court further motions
regarding this item once there has been an opportunity to review
this ruling and gather evidence relevant thereto.
jj.

Each

increase or decrease

of the parties

shall

be

awarded

any

in the account balances awarded to them
12
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resulting from interest earned or change in market conditions from
the date of the exhibits on which the figures used in the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and this Decree of Divorce are taken
to the date of distribution between the parties. On any account in
which there is a proration between the parties, the gains and
losses, together with the cost of administering the account are
ordered to be prorated on the same percentage as the distribution
between the parties.
kk.

The award of any account of any kind to either

party will include any interest earned from the time of trial until
delivery to said party.
10.

The

accounts

at

First

Security

Bank

for

the

childrens* college funds as follows:
Angie #2028060247

$22,569.00 (stm. 6/95)

Braxton #2028214635

$18,869.00 (stm. 6/95)

Bryson #2028093544

$18,869.00 (stm. 6/95)

These accounts are not marital assets but are the
assets of the children and shall be distributed only upon the joint
signatures of both parties.
There

is

a

Liberty

Life

Insurance

Policy

No.

XF10331121 with a $500,000.00 face amount and which has a cash
value of $9,318.00 which is owned by an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of the minor children. This policy is not a marital asset.
The children are ordered to remain the beneficiaries on this policy
and no substitute beneficiary is to be named.

Based upon this

understanding, plaintiff is ordered to execute the necessary papers
13
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to allow for the removal of her name as beneficiary.
11.

The award of assets, liabilities and adjustments as

set forth in the next three foregoing paragraphs is set forth in
the following accounting:
DEFENDANT

PLAINTIFF

Real Estate
House and real property at
2829 E. Osmond, Ogden
(Appraisal $534,000 less mortgage $346,362)

$187,638

Business Interest
Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Inc.—
Current Accounts Receivable $944,035
at 1/6, 60% collectible $93,349
Balance sheet assets, 1994 Tax Return—
$16,789 @l/6

93,349
2,798

RMA Bank account $30,000 @l/6 share
WNC Tax Credits XXI
Partnership Interests
8,306

Bohman Ranch, L.P. (Gifted)
BB Ranchers ($300,000 invested before marriage)
Powell Recreation L.C. (Houseboat)
Stock and Investment Accounts
21,500

Charles Schwab #1686-5838 Family Trust

87,267

87,267

79,740

101,220

(together with any earnings from the time of the thai of this case)

Fidelity T071932704 Irrev. Family Trust
Fidelity USA X29-002453
(together with any earnings from the time of the trial of thu caw)

Crown Energy C o r p ,

69,505 sh.

(premarital)

14
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DEFENDANT

PLAINTIFF

Bank Accounts
First Security Bank #2021027327

23,687

First Security #2021022146

-0-

Weber State Credit Union #799001318862

25

First Security Bank children^ college funds:
Angi #2028060247
$22,569 <stmt6/95)
Braxton #2028214635 18,869 (stmt6/95)
Bryson #2028093544
18,869 (stmt6/95)
Vehicles/Personal Property
1990 Audi Quattro (corporate asset)
1990 Porsche 911 C4 Cabriolet (Birthday gift)

43,225

1980 Porsche 91XSC (Brad's premarital)
1989 Jeep Chero&ee Ltd. (Brad ©Ranch)
1992 GMC Van (Becky)

14,691

Polaris 500 snowmobile

2,500

Snowmobile trailer

1,000

Horse trailer

4,000

Furniture and furnishings
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence)

—

—

—

—

Art
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence)
Jewelry exclusive of wedding ring
(Divided pursuant to ruling of Brian Florence)
Value of personal assets received by plaintiff
exceeding that of defendant
Horses:
Dusty
Page and foal

11,803
1,000
4,500

15
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DEFENDANT
Life Insurance

PLAINTIFF

fall owned by Family Trust)

Kemper Life #FK2037564

$500,000 term

Liberty Life #XL10331120

$500,000 term

Liberty Life #XF10331121 $500, 000 <c«hv«iuc3/4
$9,318 - children's asset
Retirement Plans
Charles Schwab #1686-6226 IRA Contrib. <3/3i/96>
Charles Schwab #1686-6227 IRA Rollover

$181,454
156,530

158,365

(3/31/96-$314,895)
(together with any earnings from the time of the trial of this case)

Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology Pension Plan
Fidelity #T098310364 (i/23/%)

56,058

Miscellaneous
1994 State Income Tax Refund
3,597
1995 Income Tax Refunds
Federal

1/2

7 ,194
(3 , 5 9 7 )

1/2
*>

Insurance proceeds
Liabilities
Cliff's Chevron
R. Thane Hales, DDS
Debt to Rocky Mountain Anesthesiology account
Premarital

(7,400)

and Other Credits

Premarital assets, Brad Bohman
— s e e exhibit 77A

(375,967)

Premarital assets, Becky Bohman
— s e e exhibit 23A

(5,000)
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DEFENDANT
$20,000 Note between parties re debts

PLAINTIFF

(20,000)

20,000

Lake Powell expense paid by Brad

(2,906)

2,906

Smith's bill paid by Brad

(3,240)

3,240

Property taxes paid by Brad

(2,408)

2,408

Liability to BB Ranchers for tax credits

(42,257)
$452,246

TOTALS
12.

$452,247

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant

for attorney' s fees and costs in this action in the amount of
$5,000.00.
13.

Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees related to

the Motion to Amend and/or Clarify is denied.
14.

Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees related to

further proceedings in this case is currently under advisement and
is not dealt with in this decision.
15.

Each party is ordered to execute any documents and

perform any acts necessary to effectuate the terms of this Decree
of Divorce when entered.
DATED this

C?

day of

1997,

BY THE COURTS

MICHAEL D. LYON, District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
/~ 1 n
^
^

^L

ELLEN MAYCOCK j
Attorney for^-Defendant
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MINIMUM SCHFnVLE FOR VISITATION
UTAH COPT ANN §30 3 i

1
2

The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, beginning with kindergarten
If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, th& following schedule shall be considered the minimum visitation to which
the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled
a.
one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.nv until 8:30 p.m.;
b.
alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m.
on Sunday continuing each year;
c.
holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall not be made to the regular rotation of the
alternating weekend visitation schedule,
d.
if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the'dhild's
attendance at school for thanrchool day;
e.
if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that
the child is free from school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier
holiday period;
f.
in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays
(1)
child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p m until 9 p m.; at the discretion
of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(2)
Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m on the holiday;
(3)
Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7 p m , unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completel) entitled,
(4)
Memorial Day beginning 6 p m on Friday until Monda> at 7 p m , unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completei) entitled,
(5)
July 24th beginning 6 p m. on the day before the holiday until 1 1 p m on the holiday,
(6)
Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p m the day before the holiday until 7 p m on the holiday; and
(7)
the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and
Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided;
g.
in years ending m an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(1)
child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p m. until 9 p m , at the discretion of the noncustodial parent,
he may take other siblings along for the birthday,
(2)
New Year's Day^begmning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p rr> on the holiday;
(3)
President's Day beginning at 6 p.m the day before the holiday until 7 p m on the holiday,
(4)
July 4th beginning at 6 p m the day before the holiday until 1 1 p m on the holiday,
(5)
Labor Day beginning at 6 p m on Friday until Mondav at "* p m unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period ot time to which the noncustodial parent is completel\ entitled,
(6)
the. fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U E A weekend beginning at 6 p m. on Wednesday
until Sunday at 7 p m unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent
is completely entitled,
(7)
Columbus Day beginning at 6 p m. the day before the holiday until 7 p m on the holiday,
(8)
Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p m ; and
(9)
the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day
beginning at i p.m. until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
h.
Father's Day shall be spend with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m on the
holiday,
t.
Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother e\ery year beginning at 9 a m until 7 p m on the
holiday,
j.
extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be:
(1)
up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent;
(2)
two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent, and
(3)
the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with these guidelines;
k.
the custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation
from school for purposes of vacation;
1.
if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of the vacation
time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits,
m.
notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child shall be provided at least 30 Have .« ~ ^ . —
other parent, and
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MEDIATION S E R V I C E S
Brian R. Florence
1943 E. 6200 So.
Ogden. Utah 84403

Hosne

479-3942
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»ar- .•M^iiison # i.-iisiuvar
Office
399-9291

March 16, 1997

Brad Bohman
2829 East Osmond Drive
Ogden, Utah 84403
Becky Bohman
6485 Bybee Drive
Ogden, Utah 84403
Dear Brad & Becky:
I have mailed a copy of this decision to your lawyers. I have carefully reviewed the
additional materials that each of you have submitted. As a part of this decision I am
incorporating the earlier provisions of your agreement as stated in my letter to you dated
December 22, 1996. In order to provide the entire decision into one document, I am
restating below the provisions of that earlier letter.
According to the agreement you made on November 6, 1996, Becky is to receive
the following items listed on the Family Affairs appraisal: 18; 19 A, B, K, M and O; 20, 21,
29 (this is the refrigerator--! know that Brad changed his mind about this being a marital
asset at our second meeting, but I am going to leave it in Becky's column); 32 B; 33, 34, 35,
40 B; 47 (Brad agreed at our second meeting that this was premarital); 55; 61; 69 A, B and
C; 74 A; 79; 92; 107; 108 D; 128; 131 and 151.
Brad will receive the following items: 16 on the list of property in his possession; 12;
13; 15; 19 C, D, F and L; 30; 31; 32 A; 36; 37; 48 (Becky agreed in our second meeting this
was premarital); 59 A, B and C; 62; 68 (excluding the wheelbarrow and one ladder; 70
(including the storage box); 74 B and C; 80 A, B and C; 108 A, B and C; 109; 132 and 133.
At our second meeting, Becky also agreed that some additional items were probably
premarital and was willing to have those awarded to Brad without allocation of value.
Those items include: 87; 93; 94 and 99.
You have agreed that despite the values listed on the Family Affairs appraisal, each
of you will be awarded the items listed above as if they were equal in value.
Of the items identified above as being awarded to Brad, he states that many of them
were missing. For instance: #30 he did not get many of the small appliances including the
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Brad Bohman
Becky Bohmam
March 16, 1997
Page2

green blender from the bar, waffle maker, mixers, crockpot,'\vok, electnc fryer and deep
fryer.
#31
#36
#37
#68
#70
#74
#80C
#108

Some knives are missing.
Missing bowls and cups;
He says these were supposed to be the new phone not the old ones
Missing the hoe, extension cords, blowers, gas can, good hoses and shovels
No chemicals were left and the hand-skimmer is missing;
Missing the ball hopper;
Center cube missing, other parts damaged;
Brad says this set was to include the contemporary gun metal lamps;

At our last meeting, Becky acknowledged that she may have taken some of these
items inadvertently. To the extent that she has them they are to be returned.
Before addressing the dispute regarding the balance of the personal property, I want
to make a few observations. The controversy of the personal property has consumed more
energy and funds than is warranted given the value of the items Both of you have the
resources to move on with your life without devoting this much attention to such petty
matters In my view, Brad has been pnmanly responsible for addressing claims over minor
items He wants items of personal property returned and then complains that parts are
missing or damaged. On the other hand, Becky has basically been in control of most of the
items of personal property throughout your controversy and has made unilateral decisions
as to what she will take without making any effort to reach a reasonable division absent
considerable lawyer involvement and this mediation
Neither of you are going to be happy with this decision. It is time to put the
controversy behind you. Get on with your lives You will both be better off for it.
The balance of the personal property on the Family Affairs appraisal will be awarded
and valued as stated below This decision is based on each of your comments at our last
meeting when we went through each item. I have also considered the wntten submissions
I have received from you following that meeting. I have attempted to balance the respective
equities and claims as fairly as possible

Brad Bohman
Becky Bohmam
March 16, 1997
Page3

The personal property identified in the appraisal as/being in Brad possession is
awarded to him as follows:

NO.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10-12
13
14
15
17
18

VALUE
Brad says these were a gift. In any event each have some and
Becky's have not been valued.
Each have one. Becky's has not been valued.
Becky's have not been valued.
Decided in Court.
Each should get one of the wet suits.

Children's items will not be valued here or elsewhere.
Decided in Court.

19
20
21-25 Decided in Court.
26.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-0-0-015.00
-0-020.00
5.00
-0-042.00
25.00
-0400.00
18.00
-010.00
-0-090.00
25.00
150.00
5.00
75.00
-06.00
.50
-09.00
3.00
9.00

Brad Bohman
Becky Bohmam
March 16, 1997
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39
40

$
$
These items total

4.00
12.00

$ 963.50

The balances of the items that were in Becky's possession at the time of the
appraisal are awarded as follows:
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

To be returned to Brad—premarital

This was purchased during separation. The contract
shows a purchase price of $23,955.00 with a trade in
value of $3,500.00, cash of $2,000.00 and a remaining
due on the contract of $14,000.00. Equity

10
II
14
1617
19E
19G
19H
191
19J
19N
19P
19G
22
23-25
26
27
To be returned to Brad —premarital
28

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-025.00
18.00
8.00
4.00
12.00
6.00
65.00

$9,000.00
$
-0$
12.00
$ 24.00
$
12.00
$ 20.00
$
50.00
$ 25.00
$
-0$
-0$
-0$ 80.00
$ 336.00
$ 60.00
$
-0$
-0$
-0$
-0$
25.00

1
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38
To be returned to Brad—premarital
39
40A Brad has this
40C&DOmitted from further discussion
40E
41
Brad has this
42
43
Brad has this
44
45
Each of you claim the other has these. No further award
46
Brad has these
49
50-51
52
Was included as part of the earlier agreement related to
items #68B
53
54
56
Brad has this
57
Brad has this
58
Brad has this
60
63
Brad has this
64
Brad has this
65
Brad has this
66-67 These are to be returned to Brad
71
Only item I am including as being purchased with $20,000.00
loan from Brad
At the home
72
Appraised with the home
73
75
There is a dispute as to whether a couch taken by Brad was
included as part of this appraisal and whether it was premarital.
Becky claims that this was purchased during separation and
financed with the loan. Whatever division concerning these sofas
and couches has taken taken place shall remain and a positive
value assigned to Becky.
76

You agreed to split these

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-0-0295.00
-09.00
150.00
60.00
25.00
20.00
-015.00
30.00
-0-

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-0-010.00
18.00
-042.00
24.00
50.00
75.00
175.00
60.00

$
$
$

-0-0-0-

$ 400.00
$

-0-
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77
78
80D
80E
80F
81
82
83
84
85
86
88
89
90
91
95
96
97
98
100
101
102
103
104"
105
106
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Each of you have some of these. The division shall remain as is.
To be returned to Brad—premarital
Rented
Brad has this
Brad has this

Shall remain as presently divided

To be returned to Brad—premarital
Brad has this
Brad has this

Rented
Each claim the other has some. Shall remain as divided.
Brad has this

-0$
-0$
55.00
$
-0$
-0$
45.00
$
18.00
$
-0$
10.00
$
40.00
$
30.00
$
50.00
$
70.00
$
50.00
$
35.00
$
-0$
20.00
$
25.00
$
-0$
-0$
30.00
$
$ 250.00
$ 150.00
-0$
$ 456.00
10.00
$
$ 400.00
-0$
-0$
-0$
25.00
$
20.00
$
70.00
$
40.00
$
30.00
$
65.00
$
-0$
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121
122
123
124
125

126
127
129
130
134-135
136

137
138

Each of you claim the other has. It shall remain wherever it's
located.

139
140
141
To be returned to Brad
142 Brad has this
143 Brad has this
144
145-147
148 Brad has this
149
Becky says this was left in the home. Brad says it wasn't.
It shall remain with whomever has it
150A Brad has these although Becky has the turn table which
is to be returned to Brad.
152-154
155
156
157
158
159 Each of you are to get one. Brad is to get the desk that goes
with the unit attached to the wall.
160
161
162
163

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-040.00
20.00
10.00
8.00
3.00
5.00
10.00
4.00
-025.00
10.00

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

-030.00
160.00
250.00
30.00
75.00
-0-0-0-

$

-0-

$
$
$
$
$
$

100.00
-060.00
-075.00
-0-

$
$
$
$
$

-040.00
25.00
-020.00
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164-165
166
167
168-190
191
192, Decided by Court

$
-0$
4.00
$ 20.00
$
-0$ 200.00
$
-0-

The value of the items being awarded to Becky tota^ $12,645.00. The value of the
items awarded to Brad on this list total $1,878.00 which added with the Items from the other
list of $963.50 make the total value of the items going to Brad at $2,841.50. The net
difference is $9,803.50.
With respect to the $20,000.00 dispute, the Post-Nuptial Agreement is fairly clear.
Other than the trampoline which I have previously acknowledged, there will be no further
credit given to Becky for any items of personal property. The $20,000.00 shall be
considered a debt owing Brad from Becky and as per the terms of the Post-Nuptial
Agreement is to decrease the amount of any property settlement.
Each of you have made claims that the other has property which was not part of the
formal appraisal. Each of you have made claims that some of the items are premarital or
should not have been included in the appraisal for one reason or the other. Brad has made
claims concerning Becky's jewelry. Becky has made claims concerning items of personal
property Brad has purchased, but then placed at the ranch for use. There is absolutely no
way of ever being able to determine conclusively which of you is more factually correct.
Accordingly, all of the rest of the personal property of whatever nature shall be awarded to
the person presently in possession without further value being assigned.
As per the terms of the values assigned above, Becky owes Brad the difference of
$29,803.50. If there are other aspects of your property division that have not been resolved
then this amount can be included in that overall division. If not, then judgment should be
awarded to Brad in the amount indicated.
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There was some discussion concerning family photographs. If either of you has
photographs that the other may want then they are to be copied and costs shall be shared.

:

lorence

BRF:jt
cc:
B. L. Dart, Esq.
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
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June 21, 1997

Brad Bohman
2829 East Osmond Drive
Ogden, Utah 84403
Becky Bohman
6485 Bybee Drive
Ogden, Utah 84403

Dear Brad 8i Becky:
Brad and Ellen have requested that I reconsider my decision of March 16, 1997.
Bert agreed they could make that request but made it clear he thought my decision should
stand and that it covered all of the issues. In response, I feel it necessary to more fully
explain my perspective so that both lawyers better understand what I have done.
It was initially agreed by each of you and your lawyers that I would act as a mediator
to help you reach a decision related to the division of your personal property. This had
been discussed with Judge Lyon who accepted the idea. That discussion appears on
pages 94 through 98 of your hearing transcript. During that discussion your lawyers
presented your respective views concerning the use of the $20,000.00 and property that
should be excluded as "gifts". Judge Lyon gave you some guidance on how he would
approach the gift dispute. It would be well for you to review his comments in that regard.
I attempted to follow his guidance in reaching my decision.
Our first meeting was November 6, 1996. You both seemed prepared to primarily
focus on the Family Affairs appraisal. During the general discussion at the start of our
meeting you each agreed there were substantial errors in the values assigned to some of
the items of personal property by that appraisal. You both claimed that the other person
was in possession of personal property that was not included in the Family Affairs appraisal.
You both claimed that the appraisal included property which should be excluded because
it was either premarital or a gift or, in Becky's instance, that it had been purchased with the
$20,000.00.
We agreed to deal with the items that were on the Family Affairs appraisal first and
then address your claims as to the items that were not listed. Each of you was given the
opportunity to exclude from discussion any item on that appraisal as not being part of the
marital estate. Through that process, we identified each item of personal property that you
both agreed was marital and subject to division.
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After reaching that agreement, you made considerable progress in dividing many
of those items. There was little regard to the actual value assigned in the formal appraisal
since both of you obviously had a better feel for the true value of many of those items. You
eventually reached a statement, partially because we were all tired and it was agreed that
we would meet again to take up the other matters. Our next meeting was set for December
9, ,1996.
During thatfirstmeeting I got the impression that both of you were likely to become
intractable concerning some of your positions and expressed that concern to your lawyers.
They agreed, with your consent, that I would thereafter act as an arbitrator to decide the
remaining issues. In hindsight, that may have been a mistake. At our second meeting you
each seemed to be more entrenched and less willing to make any concession, apparently
hoping that I would see things your way, nothwithstanding my waming that one or both of
you would likely be very unhappy with my decision if I were forced to make one as an
arbitrator. I continued to encourage you to try and reach an agreement so it would not be
necessary for me to make a binding decision.
Between the first and second meeting, two things happened which in my view set
the tone for future concerns and governed in large part how I came to view your respective
claims. First, Brad agreed at the initial meeting that the refrigerator (item 29 in the
appraisal) was marital and also agreed that it could go to Becky. Before the second
meeting he decided that was a mistake and that refrigerator was really premarital and
should go to him. This was the most obvious example to illustrate the point that you both
seemed to keep changing positions.
Second, by the next meeting Becky had moved, taking everything with her except
for those items that she agreed were to be awarded to Brad and some other items that she
obviously didn't care for and just left at the home. Becky even took those items which she
had intended to concede to Brad as his premarital property but was not a part of our formal
agreement in thatfirstmeeting. This unilateral action on her part didn't help matters. More
importantly was Brad's claim that of the items that were left for him as per our agreement,
many were damaged or had parts missing. Becky denied this in large part.
From that, it became clear to me that if I were to make further attempts to divide the
property rather than make a cash adjustment, it would just lead to additional claims that the
property was being returned in a damaged condition or with missing parts. Notwithstanding
Brad's desire to have some of the other marital property actually divided, I believed it would
not work and would only lead to further controversy. This case needed closure.
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Our second meeting was December 9, 1996. We made absolutely no progress.
Each of you did admit however that the property issues could probably be settled with a
payment of cashfromBecky to Brad but you had vastly different views as to how much that
should be. Despite repeated efforts on my part to have you approach this differently, you
each seemed intent on forcing a decision by me.
At that point I went through the Family Affairs appraisal, item by item, and made
notes regarding each of your claims concerning the origin and your respective desire with
respect to each item. I then listened to your claims concerning items of property that you
each contended the other had but which was not included in the Family Affairs appraisal.
I wrote down every item that Brad claimed was in Becky1 possession and not
appraised. Becky denied she had some of these items. She claimed that Brad had much
of it in storage together with other property. Of the items she did acknowledge having, she
claimed that Brad also had a fair share such as saddles and accessories, water ski
equipment, golf equipment and other minor items of personalty.
I also wrote a similar list of the items that Becky claimed Brad had although
admittedly, her list wasn't as long.
There was a discussion concerning jewelry. Becky claimed that it was all gifts.
While Brad acknowledged that a few items may have been gifts, he claimed that the
balance had either been purchased as an investment or purchased by Becky without his
prior knowledge.
We concluded that second meeting by my again encouraging you to reach a
settlement without my having to make a binding decision.
I wrote you on December 22,1996, formalizing the agreements that had been made
in our first meeting and inviting you each to provide me any further documentation you
might have in support of your respective positions on the balance of the dispute.
To make certain that the scope of my role and authority was correctly understood,
we had a conference call on January 10, 1997 with the lawyers and Brad participating.
That was followed by a letterfromBert dated January 10,1997, a clarifying letter from Ellen
on January 13, 1997 and a correction letter from Bert on that same day. Those letters
defined my role and the issues I was to decide.
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Bert mailed me his written position on January 17, 1997 together with the exhibits
that had been used at trial which stated Becky's claims much more specifically than had
been provided me during our meetings.
I received a letter from Brad which is dated January 29, 1997 with some
supplementary materials but this was not received by me until February 27, 1997 when it
was faxed from Ellen's office. I also received a letter from Brad dated February 13. 1997
together with a number of supporting documents. It was not clear to me whether Ellen or
Bert ever saw this letter or materials.
I then made a substantial effort to try and reconcile the materials that had been
supplied with your respective claims and tried to fit them in with the items or property that
were covered by the Family Affairs appraisal. The materials you furnished did nothing more
than clarify the hopelessness of your polarized positions. The exhibits used at trial were
helpful but your respective positions had changed some since then and were further
compromised by the agreements that were made in our first session which made it
impossible to reconcile those changes.
With that backdrop, I made the decision I did as contained in my letter to you dated
March 16, 1997.
Having reviewed everything once again, I am still satisfied that the overall decision
and the basis for it is fair and it shall stand with these exceptions.
It appears that during the course of the trial there may have been some items of
personal property that you each admitted was to be awarded to the other. These prior
understandings may not have been made adequately clear to me and my decision may
have resulted in one or both of you ending up with personal property that was originally
agreed to be awarded to the other. Having said that, I will not change my decision other
than to say that I would hope that if either of you are in possession of property that you
know was to go to the other, then I would hope that you would be honest enough to return
that without the formality of a specific decision.
The other area of concern involves the jewelry and the documentation that Brad has
produced demonstrating other assets purchased during the marriage that have not
appeared on Becky's list and Brad claims he does not have. Brad is also insistent that the
Court order requires the jewelry, other than Becky's wedding ring, to be divided. Other than
the Judge's comments which I have already alluded to, I find nothing in the Judge's decision
to support that position.
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Brad seems quite intent on having property returned to him rather than cash. For
the reasons stated above I will not do that. I am concerned about the documentation that
Brad has produced showing other purchases that have not been a part of the Family Affairs
appraisal and have not been specifically valued. Given your respective lack of trust as to
the other's honesty, I doubt that it would be possible to ever get truly complete facts to
make further modifications of my decision and I will not do so.
The jewelry is a little different matter. I have already stated your respective claims
concerning the purchase of the jewelry. Having reviewed the receipts Brad has produced
covering jewelry purchases during this marriage, it appears that the purchases exceeded
what might normally be consistent with Becky's claim that these were all gifts. Accordingly,
I am modifying my decision and awarding Brad an additional $2,000.00 cash.
As I have said before, this case needs closure. At least one of you will always be
dissatisfied with any decision that is made regarding these issues. It is not a matter of who
"gloats" or who feels that this decision will "perpetuate the gross inequity". The decision
must be made. It has been. You both have the ability and hopefully the maturity to get on
with your lives.
Cordially,

Brian R. Florence
cc:

B.L. Dart, Esq.
Ellen Maycock, Esq.

